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The contemporary media shape identity; indeed many argue that they now exist close to the 
very core of identity production. In a transnational world typified by the global circulation 
of images, sounds, goods, and peoples, media spectatorship impacts completely on national 
identity, communal belonging, and political affiliations. By facilitating a mediated engagement 
with distant peoples, the media ‘deterritorialize’ the process of imagining communities. And 
while the media can destroy community and fashion solitude by turning spectators into atomized 
consumers or self-entertaining monads, they can also fashion community and alternative 
affiliations.
Ella Shohat (2003:74)
The audio-visual mediascape in post-Soeharto Indonesia is very dynamic; it is marked by a 
great variety in film formats, genres, and styles, and entrenched by a host of discussions and 
activities. All sorts of films can be found in cinemas, at cultural centres and in galleries, in 
cinema clubs at universities, and in other public or private places. Indonesian independent 
film productions, documentaries, auteur films, popular, and gay and lesbian films are just 
few examples of what is on display. National television is also animated by a great variety 
of programmes such as soaps, infotainment programmes, game shows, and reality shows. At 
first glance, many Indonesian films and television programmes make use of styles, genres, 
and formulas that are similar to those that can be found all over the world. Even so, all films 
and programmes which are produced, distributed, screened, or watched in Indonesia are part 
of a specific complex of discourses and mediation practices. This setting suggests particular 
ways of reading and understanding film texts. Consequently, notwithstanding the effects of 
globalization and transnational media flows, similar genres, styles, programmes, and formulas 
engage in representations and interpretations which tap into Indonesian imaginations of 
community and nation.
In Virtual Geography, a book about the media coverage of the First Gulf War, McKenzie 
Wark wrote about a staged media appearance by Saddam Hussein. Filmed with Western 
people whom he had taken hostage, Hussein gently ruffles the hair of one of them, a little 
boy. Wark asserts that in doing so Saddam Hussein was making use of, and performing, a 
well-known and widely accepted Iraqi generic style: to give the impression of ‘the noble and 
respected elder’. In the West, however, that same image had a totally different affect as it 
tapped into other ‘confounded and most cherished beliefs about genres of television and the 
kinds of stories they legitimately tell us’. Viewers in the West, brought up on ‘Orientalist’ 
media literacy, responded with disgust on seeing a vile Arab who harassed a little boy (Wark 
1994:4). Wark comments on how people brought up in different cultural frames are geared 
to other ways of handling information, and have a repertoire of quite different stories with 
which to filter events. As he phrases it: ‘How could we claim to know what goes on at the 
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other interzones, in quite other spaces where different flows from different vectors meet 
quite other memories and experiences of everyday life?’ (ibid:19).  In other words, how do 
we make an image of and imagine the other, and how do they make an image of and imagine 
themselves? 
In any nation, the significance and possible interpretations of images and media texts 
are based on both discourses that circulate in society as well as mediation practices. In this 
book, I situate film as a social practice (Friedberg 1993; Stacey 1993; Staiger 1992; Turner 
1992; Wasko 1994; Willeman 1994) within the shifting political and cultural frames of the 
Indonesian nation. Exploring historically emergent forms of representation and imagination 
of communities in the Indonesian audio-visual mediascape, I address the impact of discourses 
and film mediation practices on the production of collective identities and social realities. My 
account ranges from discussions on the ‘idealized Indonesian self in television discourses’ 
(Kitley 2000:12) and film (Sen 1994) under the New Order, to a topsy-turvy heated debate 
about the representation of the Indonesian nation and the daily lived reality of the people in 
film and on television in 2007.
‘Discourse’ is a prominent concept in this book. Along the lines of Norman Fairclough’s 
media discourse analysis, I use the term in two ways. On the one hand, I use it in the sense 
which is prevalent in language studies: ‘discourse as social action and interaction, people 
interacting together in real social situations’ (Fairclough 1995:16). On the other hand, I use 
discourse in the sense which is prevalent in post-structuralist social theory, as propounded 
by Foucault: ‘a discourse as a social construction of reality, a form of knowledge’ (Ibid.). 
Discourses appertain broadly to knowledge and knowledge construction. In a combination of 
these two senses, a discourse is the language used in representing a given social practice from 
a particular point of view. For instance, the social practice of politics is signified differently in 
liberal, socialist, and Marxist political discourses (1995:18, 56). In addition, film mediation 
practices are defined here as the practices of film production, distribution, exhibition, and 
consumption.
There is no one-to-one meaning which clings onto media (McLuhan’s ‘the medium is the 
message’); rather, different, culturally imbued practices, mechanisms, and politics lie at the 
base of all meaning. This is not to say that politics and mechanisms of mediation practices 
are the key to how a text is read, for it is up to the audience ‘to decide whether to read the 
image in terms of ‘our’ frame of reference, or in the frame of what we know about the other’ 
(Wark 1994:5), and there are many other ways of reading from which to choose. Prevailing 
discourses and film mediation practices disclose competing forms of representation and the 
imagination of specific identities, as well as the construction of social realities. In my account 
of the construction of social realities, I draw on the Foucauldian idea that each society 
has its own regime or general politics of truth. This refers to the types of discourse that a 
particular society harbours and causes to function as true: which facts, narratives, myths, or 
representations are acknowledged to function as true in a society. 
Central discourses, such as those about the ethical values of a nation, resound in 
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discourses on film and permeate the discourse practices and narrative practices of film texts, 
television programmes, and soaps. Film discourse practices entail the merger of societies’ 
discourses with mediation practices. In discourse practices, discourses are put into practice 
in the production, distribution, and consumption of film texts; in other words, discourses 
materialize in film texts. An example of a discourse practice is the production of historical 
films and documentaries and their mode of distribution. In Chapter Three, I show that the 
production of these genres represents prevailing concepts of historiography and the nation-
state, and that their mode of distribution ties in with the endeavour to direct discourses on 
historiography. Film narrative practices are a component of discursive practices. They relate 
to the form and content of film texts. Narrative practices are about stories and the way in 
which these are told in audio-visual media within the context of power relations. 
Power relations involve both the actual power of the state in controlling the mass 
media through censorship and broadcasting and press policies, and through the possession 
and control of private national and transnational media industries and institutions (see 
Abu-Lughod 1993; Croteau and Hoynes 1997; Dasgupta 2007; Harbord 2002; Hong 1998; 
Lull 1991; Shohat and Stam 1994, 2003). These elements coalesce to shape the form and 
content of domestic audio-visual products. Powerful though they are, the state and public 
and private media industries and networks are not alone in shaping the form and content 
of film; audiences and pressure groups are also important in defining these. Audiences can 
decide if they want to watch a film or not, and even though rating polls have been criticized 
for their inaccuracy, they guide advertisers who in turn influence private media industries.1 
Furthermore, state censorship is not the only force which delineates the margins of the form 
and content of media productions. Pressure and protests from audiences, mass organizations, 
or communities of conviction can lead to self-censorship on the part of film-makers and the 
banning of films and television programmes. The form and content of audio-visual media in 
conjunction with the questions of power, authority, and access to resources impinge on what 
representations of the nation, communities, and social realities circulate in society.
Social truths or realities are not stable, but are constantly defined and re-defined in 
competing discourses. Fairclough argues that ‘[c]hanges in society and culture manifest 
themselves in all their tentativeness, incompleteness and contradictory nature in the 
heterogeneous and shifting discursive practices of the media’ (1995:52). Particularly after 
the resignation of President Soeharto, the Indonesian mediascape has been marked by a 
high variety in discourses in which different communities compete for representations of the 
Indonesian nation and its social realities. Contemporary imagined community in Indonesia 
is pluralistic, diffuse, and not easily tied to place. It is formed around a range of social and 
cultural concerns, not simply political ones (Kitley 2002:211). 
Benedict Anderson’s idea of imagined communities (1983) is one of the key concepts in 
my research. Anderson pointed out the way in which new media technologies have contributed 
to nation formation by enabling imaginations of the nation as a sovereign and territorially 
bounded community. Anderson argued that with the rise of print media, the wide circulation of 
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newspapers and novels written in national languages induced readers to imagine themselves 
as being part of a vast community, one not based on face-to-face encounters between its 
members. Whilst the imagination of communities can be connected to consumption of media 
technologies and discourses, there are some reservations with regard to Anderson’s notion 
of imagined communities. As Philip Kitley has said, the totalizing, unifying ideas which 
Anderson suggests, were an intrinsic part of post-colonial national communities, and are no 
longer appropriate to contemporary imagined communities (2002:211). These are far more 
pluralistic and diffuse, and often transcend boundaries of the nation. 
In the last decade scholars have questioned the capacity of the nation-state in the post-
colonial world to bind its citizens in the same way this was achieved in Western history 
(Meyer 2000; see also Bayart 1993; Chabal 1996; Mbembe 1992; Taussig 1997; Van der 
Veer 1994; Werbner 1996). In film and cultural studies, the crisis of the nation-state, which is 
central to current debates as well as to actual power struggles, led to a shift in focus towards 
transnational formations. Extensive circulation of transnational mass media and a growing 
access to these media through new technologies have led to an expansion in constructions 
of new shared worlds and in imaginations of distinct communities of sentiments, which are 
no longer confined by national borders (Appadurai 1996; Garnham 1993; Gillwald 1993; 
Shohat 2003; Sen 2003). In this context, the nation-state and national identity are no longer 
recognized as the privileged space and form for the imagination of communities.2
Nevertheless, notwithstanding a globalizing world, the state is still important in shaping 
political realities (see Baumann 1996; Duara 1998, 2008; Shami 1998). Moreover, the state 
can be important in defining the shape of cinema. As Wimal Dissanayake has argued, cinema 
in Asian countries was closely allied to the nation-state for the simple reasons of economics 
and exercise of content control. In Asian cinemas, assistance from and co-ordination by 
the government was imperative as film corporations, script boards, training institutes, and 
censorship panels in Asia were mostly supported or supervised by the state (Dissanayake 
1994:xiv). Krishna Sen stressed this point in relation to Indonesian cinema: ‘At a time when 
the border zones of the Indonesian nation are being violently tested by ethnic, religious and 
regional differences, when in fact it has contracted in relinquishing the world’s newest nation, 
East Timor, it may be foolhardy to speak at all of something called Indonesian cinema. But 
the institutional organization of films produced and consumed in Indonesia is such that it is 
impossible to discuss these except as ‘national cinema’ (Sen 2003:147).’
Now the tide has turned and in the past decade, at least in the case of Indonesia, it 
would be hard to speak of a ‘national cinema’. Particularly after the stepping down of 
President Soeharto, several changes have occurred in the constitution of power relations and 
the discourses that define Indonesian cinema. The resignation of Soeharto on 21 May 1998 
marked the commencement of the era of Reformation (Era Reformasi). The slogan reformasi, 
reform of Indonesian politics, economy, and legislation, reigned supreme. Before Soeharto 
decided on the wisdom of retirement, reformasi in politics had meant the demand for a new 
president, free general elections, the freedom to found political parties, and the annulment of 
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five political acts from 1985 which lay at the core of the deficiencies in the formal political 
system. Economically, it demanded an end to crony-capitalism, monopolies and cartels, and 
the dominant role of the big conglomerates. Reformasi also called for a strong legislative 
power, a bureaucracy and judicial power which were not at the beg and call of the ruling 
elite, and an end to corruption, collusion, and nepotism (korupsi, kolusi and nepotisme, KKN) 
(Van Dijk 2001:114-5). After the fall of Soeharto, the bid to introduce reform affected every 
possible field and led to a negotiating and redefining of all kinds of issues. 3
Besides being stirred by the euphoric atmosphere of Reform which induced a new found 
freedom of expression, opposed to the hegemonic narratives of the nation-state, an important 
part of the changes in Indonesian film mediation practices and discourses can be traced to 
the circulation of new audio-visual media. Many new activities and developments in post-
Soeharto audio-visual media were made possible by the growing and widespread availability 
of such new technologies for film production and exhibition as digital video cameras, computer 
editing programmes, and digital video projectors. Digital video, for instance, presented 
‘the ability to construct and transform meanings and practices’ (Ukadike 2003:128), which 
challenged the dominant cinematic practices and film culture. Both Indonesian film-maker 
Garin Nugroho and film-maker and academic Gotot Prakosa asserted that because of the new 
video technologies virtually everyone in Indonesia was given access to audio-visual media. 
In their opinion, the advance of new technologies has definitely shaped democratization 
processes in film production and creativity in Indonesian cinema (‘Eforia film’ 2001; Prakosa 
2005:10-1).
Both political change and the ‘democratization’ of Indonesian cinema in the wake of new 
film technologies have given rise to discourses which have opposed the concept of national 
cinema ‘[to privilege] ideas of coherence and unity and stable cultural meanings associated 
with the uniqueness of a given nation’ (Dissanayake 1994:xiii). Instead, post-Soeharto new 
and oppositional film mediation practices and discourses have supported the premise that 
in today’s transnational world, national identities are transformed or substituted by those 
which transcend the purely national and are based on social, political, or religious sentiments. 
However, at the same time post-Soeharto practices and discourses have underscored that 
contemporary processes of imagining communities are increasingly accentuating local 
identities. Commenting on cultural production and transnational imaginary, Rob Wilson and 
Wimal Dissanayake have called attention to the interplay between globalism and localism:
Postmodern cultural workers, on the verge of becoming ‘symbolic engineers’ and critical 
self-consciousness of global capital, stand at the cross-roads of an altered and more fractal 
terrain everywhere we guess at century’s end: a new world space of cultural production and 
national representation is simultaneously becoming more globalized (unified around dynamics 
of capitalogic moving across borders) and more localized (fragmented into contestory enclaves 
of difference, coalition and resistance) in everyday texture and composition.
Rob Wilson and Wimal Dissanayake (1996:1)4
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Elsewhere Dissanayake has proposed dealing with the dialectic of the local and global 
through an examination of the production of newer localities. That is, to focus on the 
production of the local and its constantly changing contours in response to the demands of 
the global. Dissanayake stated: ‘How the symbolic forms and modalities of association of 
Western capitalism are transformed, localized, and legitimized in most countries in relation to 
their historical narratives and changing lifeworlds is at the heart of the discourse of localism’ 
(2003:216-7). In discourses of localism, the simultaneous process of transnationalization and 
deterritorialization of consciousness does not primarily have to lead to new shared cultural 
imaginaries of transnational identities alone. Instead, it has an equal power to inform the 
founding of hybridized local ones. Furthermore, in the view of Arif Dirlik, the re-emergence 
of the local can be seen as a site of resistance and struggle for liberation:
It is the struggle for historical and political presence of groups suppressed or marginalized by 
modernization […] that has dynamized this postmodern consciousness and has produced the 
contemporary notion of the local, which must be distinguished from ‘traditional’ localism if 
only because such struggles are themselves informed by the modernity that they reject. This is 
the local that has been worked over by modernity. It finds expression presently in the so-called 
‘politics of difference’ that presupposes local differences (literally and metaphorically, with 
reference to social groups) both as a point of departure and as a goal of liberation.
Arif Dirlik (1996:35)
Although Wilson, Dissanayake, and Dirlik do not explicitly differentiate between the local 
and the national, Krishna Sen, with reference to Dirlik, has drawn attention to the difference 
between the two. She argued that a few years before the fall of Soeharto, local culture in 
Indonesia was mobilized in the cultural discourse to oppose the dominant rhetoric of national 
culture and nationhood propounded by the New Order state.  In Indonesia, notions of localism 
as a figurative site of resistance were often not defined in opposition to transnational culture 
or globalism, but rather in terms of the political constellations within the nation (2003:147, 
155-6). It is along these lines that I address Anderson’s concept of imagined communities. 
Treating film as part of a complex semiotic field which foregrounds formations of social 
identities and realities, I focus my account on three main themes. Firstly, I examine discourses 
on particular audio-visual media formats and genres that lend themselves to the imagination 
of identity and community formation. Secondly, I query the processes of empowerment 
which are entailed by the consumption of these media formats and genres. Thirdly, I explore 
the impact the circulation of particular genres and formats has on public debates.5 Questions 
that will be addressed in this context include: How is one to characterize the Indonesian film 
industry before, during, and after the fall of Soeharto? How has the spirit of Reformasi altered 
Indonesian film mediation practices, and what was the significance of new technologies that 
were available around the same time? What representations of history were screened during 
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the New Order, and to what extent did notions of ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ determine the critical 
discourses surrounding Indonesian media? What was the role of Islam in film mediation 
practices before, during, and after the Reform era? To what extent did secular and religious 
discourses clash in defining the moral bounds of mainstream film and television productions? 
In what way did such discourses shape social realities?
This book is divided into three parts, each of which consists of two chapters. The first chapters 
in the first two parts give an outline of New Order film discourses and practices. The chapters 
discussing the New Order era heavily rely on Krishna Sen’s research on Indonesian cinema 
(1994). In each case the chapters are followed by a second chapter, in which the developments, 
continuities and changes in these discourses and practices in post-Soeharto Indonesia are 
set out and discussed. In the third part, New Order and post-New Order developments are 
incorporated in both chapters. 
The first part contains an analysis of film mediation practices; the second is about 
film discourse practices, while the third studies film narrative practices. Investigating film 
mediation practices, I dissect concrete practices of film production, distribution, exhibition, 
and consumption and describe the normative discourses about these practices. These 
discourses disclose a series of representations of divergent imagined communities. When 
I turn to film discourse practices, I concentrate on the use of narrative tropes, rhetorical 
strategies, and modes of film distribution and exhibition during the New Order and Reform 
era, which are connected to historiography. The choice to focus on historiography is founded 
on the general view that history is the essential basis of the narrative of nation-states. History 
provides the foundation for a nation’s unity and the state’s legitimacy to rule (see Anderson 
1983, Hobsbawm 1983). Another reason for this focus on historiography is that film discourse 
practices under Soeharto rule that related to history were immersed in New Order politics 
and policies of national-myth-making and ideological production. In my exploration of 
film narrative practices, I study the composition of film narratives in the context of power 
relations. I examine to what extent the form and content of narratives depend on censorship, 
commerce, and ideological or political motives. The central point here is the impact these 
power relations have on debates and representations of realities and the moral bounds of the 
Indonesian nation and society.
In the first part I contrast New Order mainstream film mediation practices to post-
Soeharto alternative, underground mediation practices. In this part I show that in discourses 
and film policies, different film formats and festivals have represented the imagination of 
different audiences and communities. In Chapter One, I discuss policies where the 16 mm 
format represented national lower class audiences and 35 mm film transnational middle-class 
audiences. I also analyse New Order film festivals and give details of particular representations 
of audiences and the nation, conventions and motives for film showings, as well as discourses 
about participation in these festivals. In Chapter Two, I examine the changes and continuities 
in post-Soeharto film mediation practices. I discuss new mediation practices and the rise 
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of new film genres and festivals. I demonstrate that in the post-Soeharto era discourses 
mainstream 35 mm film is connected to New Order domination and transnational identities. 
Conversely, alternative independent film which uses the digital video format is seen as an 
oppositional cinema, representing local identities. I furthermore discuss the emergence of 
film festivals during Reform, examining how these are connected to supranational identities. 
I end the second chapter with an analysis of the circulation of pirated films as an oppositional 
media practice.
In the second part, I extrapolate on the conception and use of particular discourse 
practices with a focus on specific modes of engagement in relation to discourses about 
history, historiography, and events in society. Modes of engagement consist of dominant 
representations or ways to address certain topics, which are part of the central discourses of 
a society. Modes of engagement reach beyond particular modes and styles of film production 
(Nichols 1991:22-23) in that they encompass the ways in which particular topics in society 
are represented across all kinds of media. In film, modes of engagement materialize in the 
use of particular generic features, narrative styles and conventions. I moreover trace through 
what kinds of discourse practices particular film genres reached Indonesian audiences, and 
investigate the practice of ‘framing’ film texts.
Chapter Three is devoted to the way in which the New Order state seized upon particular 
film genres in order to promote its own model of national history and identity, legitimizing 
its mandate to rule the nation. I give an account of discourses on the production of history, 
development and propaganda films and the particular modes of engagement into which 
these films tap in relation to historiography. Moving a step further, I examine the practice of 
screening these films as part of a special framework: a New Order memorial day. In Chapter 
Four, I reveal in what way dominant modes of engagement and generic conventions in film 
changed or continued to exist after the stepping down of President Soeharto. I discuss the 
production of counter-histories and the emergence of alternative genres and new practices 
of framing during Reform. One of the focal points in this chapter is the rise of Islam in the 
post-Soeharto mediascape. I address the founding of the new genre of Islamic film, and the 
interconnected formation of the Islamic film community, which sees itself as an oppositional, 
post-colonial cinema, based on Islamic ideology. Once again I tackle the practice of framing, 
and the growth of images of Islam in mainstream post-Soeharto audio-visual media, as part 
of the commercialization of the Islamic fasting month Ramadan.
The last part of this book is about narrative practices. I examine the circulation of 
popular genres and the composition of stories within film genres, such as the use of particular 
generic formulas, in connection to power relations. This leads me to address the margins of 
possible narratives and the basis of socio-political power relations. I sift through debates 
on particular narrative practices, testing to see how far they can go morally before they are 
obstructed by the boundaries set by the state and religious pressure groups. In this context, I 
address the tussling of realities constructed on competing worldviews and truth claims, and 
the role of real and imagined Islamic authority figures in delineating film narrative practices. 
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Chapter Five considers the connection between film and television formats of horror, generic 
formulas, and imagined audiences and communities. On another level, the chapter seeks to 
explore how discourses about the formulas of horror films can be related to debates on what 
constitutes the modern Indonesian nation. In Chapter Six, I delve deeper into discourses 
on representations of modern Indonesian realities. I discuss recent debates about the moral 
bounds of narrative practices in the post-Soeharto Indonesian mediascape. I demonstrate in 
what way commerce and censorship, both from the state and the street, define the churning 
out of film texts. Then, I examine debates about which narrative practices are perceived to be 
fitting modes of representation of Indonesian society. These debates are related to divergent 
worldviews derived from religious and secular realities. They are part and parcel of a struggle 
about who and what shape and decide on national popular discourse and what realities are 







1 New Order and surface
Introduction
In the second week of May 1999, a little van toured around West Java hunting for a location 
to shoot the film Provokator (Provocateur). As it entered Cigosong, a village in the district 
of Majalengka, the vehicle was attacked by an angry mob. The van was attacked because the 
title of the film had been written in large letters on the van’s windows, and members of the 
rural community thought that the team consisted of ‘provokator’ – a label given to unknown 
forces which had been stirring up eruptions of violence in the country since the mid-1990s. 
To save themselves, the production team, led by the film’s producer Sonny P. Sasono and its 
director Mardali Syarief, quickly wiped the word provokator off the van’s windows. After 
this rather upsetting experience, Sonny decided to postpone the shooting of his movie until 
after the general elections of 1999, when, he hoped, emotions would be less volatile. He 
believed that after the elections the shooting of the film in Majalengka would present no 
difficulties. By a judicious payment his party had already secured the ‘protection’ of the local 
police force; it had arranged with local authorities that there would be no interference during 
the shooting of the film, and had obtained the support of one of the regents (bupati) of the 
district Cirebon to help provide facilities for shooting the film (ema 1999a). The decision to 
postpone the production of Provokator was the third hindrance the film encountered in its 
pre-production process; before production stopped completely four months later, it would be 
followed by even more.
In this chapter I explore different aspects of film mediation practices during the Soeharto 
era. In each section I take a particular example which illustrates the situations and conditions 
in which the different mediation practices took place. My first example is a discussion of the 
production process of Provokator. The pre-production of this film began a few months after 
President Soeharto had stepped down. Notwithstanding Reformasi, many rules, regulations, 
and conventions of New Order film production still appeared to prevail. The second section is 
an elaboration of some of the issues raised in the first section. I give an overview of New Order 
policies and normative discourses on mobile cinemas to provide some background details 
to film distribution and screening. In the third section, I give more details about particular 
imaginations and representations of audiences. I examine the practices, conventions, and 
motives for film exhibition, in conjunction with discourses about film consumption. The 
focal point are the film festivals which were acknowledged by the New Order.
Part One
14
1.1. Production: The attempt to produce Provokator the New Order way
About a year after the stepping down of President Soeharto the pre-production process of 
Provokator commenced. In April 1999, the new film production house PT. Mutiara Industri 
Perfilman Rakyat (Pearl People’s Film Industry) planned to produce two films. PT. Mutiara 
was owned by Sonny Sasono, who was also head of the new mobile cinema organization 
Himpunan Film Keliling Indonesia, (Association of Indonesian Mobile Cinema, Hifki) 
and the National Committee of Concern for the National Film Industry (Komite Peduli 
Perfilman Nasional, KP2N). The films were meant to revive the film industry, which had 
been losing ground from the beginning of the 1990s. One of the films, entitled Bonex, was 
going to be about hooligans on a train, while the other, Provokator, was based on the issue of 
‘provocateurs’ who had incited riots in various places in the past few years.
The story of Provokator is about a girl who has an illegitimate son by a man of Chinese 
descent. After the child is born he is handed over to a foster home, and when he grows up it 
appears that he is a very clever boy. Because of his intelligence he is sent to school abroad, 
but there he is taught to become a provocateur. No explanation of how this happened is 
given. When the boy returns to Indonesia he is constantly engaged in acts of provocation, 
and at some point in the film he will even rape his stepmother. It was estimated that the film 
would be finished in one month and then distributed to middle and lower class cinemas by the 
Indonesian Association of Movie Theatre Agents (Himpunan Pengusaha Bioskop Indonesia, 
HPBI) and Hifki (TON 1999). The production costs of the film were estimated to be around 
Rp. 13 billion (US$ 928,571) (pur 1999a). 
Sonny said his production house had deliberately set out to make a film about the inciters 
of chaos and riots in order to give the Indonesian public an insight to what was happening 
and aspects behind issues of provocation which were left unsaid. He believed that while 
it was public knowledge that all riots were deliberately staged, none of the reports in the 
written or electronic media made clear who the provocateurs actually were. The fictional film 
Provokator would provide a picture of the lives and backgrounds of real-life provocateurs, 
whose names would be concealed to avoid the protests of family members or NGOs. To 
ensure the film would be as real as possible, it was planned to insert stock shot material in the 
film of riots which occurred between 1997-1998 in Ambon, Sambas, Banyuwangi, Kupang 
and Ketapang, and the ‘Semanggi tragedy’ in Jakarta in which police and armed forces used 
excessive violence to combat students (ema 1999b). 
The first hurdle in the production of Provokator was to obtain permission from the 
Guidance Council of Film and Video (Pembinaan Film dan Rekaman Video) of the Department 
of Information to register for production. The registration request was almost turned down, on 
the grounds that the film contained elements of the SARA law (an abbreviation of incitement 
of Suku (ethnic groups), Agama (religion), Ras (race), and Antar-golongan (class) differences 
for the purpose of creating violence). New Order censorship prohibited the mass media to 
address any of these subjects. With such a controversial theme, there were real fears that the 
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production of the film would result in protests and new riots. After a fortnight, when there had 
still been no answer from the Department of Information, Sasono submitted an assurance that 
the film would not contain anything which could give rise to anxiety (ema 1999b). When the 
Department of Information finally did grant permission to register the film for production, a 
new complicating factor presented itself: the Department of Information sent the Film Censor 
Board a memo requesting them to pay special attention to Provokator after production.
After the aforementioned third impediment, which postponed the film’s production until 
after the 1999 elections, the next complication it encountered in the pre-production stage had 
to do with registration of the film crew, actors and actresses with official film organizations. 
The production team had decided to use a new approach: they would not draw on established 
actors and actresses to play in the film, but instead give new or aspiring stars recruited by 
the newly established Association of Film and Television Artists (Himpunan Artis Film 
dan Televisi, Hafti) an opportunity. At the film’s selamatan (ceremonial meal, which in the 
context of film is commonly held at the beginning and end of production in order to pray 
for a successful outcome), the director Mardali Syarief frankly admitted that the production 
team had neglected to acquire any ‘recommendation’ of the Indonesian Film Producers’ 
Union (Persatuan Perusahaan Film Indonesia, PPFI), the Union of Film and Television 
Employees (Ikatan Karyawan Film dan Televisi, KFT), or the Indonesian Film Artists’ Union 
(Persatuan Artis Film Indonesia, Parfi) (ema 1999c). In the past, film producers had been 
required to work with members of these organizations, which entailed arranging payments 
for assistance at several stages of film mediation practices. Mardali’s new approach appeared 
to have overstepped the mark. About two weeks later, aspiring actors and actresses who had 
signed on for the film complained that they were asked to pay a levy of Rp. 30,000 (US$ 
2.14) to the Himpunan Artis Film dan Sinetron Indonesia (Indonesian Film and ‘Electronic 
Cinema’ Association, Hafsi) for a membership card, and another Rp. 70,000 (US$ 5.00) for 
the costs of training. Sonny, the producer of the film, acknowledged that it was mandatory 
for all aspiring actors to join Hafsi and obtain a membership card. However, his production 
house did not know anything about other charges and Sonny guessed that the Rp. 70,000 was 
part of a deal with the agency which managed the artists (ema 1999d; pur 1999b). The initial 
plan to start the shooting of Provokator on 10 July 1999 was postponed so that the actors and 
actresses could be registered. Another reason to postpone the shooting was that there were 
still some problems with fixing the location (ema 1999d).
Around a month later shooting had still not commenced as there was now a fifth hurdle 
to be faced. This time the delay in starting the shooting was caused by the subject of the film. 
Because the story touched on several political conflicts which had occurred in Indonesia, it 
was decided that direct permission from the army was needed if the movie were to be shot. 
The letter of permission from the headquarters of the Indonesian national army (Tentara 
National Indonesia, henceforth TNI), for which the producer was still waiting on 30 August 
1999, also allowed the use of 1200 fake firearms, which were barely distinguishable from 
the real weapons used by the army and police force. The fake firearms were going to be 
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used in a scene in which the police defuses the demonstrations by students in several 
areas of Jakarta, depicting amongst other unrests the Trisakti and Semanggi affairs: bloody 
interventions by police and armed forces against demonstrating students in 1998, resulting 
in severe casualties and loss of life by students in both incidents. To make these scenes as 
realistic as possible, miniature replicas of the Trisakti University and Semanggi Bridge 
were built on the terrain of a sugar factory in Majalengka, West Java (‘Film Provokator.’ 
1999).
Another month later, on 25 September 1999, it was planned to start the production of 
Provokator in two weeks and screen the film on the private television channel TPI. By this 
time, it emerged that the theme of Provokator had somewhat changed and it would now be 
packed with social messages. Instead of showing the background of a perpetrator of riots, 
in broad lines Provokator was to portray how the violent behaviour of disaffected masses 
was destructive to the nation. It was hoped that the film would teach people not to be easily 
provoked to act destructively, and thereby harm the nation (ric 1999). Three weeks later it 
appeared there was a new obstacle for Provokator in its pre-production process: a lack of 
funding. Even though the United Nations Development Programme had provided Rp. 4.4 
billion (US$ 314,285) for the production of both of the films PT Mutiara Film wanted to 
produce, it turned out this was not enough. Whereas the film Bonex received extra financial 
support from the State Railway Company (Perusahaan Jawatan Kereta Api, PJKA), for 
which it had to change its initial story into one which celebrated the PJKA, Provokator was 
not able to obtain additional funding (ema 1999e). This latest problem in the pre-production 
process could not be overcome, and the attempt to produce Provokator stopped there.
Even though the endeavour to get the production of Provokator under way began about 
a year after the stepping down of President Soeharto, it transpired that virtually all New 
Order rules and practices in film production were still valid. The obstacles strewn in the path 
of the production team of Provokator at different stages in its pre-production offer an apt 
illustration of how film production under the New Order worked. The pre-production process 
of Provokator reveals several essential issues. Firstly, most of the hindrances the production 
team encountered relate to different aspects of official censorship, mainly pre-censorship, in 
film production. In her book on Indonesian cinema under the New Order, Krishna Sen noted 
that the role of the Film Censor Board (Badan Sensor Film, BSF) was only one part of the 
New Order censorship pertaining to domestic film (Sen 1994).  Even before a film reached 
the censor board, it had first passed several stages of pre-censorship. For example, it was a 
common procedure under the New Order to refer a scenario on to other departments with 
responsibility for the issues and subjects contained in the film. Sen specifies that this worked 
as a discreet kind of censorship which affected fewer people and caused little open friction 
between the government department and those involved in the industry (Sen 1994:66).
The requirement that the approval of the Directorate of Film and Video of the Department 
of Information be obtained before the shooting of Provokator could start and the examination 
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of the screenplay of the film by the head quarters of the TNI are examples of such pre-
censorship. Another example is the obligation for aspiring actors and actresses to join Hafsi 
or Hafti, if they want to have a role in the film. In 1976, six professional film organizations 
were officially endorsed as the only lawful organizations for particular functional sectors of 
cinema. Besides the Union of Film and Television Employees (Ikatan Karyawan Film dan 
Televisi, KFT) for all those employed in film production (technical, artistic, and unskilled 
staff of the film industry, excluding actors), these were: the Indonesian Film Artists’ Union 
(Persatuan Artis Film Indonesia, Parfi) for actors; the Indonesian Film Producers’ Union 
(Persatuan Perusahaan Film Indonesia, PPFI) for producers; the All Indonesian Association 
of Movie Theatre Companies (Gabungan Perusahaan Bioskop Seluruh Indonesia, GPBSI) 
for cinema owners; the Indonesian Association of Film Studios (Gabungan Studio Film 
Indonesia, Gasfi) for the half dozen studio owners; and for those working in subtitling, the 
Indonesian Association of Subtitlers (Gabungan Subtitling Indonesia, Gasi). Membership 
of the professional film organizations was compulsory for anyone who wished to work in 
the film industry, and no one could participate in film production without prior approval of 
the relevant functional organization (Sen 1994:56). Hafti, newly founded during Reformasi, 
instantly gained a reputation for applying the same procedures as Parfi during the New Order: 
aspiring actors and actresses were to make a payment in order to obtain a recommendation 
(pur 1999b).
Besides these formal bureaucratic hurdles, the outline of the pre-production of Provokator 
gives an indication of the widespread unauthorized practices in film production. I call these, 
in a literal translation of praktek miring (skewed practices), the ‘cursive practices’ of film 
mediation. The account of Provokator shows such straightforward cursive practices as the 
payment of unofficial contributions (pungutan liar or pungli) to parties which were either 
related to official institutions of film production or were part of unofficial yet institutionalized 
conventions. In the case of Provokator Sony hinted at the payment of pungli in his comment 
that he had secured safety from the local police in Majalengka. Another example of pungli is 
the ambiguous mandatory payment of a levy of RP. 70,000, beyond the accountability of the 
producer, for ‘training costs’ for actors and actresses participating. More examples of pungli 
and other stratagems in different New Order film mediation practices will follow in the next 
section of this chapter.
The outline of the production process of Provokator also gives an insight into the 
choices in film themes and into the common practice of revising scripts to satisfy censors or 
sponsors during a film’s pre-production process. In his position as a film producer who was 
simultaneously head of the new mobile cinema organization Hifki, Sonny wanted to make 
two commercial films which would be distributed to middle-class and lower-class cinemas.1 
Consequently, these films should cater to the tastes of middle-class and lower-class audiences. 
In order to attract a large number of viewers from this audience segment, both Provokator 
and Bonex were to represent real life issues of provokers and riots, and hooligans. Probably 
to avoid any risk-taking, the themes were transformed into stereotypical stories, similar to the 
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stories found in popular films or television soaps that were produced in Indonesia during the 
New Order. Such themes as the illicit affair, rape scene, and the planned depiction of violence 
in Provokator had also been a mainstay of hundreds of films produced in Indonesia since 
the 1970s.2 Another aspect of changes made in the film’s initial story was the revision of the 
script in response to the wishes of either the authorities (censorship) or sponsors (financial 
backing). After examination by the headquarters of the TNI, the story of Provokator was 
altered from an account of ‘who were responsible for issues of provocation preceding the 
resignation of Soeharto’ to a social edification for the people warning ‘how violent behavior 
of the angry masses damages the nation’. In the case of Bonex, the story was altered to please 
its sponsor, PJKA (ema 1999f).3
While in many aspects the story of the pre-production process of Provokator shows the 
working and legacy of the New Order system, conventions, and practices of film production, 
it also gives an inkling of insight into New Order mediation practices in relation to film 
distribution and exhibition. Both the establishment of the new mobile cinemas organization 
Hifki as well as Sonny’s intention to distribute his films to middle-class and lower-class 
cinemas can be seen as attempts to tackle profound problems in film distribution and exhibition, 
the structure of which had been implemented during the New Order. These problems are 
inextricably linked to New Order business deals and political manoeuvring, which shaped 
both the organization of film distribution and exhibition, and normative discourses about 
different film media and formats, which will be discussed in more detail below. 
1.2. Distribution and Exhibition: Trade and charade in cinemas and film formats
Mobile cinemas, called layar tancep (literally ‘screens stuck in the ground’), were open-air film 
screenings which usually operated in villages at the fringes of cities or in remote areas. People 
hired layar tancep to enliven all kinds of festivities, for example wedding parties or circumcision 
ceremonies. Because mobile cinemas were able to reach remote areas, they were also used to 
convey public service announcements or make known government political policies. 
After the resignation of President Soeharto on 21 May 1998, Indonesia was intensely caught 
up in the spirit of Reformasi. Reform was either negotiated or forcibly implemented in every 
possible field. In this setting the make-up, and at times even the existence, of some of the 
professional film organizations was called into question. Depending on their records of 
internal disputes, some organizations were reformed by replacing the former top with new 
leaders. In other cases, organizations were divided into different alliances, mostly consisting 
of those supporting the old system opposed to those wanting to reform it. Hifki, the mobile 
film organization headed by Sonny Sasono, was an example of such a new division which was 
founded during Reform, forged in a crucible of internal disputes and personal interests. Hifki 
was a secession from the Association of Indonesian Mobile Cinema Screening Companies 
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(Persatuan Pengusaha Pertunjukan Film Keliling Indonesia, Perfiki), to which Sasono had 
been appointed the Secretary-General in 1996. The original mobile cinema organization was 
founded in 1974 and before 1993, when it was granted official recognition as one of the New 
Order professional film organizations, it was mostly disregarded by the state. 
Despite many years of official disinterest, mobile cinema was an important part of the 
system of film distribution and exhibition in Indonesia, particularly given the share of film 
audiences which was reached by this medium. Krishna Sen mentioned a sample survey of 
thirteen provincial capitals in 1971, which showed that 11 per cent of those surveyed had 
seen films at mobile cinemas. It was estimated that by the late 1970s, mobile cinemas were 
regularly visiting at least 80 per cent of villages in Indonesia (Sen 1994:72). The mobile 
cinema organization Perfiki had branches and representatives in sixteen regions, mostly 
situated in Java. According to Perfiki data, in 1993 there were around 200 to 300 layar tancep 
companies with approximately 500 to 750 film units (car, screen, generator and projector). 
Many of the layar tancep companies had their own film copies, which were stored in 
depots. In 1993 the number of films owned by the companies was estimated to be around 
40,000. There were all sorts and genres of domestic, Indian, Mandarin, and Hollywood 
films to choose from (Marjono 1993; My 1993; Sari 1993). Nevertheless, with layar tancep 
audiences, domestic films, in particular those with comedy and action as their themes, were 
most popular. Because of the setting in which layar tancep was operated and the taste of its 
audiences, it was perceived to be a medium most likely to appeal to lower-class and village 
people (‘Menpen kukuhkan Perfiki.’1993; Rianto 1993; Sari 1993).
The nature of lower-class and rural entertainment may be one of the reasons why mobile 
cinema had been mostly disregarded by the New Order state. Before 1993, there had been 
no concrete government policy for mobile cinema, nor was it ever inserted in the National 
Film Development Programme. In its operations, layar tancep dealt mostly with regional 
authorities, for example, obtaining permission to screen films, and pay levies and viewer 
taxes. Inevitably, before Perfiki was acknowledged as an official organization some rules 
and regulations for mobile cinema screening were enforced. For example, at the first Perfiki 
congress, organized in 1983, decisions were made about some organizational matters. Most 
of these arrangements related to market segmentation. One of these was that the GPBSI 
and, at that time, the Union of Exploiters of Mobile Movie Theatres (Persatuan Pengusaha 
Bioskop Keliling, Perbiki) agreed on an action radius for mobile cinemas. These were only 
allowed to operate in an area which was situated at least 5 km or more from the location of 
a movie theatre. It was stressed that mobile cinemas could screen only domestic films, a rule 
which had already been in force since 1974 (‘PERFIKI.’1994; Sen 1994:72). With one stroke 
of the pen, the market segment of mobile cinema was clearly defined: it was to cater to people 
in rural areas and viewers of domestic films (‘Menpen kukuhkan Perfiki.’1993). 
In 1993, the same year in which the production of Indonesian films declined significantly, 
layar tancep was officially acknowledged by the state. It was said that the reason for 
authorizing Perfiki as its official organization was that the government was aware of its value 
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in facilitating the distribution of Indonesian films and purveying the Development messages 
of the government to remote areas. At the same time, the late recognition of layar tancep was 
closely linked to a new law on film issued in 1992. The State Policy Guidelines of the People’s 
Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) in particular played a role 
in the sudden burst of attention paid to mobile cinemas. This law enshrined the aspiration that 
the position of national film needed to be raised by means of establishing a ‘cultural fence’. 
The MPR formulation of the 1992 Bill no. 8 on Film stated that a solid cultural fence was 
needed to diminish the danger of contagion by the spread of information technologies caused 
by globalization. It was planned to establish this cultural fence by building around 500 small 
cinemas screening exclusively domestic films, and spread these out over different remote 
areas. The idea was to use layar tancep as a starting point to reach ‘blank spot areas’ which 
had no cinemas. Perfiki was to be the facilitator for a chain of semi-permanent movie theatres, 
which would later be transformed into permanent theatres. The motivation behind this policy 
was the perception that village people were not ready to be confronted with foreign culture. 
Through the erection of the cultural fence they were to be shielded from foreign values and 
conduct, which could be transmitted by, for example, Hollywood films. 
For pictures of mobile cinema see Disc One 1.2.
The idea to build 500 new cinemas in remote areas was launched at a time when hardly 
any domestic films were being produced, and 12.5 per cent of regional cinemas was forced 
to close their business (ibrs 1993). The most important cause of the downfall of the national 
film industry and the related closure of cinemas was the rise of private television stations 
which began in the late 1980s. Between 1988 and 1995, five new channels were permitted to 
broadcast alongside the state television channel TVRI.4 Because of the uncertain censorship 
regulations for film production and the related unstable income, many film producers turned 
their backs on the production of films for the silver screen, and began producing films and 
soaps for television. Now Indonesian films could be watched on TV, and people did not need 
to leave their homes and pay to watch a film. Some producers who still produced films for the 
silver screen tried to attract audiences by making films which were liberally dosed with erotic 
and violent scenes, which could not possibly feature on television. However, confronted 
by an overall lack of film stock, many of the regional, middle and in particular lower-class 
theatres, whose audiences favoured domestic films, were not able to survive. 
The already weak position of these cinemas was aggravated by the grip on film 
distribution and exhibition of the Subentra group, which possessed both the distribution 
rights of Hollywood films in Indonesia and a franchise of top-end movie theatres. Subentra 
was owned by President Soeharto’s foster brother, Sudwikatmono. Through some crafty 
political manoeuvering, the group turned into the sole distribution channel for all imported 
films throughout Indonesia by the end of the 1980s (Sen 1994:62). Although this monopoly 
was established by means of crony capitalism, it was admittedly made possible because 
of the large investments of the Subentra group in a new type of luxurious cinemas, called 
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‘Sineplex’ (Cineplex).5 Commencing in 1986, the Subentra group began to invest heavily in 
renovating older theatres into new style Cineplex cinemas called Cinema 21. By 1989 the 
franchise (generally known as the 21 Group) owned 10 per cent of the approximately 2500 
screens in Indonesia, and a much larger proportion of the top quality theatres in major cities 
(Sen 1994:62).
Because of the international standard of the Cinema 21 movie theatres and the market 
position of the Group, in 1991 Subentra secured the exclusive distribution rights for films 
imported from the United States in Indonesia. The Motion Picture Association, MPA, which 
represented all such major Hollywood studios as MGM, 20th Century Fox, Warner Brothers, 
Universal, United Artists and Disney, appointed three companies which were run under PT 
Subentra Nusantara as the sole distributors of major American film studios (Anwar 2002a; 
Sen 1994:64).6 Consequently, three different constituents of the film industry – import, 
distribution and exhibition – ended up in the hands of one business syndicate. As the 21 Group 
controlled both the imports and distribution of American films and places for exhibition, they 
prioritized American films over other film productions at the Cinema 21 theatres.7 
At a time when television definitely prevailed over domestic films in C-class cinemas, 
Hollywood ruled in A-class cinemas, and B-class cinemas were either turned into Cinema 21 
theatres or filed for bankruptcy, the government planned to build 500 new theatres in remote areas. 
Alongside the goal of establishing a cultural fence, the motivation behind this plan to transform 
the semi-permanent theatres of Perfiki into permanent cinemas, was prompted by another reason. 
It was a concrete step towards applying article 28 of Bill No. 8 1992, in which it was stated 
that the screening of films could only take place in a building or place appointed as such.8 The 
new rule was devised to increase control over the screening of films, in particular layar tancep 
which had acquired a reputation of causing upheaval during screenings. There were a number of 
reasons for such accusations. Layar tancep screenings were a magnet for all kinds of activities 
besides watching film, such as trade and small-scale gambling. Often around or after midnight 
some brawl erupted over gambling or the film being screened. Besides this, it was an open secret 
that at many mobile cinema screenings the rules for film screening as set out by the New Order 
government were simply ignored. For example, at layar tancep screenings often uncensored films 
or individually re-edited films, consisting of an amalgam of attractive scenes from different films 
were shown. Moreover, Hollywood and other imported films were on show, as were films which 
were still playing in regular cinemas.
The latter practice was called the ‘fast-track films’ (film pelarian).9 It was a rule of film 
distribution under the New Order that layar tancep was the last in line to screen films. Films 
were first distributed to A-class cinemas of Subentra 21 in major cities, and a few weeks later 
to its cinemas in smaller cities and regional areas. After the popularity of the films and the 
quality of the copies had faded, these were then distributed to non-affiliated B-class cinemas, 
and later to the lower class C cinemas. Officially, the films would eventually trickle down to 
mobile cinemas. This was the theory, but in practice screenings at layar tancep frequently 
showed the newest films. Cinema owners, particularly the Subentra Group, complained 
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about substantial losses because of fast-tracked films. The plan to change mobile cinemas 
into permanent ones was drawn up with such practices in mind. It was much easier for the 
government to monitor film screenings in permanent cinemas than to try to control mobile 
cinemas in the field and force these to abide by its rules for film screening. Especially so 
since officials who were supposed to monitor such illegal practices were simply paid by film-
operators to turn a blind eye.
By becoming an official organization, Perfiki hoped to acquire government protection 
against the demand for the payment of all sorts of unofficial contributions at layar tancep 
screenings. As an official film organization, it expected to be exempt from paying ‘cigarette’ 
money to, for example, members of the Department of Information, village heads, members 
of the police, and other official or unofficial parties who happened to turn up before, during, 
and after the event. It was a forlorn hope. As soon as Perfiki was given the status of an official 
film organization, it became part of a world of slogans and unpromising policies. Those layar 
tancep companies officially acknowledged were not only required to pay various official and 
semi-official levies to the bureaucracy, Perfiki members were also trapped in a maze of all 
sorts of new rules and regulations.
Besides the ambitious plan to transform mobile cinemas into a cultural fence of permanent 
movie theatres, a new policy was set up to regulate the distribution and screening of films by 
mobile cinemas. In 1983, the segmentation of the market for movie theatres and layar tancep 
was based on a division between cities and rural areas, and upper class and lower-class film 
audiences. In 1993 this division was expanded by linking the system of film distribution and 
exhibition to film formats. A new policy was launched in which mobile cinemas were no 
longer allowed to screen films of the 35 mm format. All layar tancep units were compelled 
to use the 16 mm film format, and units which used 35 mm equipment were given a period of 
three years to convert to 16 mm. Moreover, as part of the rhetoric of mobile cinema forming 
a cultural fence, it was once more stressed that members of Perfiki were permitted only to 
screen domestic films. Imported (read: Hollywood) films were linked up with movie theatres, 
which in practice meant primarily those affiliated to the 21 franchise.10 The aim of having all 
units operate the 16 mm film format was really to prevent mobile cinemas from screening 
Hollywood or other imported films, which were generally distributed in the 35 mm format. 
The restricted allocation of local, 16 mm films to mobile cinemas would particularly benefit 
the grip on distribution and exhibition of mainly imported films of Subentra 21. In part for 
this reason, government policies on film distribution and exhibition were alleged to favour 
the business interests of Soeharto cronies.
The policy of linking formats to either imported or domestic films also exposed state 
views about identity formation. Between 1993 and 1998, the issues of identity formation and 
politics of representation surfaced in discourses which linked specific formats to particular 
spaces of exhibition. In the burgeoning discourses, different film formats began to represent 
different film genres and/or places of exhibition. Principally, in normative discourses about 
the new regulations the formats were linked to certain genres and places of exhibition and 
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particular imaginations of local audiences and communities. Top-end cinemas were associated 
with modern, urban, upper class to middle-class audiences. Mobile cinemas were associated 
with traditional, rural, lower class audiences. The mission to form an Indonesian cinematic 
cultural fence within whose boundaries only cultural-educational films designed to preserve 
Indonesian culture would be promoted, threw into sharp relief the division between the two 
different imagined audiences. Traditional, rural, lower-class audiences were perceived as not 
being ‘ready’ to watch and identify themselves with imported films containing depictions of 
foreign culture. As the 35 mm films consisted mainly of imported film productions from the 
United States, the format policy reinforced the divide by connecting or imagining domestic 
films as belonging to mobile cinemas, and foreign film productions to proper cinemas. The 
division between 16 mm and 35 mm film prescribed that audiences of either the one or the 
other format had access to a different source of representation and identification. 
However, the 1993 New Order format policy and ideas about preserving Indonesian 
identities and culture were a far cry from reality, given the advance of new media technologies. 
The policies and discourses were outdated first and foremost by the installation of parabola 
antennas, and secondly by th e circulation of new video technologies. The situation was also 
undermined by the fact that along with New Order media policies on television, discourses 
about the preservation of Indonesian culture through the production and screening of domestic 
films were merely paying lip service to such ideals. Especially after the installation of parabola 
antennas, which began around 1983 and enabled people to receive overseas programmes, 
the discourse that lower class/village people should be protected against the pernicious 
influences of foreign culture could not be upheld. In many remote areas, in particular those 
which were faring well economically, parabola antennas were installed allowing people 
to receive uncensored foreign programmes including South-East Asian public broadcasts 
and such international operations as NBC, STAR, and CNN (Sen and Hill 2000:117). In 
1993, when Perfiki was employed by the Center of Information of TNI to screen domestic, 
mainly propaganda, films in remote regions and villages in the Province East Timor, the units 
climbing the mountain tops of the most remote areas discovered that even there people could 
receive and watch foreign television shows without difficulty (Rianto 1993). The 21 Group 
also entered into fierce competition with television after the setting up of parabola antennas 
and by 1996 was forced to close some of its cinemas (‘Kelompok 21.’1996).
Another important influence greatly affecting the cinema business and making New 
Order discourses redundant, was the rise of video cassettes and, later, laser discs. Since the 
beginning of the 1990s, video rentals and video shops started mushrooming everywhere in 
Indonesia. At these outlets a wide variety of films was on offer, including films which never 
reached domestic television or cinemas. Importantly, many banned and uncensored films 
were also available in these formats. Consequently, in the endeavour to control the unruly 
mobile cinema through sweeping policies and discourses on media, film formats, and places 
of exhibition, the new video format emerged as a new ‘uncontrollable’ medium, unsettling 
everything all over again.
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1.3.  Exhibition and consumption: Film festivals as forums for national imaginations 
and representations
In the first and second sections I highlighted mediation practices in film production and 
distribution. Here, I turn to practices, conventions, and motives for film exhibition under 
the New Order. The focus lies on the organization and the system of selection and awarding 
of films at New Order film festivals. I look only at film festivals that were acknowledged 
by the state. During the New Order there also were unofficial film festivals and screenings 
organized beyond state authorization. The screenings of films under the banner of sinema 
ngamen (street act cinema), for example, and other alternative sites for film exhibition, are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Two. 
The first formal film festival of the New Order, the Indonesian Film Festival (Festival Film 
Indonesia, FFI) was organized in 1973. With the Asia Pacific Film Festival (Festival Film 
Asia Pasifik, FFAP), this was the most important film festival of the New Order bolstering the 
concerns of the government. In fact, two years before FFI, the film section of the Association 
of Indonesian Journalists (Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia, PWI) had already started a 
small-scale festival handing out awards for the best actors and actresses. Between 1973 and 
1975 both the Citra (the Indonesian equivalent for the Oscar) of FFI, and PWI awards were 
handed out to winning contestants. But in 1975 the state requested PWI stop its event. The 
reason was that some of the awards for the same categories of FFI and PWI were given to 
different winners. Instead of allowing for different assessments at two different festivals, the 
government wished to limit the evaluation of these to an official (state) jury. Since then FFI 
always included a selection of journalists in its jury (Ardan 2004:27-8). After PWI stopped 
organizing its event in 1976, there was only one other officially acknowledged film festival 
during the New Order, which was, nevertheless, not allowed to call itself a festival. This 
festival, Forum Film Bandung, was held for the first time in 1988. It selected and handed 
out awards to both foreign and domestic films which were screened in cinemas in Bandung. 
Because the government did not permit the event to be called a festival in 1988 the founders 
changed the original name Festival Film Bandung to Forum Film Bandung.11
Until 1980, when the Department of Information took over, FFI was fully managed by 
the National Foundation of the Indonesian Film Festival (Yayasan Nasional Festival Film 
Indonesia, YFI). YFI was founded on 30 October 1972 by the Indonesian Film Producers’ 
Union, PPFI, the Indonesian Film Artists’ Union, Parfi, the Union of Film and Television 
Employees, KFT, and the Indonesian Association of Film Studios, Gasfi. Later, the All 
Indonesian Association of Movie Theatre Companies, GPBSI, also joined. In 1973, YFI 
was officially inaugurated by a decree of the Ministry of Information. The foundation was 
established in order to stimulate the growth of film, heighten the quality of Indonesian film 
productions, and strengthen the appreciation of Indonesian film both in Indonesia and abroad 
(Ardan 2004:79, 99).  FFI was organized on an annual basis. Each year new members of the 
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jury were selected by the festival’s organizing committee and appointed by the Minister of 
Information. Until 1986 the festival was organized in turn in one of the provincial capitals 
and the national capital in co-operation with local governments. As the organization was 
carried out in different cities across Indonesia, the organizational structure and scale of the 
FFI changed from year to year (Sen 1994:53). In addition, the management of the festival’s 
organizing committee also rotated. Every year an executive of one of the film organizations 
which constituted YFI was appointed to lead a new organizing committee. 
The organization of FFI was big showbiz. Particularly in the provincial capitals, the 
celebration of the FFI was a huge public event. Even though in every city the character of 
FFI was different, some standard elements were part of all festivals. One of these was that 
famous actors and actresses came over from Jakarta and drove around the cities in open 
jeeps, acknowledging the plaudits of thousands of people. Every year people also flocked 
out the evening before the ceremony to attend meet and greet sessions with some of the 
nominated artists (EDN/SF/DHF/XAR 2004; Sen 1994:52). However, regardless of the 
enormous appeal of FFI in the provinces, in 1988 it was decided to stop the rotation 
of the festival and confine it to Jakarta. In fact, even before this curtailment occurred 
FFI had featured in Jakarta more often than in other cities. Above all it was organized 
in the capital in the years in which the Indonesian elections took place. The decision 
to restrict the festival to the national capital in the future was partly prompted by the 
unpleasant reality that almost every year the organization of FFI in provincial capitals 
resulted in ‘issues’. Most of these contretemps consisted of disputes and quarrels within, 
or between, different local officials in executive boards, organizing committees, and 
members of the jury. The different backgrounds and ambitions of the parties concerned 
with the organization of FFI clashed, causing a myriad of frictions. Quite apart from 
circumventing such problems, another reason for organizing the festival in Jakarta 
only was to stop the competition in the extravagance of the event in which the different 
provinces vied to outdo each other. In the provinces, the festival was perceived mainly as 
a display case in which the organizational skills, development, and assets of the different 
provinces could be exhibited. Over the years, this resulted in a huge explosion in the 
funding spent on hosting FFI. Even though the event was organized only in Jakarta since 
the late 1980s, it still reached different parts of Indonesia through the state television 
channel TVRI. 
The system of awards at FFI developed over the years. As a different organizing 
committee and executive board organized the festival each year, nearly every year new 
rules were introduced. As Sen has suggested, the award system of FFI principally was 
part of a selective process which determined who participated in Indonesian film-making. 
She considers the festival award as representative of the values, ideas and interests of 
the urban intelligentsia under the New Order. In most cases films which were selected 
for nomination and won Citra were the same which had received positive reviews in 
elite national publications (Sen 1994:54-5). In her description of domestic films, Sen 
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addresses the general evaluations of films by these juries which reinforced certain New 
Order representations and imaginations of Indonesian society. Sen’s remarks about the 
assessment of films by different FFI juries reveal the juries’ support of three principal 
themes. In order of precedence, these were: the positive reception of films which 
juxtaposed ‘science’ against ‘rural beliefs’, in which science wins (Sen 1994:124); the 
remarkable success of films which focused on the mediating role of the middle class, 
standing between the high and mighty and the poor, particularly in favour with festival 
juries during the 1970s and much of the 1980s (Sen 1994:128); and, the juries’ support for 
narratives about countering corruption and the restoration of femininity (Sen 1994:148). 
In contrast to these themes, FFI juries largely rejected films which tackled unconventional 
social commentaries (Sen 1994:121,124,127-8,148).12
In a nutshell, the evaluations of the films nominated and given awards at the FFI show 
that these reinforced representations of New Order norms about development (the victory 
of modern science over traditional beliefs), the valued position of middle classes, and 
mainstream gender constructions. A Citra was not an indication of the popularity of a film 
with the audiences. On the contrary, most audiences preferred watching popular action films, 
slapstick comedies, cheap dramas, teen flicks, horror and other sorts of films which hardly 
ever entered the FFI competition. Nevertheless, as a symbol of prestige the Citra was an 
important goal for film professionals, in particular those who wanted to go international. 
Inevitably films which won a Citra were likely to be followed by other films constructed on 
similar formulas (Sen 1994:54). This practice of copying certain formulas only served to 
strengthen the role of the FFI in reinforcing New Order values and ideas about representations 
and imaginations of Indonesian culture and society.
Although initially FFI was run by YFI, over the years the organization of the festival 
was increasingly absorbed into the matrix of New Order political considerations. In 1981-
1982, official parties connected to the Department of Information were systematically 
involved in FFI events (Ardan 2004:79-81). The control of the Department of Information 
over the organization of the festival was gradually solidified under the auspices of Minister 
of Information Ali Murtopo (1978-1982). In 1978 at the FFI in Ujungpandang, Murtopo 
launched the first FFI motto coincident with New Order politics: ‘Cinema as a powerful 
means of communication for the sake of national development’.13 A year later, in 1979, at 
the FFI in Palembang, Sumatra, a new slogan was launched: ‘We decree that the character of 
Indonesian film should be cultural educational’.14 At the FFI in Surabaya in 1981, Murtopo 
voiced the new task of FFI as follows: ‘Socialize and unite Indonesian cinema in national 
Development’.15 Gradually the FFI was turned into an event that represented the state’s 
considerations. Under the next Minister of Information, Harmoko (1983-1998), FFI was 
even more deeply allied to New Order political concerns. At the opening of the festival 
in Yogyakarta in 1984, the new motto for the FFI ran: ‘Intensify the role of Indonesian 
cinema as a medium of communication and information in order to contribute to the success 
of the fourth Pelita (abbreviation of Pembangunan Lima Tahun; Five Year Development 
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Programmes of the state)‘.16 In the first year in which Harmoko was appointed Minister of 
Information the custom of transmitting the award ceremony of FFI as a live broadcast on 
TVRI was initiated to ‘enable the entire nation to participate in that important event’.17 Sen 
noted that some people perceived FFI as nothing more than publicity stunts for successive 
information ministers and provincial governors (Sen 1994:53). 
In 1988, at the same time that it was decided to organize the festival only in Jakarta, a 
new executive board for the organization of FFI was installed. With great ceremony this new 
board was appointed for a period of five years, until 1994, but as mentioned earlier, from the 
beginning of the 1990s the production of Indonesian films strongly declined. As the remaining 
small number of film productions consisted mostly of popular, erotic, horror, slapstick, or 
action films, there was a huge lack of films which were considered suitable to enter the FFI 
competition. Given the lack in ‘quality’ films in 1992, FFI was shelved temporarily. At first 
the organization wanted to postpone the festival for a year. This was extended by another year, 
and then again by another year. Later the FFI of 1991 proved to have been the last organized 
under New Order rule. Only in 2004, about six years after the fall of President Soeharto, was 
the festival organized again. Instead, in connection with the run of film-makers to television, 
in 1992 the first television-film festival, Festival Sinetron Indonesia, was organized. This 
festival replaced FFI as a New Order forum for domestic film productions. Motivations for 
the awards presented to films at FSI were not much different to the assessments valid during 
the last years of the FFI. Both festivals had the mission to ‘instruct the world of Indonesian 
film’ and ‘uplift the Indonesian people’ by handing out awards to those films which endorsed 
New Order rhetoric, politics, and ideals. The only key difference between awards at FFI and 
FSI was the consideration that the medium of television reached broader audiences.18
Another important film festival held during the New Order was the transnational film festival 
FFAP. This Asian area festival was organized for the first time in Tokyo from 8 to 20 May 
1954. At that juncture in time it was called the South-East Asian Film Festival. In 1957 
the word ‘South-East’ was removed, and in 1983 the word ‘Pacific’ was added. FFAP was 
organized by the Federation of Motion Picture Producers in Asia, FPA. This federation was 
founded in Manila on 17-19 November 1953. Its founding fathers were Manual de Leon 
(Philippines), Masaichi Nagata (Japan), Run Shaw (Hong Kong) and two Indonesian film-
makers, Usmar Ismail and Djamaluddin Malik (Ardan 2004:7; U-5 2001a). By 1994 FPA 
consisted of fourteen members; besides the Philippines, Japan, Hong Kong, and Indonesia, 
these were India, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Australia, Taiwan, 
New Zealand and Kuwait (‘Festival Film Asia Pasifik.’1994).
Twice Indonesia did not participate in the festival for political reasons. At the first 
South-East Asian Film Festival in Tokyo in 1954, Indonesia was not present because it could 
not produce a film for the event. At the time the Indonesian government had prohibited 
the Indonesian production company Perfini-Persari to complete a joint production with a 
Japanese company because of the frosty diplomatic relations between the two countries 
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(Ardan 2004:8). The second time Indonesia did not participate in the festival was in 1968. 
This time the reason was internal political affairs. As an after-effect of the alleged coup in 
1965 and the ensuing chaotic political situation, no film could be produced to be presented 
at FFA (U-5 2001a).
Indonesia’s request to organize the festival was turned down twice, in 1956 and 1960. 
It was not honored because of President Soekarno’s contemporaneous political stance, this 
being his support of communism. If the organization of FFAP were to take place in Indonesia, 
this would mean that both South Korea, (Indonesia supported North Korea) and Taiwan 
(Indonesia supported China and refused to acknowledge Taiwan) would either decline 
or be unable to participate in the festival. In both instances the festival was organized on 
more neutral soil in Hong Kong (1956) and Manila (1960) respectively (Ardan 2004:22). 
The first time Indonesia organized FFAP was from 15 to 19 June 1970.19 Until the fall of 
Soeharto Indonesia hosted FFAP five times in total. Besides in Jakarta, it was also organized 
in Yogyakarta and Denpasar.
Under the New Order FFAP was seen as a prestigious festival, and to a certain extent 
as a festival representing inter-Asian relations, connections, and diplomatic affairs. Indeed, 
particularly in the early years of the festival, both the choice which country was to organize the 
event, and the system of handing out awards was strongly linked to political considerations. 
Awards were regularly handed out to films of the host countries, and often every country 
had at least one award bestowed on it. Hence, in some Indonesian reviews about the festival 
FFAP was simply written off as a form of festival arisan: a regular social gathering in 
which its members contribute to and take turns at winning a collective sum of money.20 An 
arisan film festival was seen as a party organized for the sole purpose of establishing and 
maintaining harmony among its participating members. Another element in FFAP was the 
very glamorous and sumptuous organization of the event. The host countries always did their 
utmost to entertain guest officials, artists, and film-makers as lavishly as possible. At most 
FFAP, shows were organized in which traditional dances of the host country were performed. 
Excursions and all sorts of other tourist attractions were also provided to promote the host 
countries. Sometimes the film screenings and the award ceremony at FFAP seemed to be of 
lesser importance than the fringe events.21 
The prestige of having a film screened at FFAP and more importantly the winning of an 
award was highly valued by the Indonesian government. Apart from the relations, connections, 
and diplomatic affairs for which FFAP stood, it was also seen as a forum which spread ideal 
images of Indonesia to the outside world. Reaching audiences beyond the Indonesian nation, 
the films screened at FFAP were deemed to present images of what constituted Indonesian 
culture, people, and society. This resulted in the production of film festival (festival films), 
that is: films produced exclusively to compete in film festivals abroad. For example, and 
particularly because Indonesia was to host FFAP in 1995, the directors Garin Nugroho, and 
N. Riantiarno both received funding from the government to produce film festival to represent 
Indonesia. They made the films Bulan Tertusuk Ilalang (The Moon Pierced by a Blade of 
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Grass, internationally distributed with the title: ‘and the Moon Dances’, 1994), and Cemeng 
2005 (The Last Prima Donna) (Black 2005 (The Last Prima Donna), 1995) respectively, but 
neither of these films received an award.
As the FFAP formed a forum of representations and political relations between Asian 
nations and perhaps even more because it was labeled an arisan film festival, many film people 
in Indonesia shrugged it off as a second rate film festival compared to other international or 
regional film festivals. Others, in particular members of official film organizations and New 
Order departments related to film, rejected such assertions. They came up with different 
examples to prove that FFAP was not just an arisan festival, mentioning several instances 
in which Indonesia did not receive any awards. Apparently these examples were given to 
suggest that if FFAP was indeed a festival of diplomatic affairs, it would not be likely that 
Indonesia would have been passed over so often in receiving an award (IWN 1995, U-5 
2001b).22
In sum, both at the domestic and transnational festivals, films which participated were 
perceived as representations of their nations’ cultures, and, in particular at FFAP, seen as 
representations of the participating states themselves. For this reason, in 1995 the New Order 
government supported the production of special ‘festival films’, so as to present ‘proper’ 
representations of Indonesia at the FFAP in Jakarta. In contrast, popular Indonesian films 
featuring action, sex, comedy, or horror, neither participated in the FFI nor the FFAP. Only 
films that provided authorized representations of Indonesian culture were submitted in the 
FFAP, and awarded with Citra at the FFI. 
For pictures of festival jury and awards see Disc One 1.3
Conclusion
The examination of the different stages of film production, distribution, and exhibition in 
this chapter yielded an outline of different aspects of New Order mediation practices. All the 
practices involved specific discourses and policies, which had in common that they pertained 
to both New Order national and transnational politics of representation and imagination, and 
to strategies designed to produce economic benefit. Besides the three main lines of inquiry – 
pre-censorship and other hurdles in the production process of films, the political and economic 
motivation to identify specific audiences and formats with specific film media, and the politics 
of representation at film festivals – two additional themes have run through this chapter. These 
were firstly, the magnitude of praktek miring: the semi-official or illegal ‘cursive practices’ in 
film mediation, and secondly, the importance of glamour in official film policies and festivals.
The substantial influence of cursive practices in Indonesian film mediation practices 
emerged most clearly in my account of the pre-production of the film Provokator, and in the 
section about layar tancep. The production process of Provokator revealed how the makers 
of Provokator juggled with deep-seated cursive practices and the semi-official rules of New 
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Order film mediation practices. The team could not escape the purchase of the certified 
recommendations and the need to obtain official status for its actors and actresses, but it was 
also obliged to secure covenants with ‘third’ parties, who may otherwise at some stage have 
obstructed the film’s production. This entailed paying semi-official or unofficial (pungli) fees 
in order to get their ‘recommendations’ or ‘protection’. Moreover, to satisfy the semi-official 
conventions of pre-censorship control, after having consulted members of the police and 
military the producers were compelled to change the film’s storyline
The new politically and economically informed film distribution and exhibition policy of 
mobile cinemas too was principally created to try to control the widespread cursive practice 
of screening fast-track films and non-censored or self-engineered films at layar tancep 
screenings. It was believed that the format policy was the best instrument to control these 
illicit activities effectively. Another reason underlying the new policy was to respond to the 
emergence of parabola antennas and new video technologies which opened the doors to the 
circulation of video cassettes and laser discs. However, with the steady growth of free access 
to the new technologies and bogged down in the quagmire of conflicting state policies, the 
discourse about the need for the protection of Indonesian culture and the rural lower classes 
against effects of globalization proved to be nothing but a charade.
This example of window-dressing introduced the second additional theme in this chapter, 
exposing the importance of woolly rhetoric and the artificial facades in New Order film policy 
and formal mediation practices. The artifice consisted in part in the conflicting state policy of 
supporting on the one hand economic deals to import films and new media technologies, and on 
the other hand, of upholding the 1992 Film Law, one of the aims of which was to keep the masses 
safe from foreign influences and culture. Also at the film festivals which were acknowledged by 
the state, outward appearances reigned supreme. In 1988 the idea of organizing the Indonesian 
Film Festival in different provinces was discontinued because the event had deteriorated into a 
competition in extravagance in which the different provinces vied to outdo each other. The Asian 
Pacific Film Festival was also renowned for its very glamorous and sumptuous organization. 
From time to time the film screenings and the award ceremony at the festival seemed to be of 
lesser importance than the lavish feasts, excursions, and tourist attractions offered to promote 
the host countries. Perhaps the clearest articulation of the meaning of film festivals during the 
New Order was expressed in the notion festival arisan: a social get-together in which the focus 
was on harmonious relations, glamour, and fame, instead of film.
In all, the cursive practices and charade of official film policies were important ingredients 
in the complex of Indonesian film mediation practices. Charade, affectation, and glamour were 
the chosen vehicles for the ambitious propagation and representation of New Order values, 




2 Reformasi and underground
Introduction
After May 1998, the bid to introduce reform was felt in every possible field. The spirit of 
Reform instigated a negotiating and redefining of all kinds of issues, and the term reformasi 
was pretty well ubiquitous. All sorts of groups and organizations were inspired to use the word 
in their names. Nor did it stop there. The popularity of the slogan cast a wider net and spread 
to advertisements in which everything was transformed into a product of reform: ‘reformation 
apartments’ were on sale; special reformation religious journeys to Mecca (umroh reformasi) 
were promoted, and special offers for office space were advertised as a Reformation Package 
(van Dijk 2001:208-9). Indonesian cinema was not immune to Reform and various changes 
inevitably occurred at that time. These changes ranged from new activities in film production 
to the emergence and recognition of new film genres and formats and the founding of new 
venues for distribution and exhibition. They also included the identification and naming of 
new film communities, the rise of new public fora, identifications of new audiences, and new 
topics in film discourses. Quite apart from the euphoric atmosphere of Reform which induced 
a new found freedom of expression, an important part of the changes in Indonesian film 
mediation practices and discourses can be attributed to the circulation of new audio-visual 
media technologies. Many of the new activities and developments in post-Soeharto film were 
enabled by the growing and wide availability of such new technologies for film production 
and exhibition as digital video cameras, computer-editing programmes, and digital video 
projectors. As did many new technologies, digital video challenged dominant cinematic 
practices and film culture. 
In the first chapter I gave an account of mainstream New Order film mediation practices 
and discourses which disclosed the politics of representation and imagination of Indonesian 
communities. This chapter is its antithetical image and presents post-Soeharto alternative, 
underground, or as Gotot Prakosa has called them in English, ‘side-stream’ (Prakosa 2005:3) 
channels of film mediation practices and discourses. This is not to deny that these were 
present under the New Order. Alternative film productions and underground or side-stream 
modes of distribution and exhibition certainly did exist. In the 1980s, experimental short 
films shot with 8 mm video or 16 mm film cameras were produced under the banner of ‘street 
act cinema’ (sinema ngamen), and ‘guerilla film’ (film guerilla). Such films were taken from 
one district to another and screened on walls, or sometimes bed sheets, which explains one 
of the nicknames given the cinema movement: ‘drying [laundry] cinema’ (sinema jemuran) 
(Prakosa 1997:116-8).1 Because this group existed outside mainstream channels for film 
production, distribution, and exhibition, it barely ever rated a mention in Indonesian media.
After the resignation of Soeharto, side-stream cinema cultures and practices had the 
chance to gain visibility. The rise of new alternative film genres and channels of distribution 
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and exhibition transformed discourses on representations and imaginations of Indonesian 
communities. Many discourses, which were connected to comparable concerns in Third 
Cinema theories, evolved around themes of domination and resistance in post-Soeharto film 
mediation practices and society. Third Cinema theories address discourses on political and 
economic domination, and the global distribution of power of neo-colonialist First Worlds 
over Third Worlds. In this chapter, I refer to Third Cinema on two different levels. In the 
first two sections, I refer to Third Cinema because comparable concerns were part of the 
post-Soeharto mediascape. In the third section, I broaden the analysis of discourses and use 
of Third Cinema theories. Here I connect discourses on representations of dominance and 
resistance to other post-Soeharto alternative channels of film distribution and consumption: 
side-stream film festivals and pirated Video Compact Discs – VCDs. 
2.1. Reformation in film production: Kuldesak and film independen2
Between 1999 and 2001, in the midst of the euphoric atmosphere of Reformasi and the 
seemingly limitless freedom of expression, film-making became very popular in Indonesia. 
In this section I focus on the emergence of the post-Soeharto film genre and movement 
of film independen (independent film), taking due account of the debates on its definition 
and circulation. Indonesian film independen should not be confused with the Euro-American 
meaning of ‘independent’ film, which stands for a movement which opposes the mainstream, 
mainly Hollywood, studio system. 
The voice of an old man singing a song recalls the time of the struggle for Indonesian 
Independence, a song of pride, hope, and great expectations for the future. His singing is 
accompanied by the image of the Indonesian flag, the symbol of the nation’s pride and glory. 
Yet, the flag is not blowing bravely and proudly in the wind, but is flapping weakly around the 
flagpole, a symbol of the confusion and disappointment of so many in the unstable condition 
of Indonesia three years after President Soeharto resigned. This shot was the last scene of 
the short independent or ‘indie’ film Kepada yang Terhormat Titik 2 (To the esteemed:). 
The film was produced by Dimas Jayasrana and Bastian, students at the Jenderal Soedirman 
University in the rural town of Purwokerto, Central Java. It had its premiere there on 18 
January 2002. The film shows how the common people of Purwokerto perceived their 
municipality. It captured urban life, and deliberately added a gritty touch by showing an 
impression of the lives of street vendors, street children, and farmers. At the end of the film, 
an old peasant recounts that throughout his life those in power never spared a thought for the 
meagre livelihood of the farmers of Purwokerto. 
For KYT: (special cut) see Disc One 2.1.
The production and screening of this film were two aspects of new developments in 
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Indonesian cinema which emerged at the beginning of Reformasi. The widespread availability 
of such new audio-visual technologies as digital video cameras and projectors, liberally dosed 
with the spirit of Reform which permeated into the Indonesian film scene, were the midwives 
who ushered in the genesis of a new film movement. This new movement incorporated an 
array of new activities in film mediation practices and discourses on the subject. One element 
was the introduction of the label of independence, which gave birth to the new genre of 
independent film. This genre became a model and banner for many young people in Indonesia 
to set out to make their own films. The scope of film independen transcended the production 
of independent films; it fostered the formation of a new community of mafin (an abbreviation 
of mahluk film independen, independent film creatures). These mafin established their own 
channels of film distribution and exhibition through independent film festivals. Looking 
beyond the temporal limitations of a festival, they created their own forums to exchange 
thoughts on the subject of film on the Internet and by arranging periodical meetings. 
The incentive to undertake activities in the field of film independen really commenced 
with the production of the film Kuldesak (‘Cul-de-sac’: Dead-end street), an anthology of four 
short features about such problems of the middle class youth of the city of Jakarta as drugs, 
homosexuality, and the feeling of absolute desolation. Kuldesak was made by four young film-
makers who decided to produce it underground in 1996, breaking all the rules of film production 
of the New Order. The directors Mira Lesmana, Riri Riza, Rizal Mantovani, and Nan Achnas 
had a background in producing films, and series, documentary-soaps, or music video-clips for 
television. Inspired by the cheap independent film production El-Mariachi (1992) by Robert 
Rodriguez and his book on the film’s production process, Rebel without a Crew (1996), they 
decided to take the plunge and jointly produce a film for the silver screen.
Between 1996 and 1998, the four produced Kuldesak behind closed doors. To save energy, 
time, and money, they abandoned the beaten track of New Order film production. To start 
with, they did not register the production plan of Kuldesak at the Film Board. Then, as the 
film’s directors, they neither obtained the mandatory membership of the Union of Film and 
Television Employees, nor did they follow the conventional New Order system in which it was 
only possible to become a film director after having been an assistant film director five times. As 
Kuldesak’s producers, the four did not purchase association to the Indonesian Film Producers’ 
Union. Finally, they did not have their amateur actors and actresses register as members of the 
Indonesian Film Artists’ Union. Eschewing all the formal channels, the directors and production 
team paid for the production costs of Kuldesak themselves, and were helped by actors and crew 
who joined the project for free. To distribute the film, they applied for foreign film funding. 
For ‘The making of Kuldesak’ see Disc One 2.1.
Unexpected changes in the political situation enabled Kuldesak to reach the screens of 
the cinemas throughout Indonesia in November 1998. Many rules and restrictions for film 
production and exhibition of the New Order succumbed to the process of Reformasi which 
was at its peak at that time, and were applied less strictly. Apart from a mandatory last-minute 
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registration with the Union of Film and Television Employees, the team was excused for 
not having registered at the official film organizations. Another hurdle was cleared when 
Kuldesak passed the censor board. However, despite the freer political climate, one of the 
most radical scenes of this film, two boys kissing in a bus, was censored. This appeared to 
be too revolutionary even for Reformasi. Kuldesak reached the theatres of Cinema 21, and 
was highly successful among young audiences. In different cities, queues at the ticket office 
stretched outside the cinema buildings. Touching on controversial issues and filmed in an 
MTV style, the film showed a departure from both films produced by the earlier generation 
of Indonesian film-makers and from the everyday sinetron (soaps) on television. The press 
labelled Kuldesak the first-ever Indonesian ‘independent’ film, and often highlighted its ‘non-
Indonesian’ features. 
For the trailer of Kuldesak see Disc One 2.1.
Kuldesak, made by four film-makers who ‘just went for it’, triggered a euphoric 
energy among other aspiring young Indonesians. In 1999 the Community of Independent 
Film (Komunitas Film Independen, or Konfiden) began to hold a series of ‘travelling’ film 
screenings (film keliling) and discussions in the bigger cities in Java. These were organized 
at cultural venues, educational institutions, and foreign cultural centres. The objective of 
the travelling screenings and discussions was to introduce the concept of independent film 
to a wider public. They were also a warm-up for the first Indonesian Independent Film 
and Video Festival (FFVII) held in Jakarta at the end of October 1999. This festival was 
designed to provide independent film-makers with a forum in which to screen their films. 
More ambitiously, it fostered a hope of reviving Indonesian film as a whole, an industry 
which virtually had died in the last decade of New Order rule. Besides organizing the annual 
FFVII between 1999 and 2002, Konfiden also published a monthly bulletin and commenced 
organizing workshops for film-making. 
For a glance at Konfiden 1999 and 2000 see Disc One 2.1.
With the Jakarta-based Konfiden about to organize its third independent film and video 
festival in 2001, other parties in other cities (mainly in Java, but also in Sumatra, Sulawesi 
and Bali) had formed their own Indie film communities. These communities assumed the task 
of the organization of independent film festivals with discussions, workshops, and their own 
bulletins. Generally speaking, the independent films screened were rather unsophisticated 
and inexpert. The majority consisted of short films made by young people in their early 
twenties who had no real background in film-making. This did not prevent them from 
grasping the nettle of topics which were often thought-provoking. Many included maverick 
ideas and depicted issues in the daily lives of the young, their interests, and sense of humour. 
Sometimes the films (indirectly) revealed issues of cultural, social, and political criticism. 
Some examples of films which circulated at the Konfiden festival and other film festivals of 
the time are: Revolusi Harapan (Revolution of hope, 1997), by Nanang Istiabudi. This is a 
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surrealistic story about a gang of thugs who go out on command to kill and pull the teeth of 
artists, students, and others who are in any way critical. 
For Revolusi Harapan see Disc One 2.1.
Dunia Kami, Duniaku, Dunia Mereka (Our world, my world, their world, 1999), by Adi 
Nugroho, which narrates the life of a transvestite in Yogyakarta, and Kameng Gampoeng 
Nyang Keunong Geulawa (The village goat takes the beating, 1999), by Aryo Danusiri, 
which is a chilling testament to the survivors of torture inflicted by the Indonesian Special 
Forces (Kopassus). It was filmed in Tiro, northern Aceh. 
For an excerpt from the film see Disc Two 4.1.
These films were also screened at international film festivals and on other occasions. 
As members of the various communities started to communicate on the Internet and visit 
each other’s festivals, it did not take them long to begin to think about a coalition. About a 
hundred people from all over Indonesia, mainly film buffs and students from art academies 
and Muhammadiyah universities, came together in Yogyakarta for the National Indie Film 
Festival in late May and early June 2001. At the end, after much deliberation, they decided 
to form a national affiliation of independent film communities. The next step was to establish 
an Information Centre (ICE), which operated an Internet mailing list called Forum Film, co-
ordinated from Yogyakarta. They also planned to hold a national meeting every two months. 
On 26 August 2001, during the Indie Film-maker Meeting held in Batu (a resort near Malang 
in East Java), the various communities tried to formulate a collective vision. They wanted 
to set up a programme to acquaint a broader public with the medium of film in general, and 
film independen in particular. After an all-night debate, three new ICE divisions were set 
up. Supplementing the earlier Forum Film mailing list, a web-site was to be co-ordinated 
from Malang, and an archive and a publication division were set up in Jakarta. The four ICE 
divisions would each remain autonomous bodies, standing for the same ideal but free to 
formulate their own policies.
The allotment of different divisions to different cities and their autonomy was a crucial 
issue during the debates. One reason the independent film movement adopted the form of a 
national alliance, in which the different communities remained ‘independent’ and retained an 
equal say, was the fear of domination by Jakarta. This was a legacy of New Order rule, when 
the Jakarta-based government officials and politics controlled the regions. Presumably not 
entirely coincidentally, at the same time that film communities were talking about independent 
divisions within a national alliance, on the political stage parties were engaged in fierce 
debates on a Bill which would give regional autonomy to the different provinces in Indonesia. 
Another spin-off of this reinforced commitment to regional autonomy in Post-Soeharto film 
was that many new independent films made concerted efforts to reflect the characteristics 
of their home region. The film-makers wanted to produce a movie which differed in every 
sense from a film that would have been produced in Jakarta – something imbued with local 
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pride and joy. For example, Topeng Kekasih (English title: ‘Dearest Mask’, 2000) by Hanung 
Bramantyo, is entirely in Javanese and revolves around the Oedipus Complex, while Di 
Antara Masa Lalu dan Masa Sekarang (Between the past and the present, 2001) by Eddie 
Cahyono shows the reflections of an old man about the guerrilla struggle for independence. 
Both films depicted a typically Yogyakarta atmosphere. 
See Topeng Kekasih and DAMLDMS on Disc One 2.1. 
Another example of a film that explicitly reflected local culture is Peronika (Veronica, 2004) 
directed by Bowo Leksono from Purbalingga. This film is about the bafflement of villagers with 
technologies which are mainly used in the city. All dialogues are in Banyumas dialect. 
See Peronika on Disc One 2.1.
Kepada yang terhormat titik 2 alluded to earlier creative manifestations of this stress on 
locality. Both the film’s contents and its production and screening in Purwokerto epitomized 
the re-invigorated expression of local identities in Indonesian film and on the political stage.
By 2003 the euphoria of Reformation had passed its peak, and so had the film indie 
movement. Several ICE divisions had stopped operating because of a chronic lack of 
funding, the dim prospects for turning the coalition into an official organization, and internal 
private conflicts. These conflicts revolved around questions of leadership, disputes over what 
direction to take, clashing personalities, and, at times, envy and distrust. By 2003 it was 
increasingly unclear exactly what Indonesian independent film was supposed to stand for. For 
some, independent film meant just any film produced outside the New Order system of film 
production. To a few, it also meant that films had to be produced for motives which were far 
removed from the taint of commercialism. In their opinion commercial film was contaminated 
by the New Order politics of economic growth, and a derivative of its structures of crony 
capitalism.3 They believed that, because the New Order had treated film as trade commodity, 
it had crippled the production of domestic films with the exception of cheap commercial 
films filled with sex, violence, or slapstick humour. In their eyes, the combination of film and 
commerce implied structures of New Order domination. Others believed that independent 
films tackled daring subjects, had innovative contents, and depicted free artistic expressions 
of film-makers. Yet others thought that independent film meant the production of low budget, 
technically inferior, (short) films, filmed by unskilled film-makers with a digital camera. 
Some people even thought the term stood for the production of films about the Indonesian 
struggle for Independence in 1945.
Another reason why the use of ‘film independen’ had lost its appeal was that within the 
broader context of Indonesian film, the label was connected to too many different groups. 
Broadly speaking, these groups could be divided into two factions. In mainstream media 
the four directors of Kuldesak and nine other directors who produced music videos, soaps 
and documentaries for television, were said to represent independent film. In October 1999 
these directors had formed a movement based on a manifesto called ‘I-Sinema’. I-Sinema 
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was inspired by a movement of avant-garde Danish film-makers who in 1995 had drafted a 
manifesto called Dogme 95. The ‘I’ in ‘I-Sinema’ had different meanings – it stood for the 
word ‘Indonesian’, ‘Independent’, and also other terms like the English ‘eye’ or even ‘I’ 
(Sharpe 2002). The I-Sinema film-makers were not particularly bothered about whether they 
were called independent film-makers or not. The main point of I-Sinema was to find new 
ways to produce films for the silver screen in order to revive the Indonesian film industry. In 
the manifesto, the use of digital technology was mentioned specifically as a new tool allowing 
the film-makers the opportunity to work more freely and independently (Sharpe 2002).4
On the other hand, the label of ‘independence’ was used by members of the above 
mentioned different film indie communities across Indonesia. These communities consisted 
of amateur film-makers, the majority of them students, who tried to produce films on a 
shoestring budget, borrowing money and film equipment from friends and family. In these 
communities, there was plenty of discussion about what independent film really meant. In 
their opinion, in comparison with themselves the I-Sinema film-makers were well-established 
film directors who had easy access to film equipment, funding, and even the theatres of 
Cinema 21. Some members of the indie groups supposed that if the I-Sinema film-makers 
were seen as independent film-makers, everyone producing a film in Indonesia could be 
labelled independent, particularly since there was no real film industry to speak of anyway 
(personal communication in 2001 and 2002).
When in 2002 and 2003 the private television station SCTV began organizing an 
independent film festival competition, members of these more ‘hardcore’ indie film 
communities decided to drop the term. They were convinced that the label of independent 
film had now been hijacked by the commercial television industry, and therefore was not 
worth holding onto. Despite the wrangling, SCTV’s Indonesian Independent Film Festival 
(Festival Film Independen Indonesia, FFII) was a big success.  In the first year, 1071 short 
films were sent to the festival committee of which 836 qualified to enter competition. In 
the following year this number rose to 899 films (Prakosa 2005:81). The films were from 
all over Indonesia – places as far afield as Berau (a city on East Kalimantan), Banyuwangi 
(the outermost point of East Java), Mataram (a town on the island of Lombok), the island 
Batam, Sumatran cities Medan and Padang Panjang, as well as such smaller Javanese cities 
as Wonogiri and Cilacap. They were made by a variety of people ranging in age from nine 
to seventy. Amongst those who registered their films at the SCTV festivals were primary 
school students, bureaucrats, housewives, journalists, and police officers (Prakosa 2005:7-9). 
In particular after the SCTV festivals, the label ‘independent film’ often tended to fall by the 
wayside. As the term was overburdened with too many different definitions, and represented 
too many different groups of film-makers, the indie communities decided to forget about 
debates to find a single definition for film independen. They decided that no matter what 
format, formula, subject, or label was used to describe their movement, it was best just to 
focus on the goal of bringing domestic film back to the people of Indonesia. 
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The rise of the new Post-Soeharto film genre of film independen as well as the discourses and 
approaches surrounding it, produced new imaginations of Indonesian film and society. In the 
first place, new imaginations were inherent to the genre itself. In discourses, independent film 
mainly epitomized Reformasi, and implicitly was anti-New Order. The ideal independent film 
revealed this in all facets of film mediation practices –production, distribution, and screening 
– as well as in its contents. Secondly, in another departure from the beaten track, discourses 
on the new imaginations and representations of the genre were juxtaposed with different 
communities and groups of people in Indonesian society. It was indeed a genre linked to 
communities of film-makers, both the professional film-makers of I-Sinema and (amateur) 
film-makers of various film indie communities, all over Indonesia, but by no means exclusively 
so. Film independen represented any person with a camera who, for example, opted to send 
his or her film to the SCTV’s FFII. Hence, independent film both connoted different film 
communities and an extremely diverse group of ‘common people’ who made films. However, 
just as the term reformasi, which was commonly bandied about by everyone in all kinds of 
situations, it never clearly emerged exactly what film independen did represent.
Besides opening the door for the creation of new representations and imaginations of 
film in relation to either the genre or communities, some discourses about developments 
and activities in independent film disclosed the malaise stirred up in socio-political 
affairs. Much of this disquiet was a legacy of New Order rule: the fear of domination 
by Jakarta, which inspired the decision to found a film indie network that consisted of 
different autonomous divisions, was a persistent legacy of New Order politics. Such 
lingering apprehension insinuated itself into the debates about New Order legacies. It 
influenced discussions on the ‘real’ meaning of domestic independent film, and opinions 
about the ‘hijacking’ of the label film independen by the television industry. Some critics 
perceived a link between commercial film, New Order policies and control of media. 
The overall accusation was that New Order film policy had crippled the production 
of domestic films with the exception of cheap, commercial productions. Nor were 
complaints aired in such discourses restricted to New Order legacies; other debates on 
and activities in independent film were stimulated in contemporary politics. In the same 
period in which Parliament discussed a bill on the ‘regional autonomy’ of the different 
Indonesian provinces, various local film communities were defending their autonomy 
in the formation of a national film indie alliance and were highlighting local identity 
in the contents of their films. Finally, the breakdown of film independen may also be 
regarded as representative of developments in the socio-political sphere. Around 2003, 
when the hype about independent film began to fade, so too did the prospects and ideals 
of reformation in the political scene.
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2.2  Distribution and exhibition of new media formats: ‘Local’ Beth versus 
‘transnational’ Jelangkung 
When the production and screening of film independen was at its height in 2001, discussions 
on film distribution and exhibition began to cover the problems of access of domestic 
films to the top-end cinemas of Cinema 21. These discussions were fuelled by the case of 
Beth, a domestic film scheduled for screening in one of the theatres of Cinema 21 at the 
end of November 2001. This did not eventuate as negotiations between the film’s director 
and bookers of Cinema 21 failed and the film was withdrawn from mainstream channels of 
film exhibition. Instead, it was distributed and screened through alternative networks set up 
by film independen communities. The failure of the film Beth to reach Cinema 21 theatres 
fuelled discussions about existing power structures in Indonesia in relation to film and local 
and national/transnational identities. Particularly in the discourses about Beth held at film 
indie meetings and on mailing lists on the Internet, the cinema network 21 was made to 
epitomize entrenched New Order structures. Allegedly, the network gave access only to 
those Indonesian film-makers or films which represented upper middle class transnational 
identities, meaning well-to-do people who can afford schooling at universities in Indonesia 
or abroad.
In this section I explore in what ways post-Soeharto cinema dealt with demands to 
refurbish the structures and conventions in film distribution, and to update technologies 
for film exhibition. To illustrate the discourses about domination and resistance in film 
connected to the idiosyncracies of local, national, and transnational Indonesian identities, I 
compare details of the film Beth (Aria Kusumadewa 2001) with those of another domestic 
film, Jelangkung (Rizal Mantovani 2001). The second film was a huge success in theatres 
belonging to the 21 Group. 
Only a few months after the resignation of President Soeharto, Indonesian film productions 
began to reach the screens of Cinema 21. Most films were made by film-makers who had 
received their film education at the faculty of Film and Television at the Jakarta Art Institute 
(Institut Kesenian Jakarta, IKJ), but now others who mastered the technical aspects of film-
making abroad also began to produce films for domestic audiences. In 2001 two digital 
films, made by semi-professional film-makers who had received film education in the United 
States, were screened in Cinema 21 in Pondok Indah, South Jakarta. Including these two 
productions, around ten domestic films were screened in Cinema 21 between 1998 and 2001. 
The growing number of domestic films, both in 35 mm and digital video format, which 
reached Indonesian top-end cinemas prompted discussions in national media on ‘the birth of 
a new generation of Indonesian film-makers’ and ‘the revival of Indonesian cinema’. Even 
though most films were art movies that were not enormously popular with a broad audience, 
the mere fact that they were produced and reached Indonesian cinemas seemed to offer a 
source of hope for the future of Indonesian film.
Part One
40
In October 2001 the film Jelangkung was released.5 With the unexpected success of 
Jelangkung the future for Indonesian film in domestic cinemas seemed brighter than ever. 
Jelangkung was directed by music-video director Rizal Mantovani, and produced by soap 
actor and producer Jose Poernomo, who had recently founded his own production company 
Rexinema. The film was made purely with commercial objectives. The producers wanted to 
make a film which would simply entertain, and not in any way deal with any moral or social 
messages, or other, often incomprehensible, ‘heavy stuff’ (Agustin 2002; Sitorus 2001). 
Jelangkung was produced in two weeks and shot on digital video format. The story of the 
film is about a group of teenagers which sets out to trace ghosts based on legends of haunted 
places in Jakarta. The director and producer of Jelangkung were inspired by two popular 
American horror films: The Blair Witch Project (Daniel Myrick and Eduardo Sànchez, 1999) 
and Fright Night (Tom Holland, 1985). They used a combination of elements from these two 
films and translated this into an Indonesian setting using urban legends of Jakarta.
For a trailer of Jelangkung see Disc One 2.2.
Jelangkung was initially screened in only one of the movie theatres of Cinema 21 in 
Jakarta. This theatre in Pondok Indah Mall was the only theatre in which a video-projector 
could be operated. The theatre was also used for the preview of films or presentations and, 
as were other Cinema 21 theatres, it was equipped only with standard 35 mm projectors. For 
that reason, the producers themselves had to supply the video projector to screen the film. 
Because of word-of-mouth promotion which praised the film’s story and its musical score, 
as well as the gossip that a real ghost had slipped into the film during recording, Jelangkung 
became a real hit, initially among teenagers whose enthusiasm passed on to other categories 
of audiences. People were queuing for hours at the Pondok Indah box office to obtain tickets 
that were sold out in only a few minutes. Because the film was such a success, in December 
2001 the producers decided to make copies of Jelangkung in Singapore, ‘blowing it up’ to 
the 35 mm format. This way the film could be screened in different cinemas. To illustrate 
the huge popularity of the film: at that time the costs of transferring digital film to 35 mm 
were approximately Rp. 400 million (US$ 32,000), plus an extra amount of Rp. 13 million 
(US$ 1,040) per copy. By February 2002, twenty-four Cinema 21 theatres all over Indonesia 
screened Jelangkung (Agustin 2002). In January 2002 Jelangkung attracted even more 
viewers than the just released Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone (Chris Colombus, 2001), 
which was a worldwide success. The enormous success of the film attracted the attention 
of some American film companies, such as Miramax and Vertigo Entertainment, which 
wanted to preview the film and perhaps buy it to make an American version (‘Produser AS 
tertarik.’2002).
With both the rise in production of domestic films and their unproblematic distribution 
to prestigious cinemas it seemed that after the fall of Soeharto domestic film had met a 
more conducive environment. With the box office hit Jelangkung, film producers and 
journalists started to believe that Indonesian cinema had been successfully ‘reformed’, 
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but this optimistic idea was questioned by the case of Beth. Beth, a film directed by Aria 
Kusumadewa, was an independent production. The idea of producing the film was born out 
of nightly conversations of the director with artists, famous local actors, actresses, and other 
individuals from various backgrounds, hanging out at Bulungan in South Jakarta. This group, 
which called itself Security Post Community (Komunitas Gardu), wanted to make a film 
which criticized the contemporaneous Indonesian socio-political situation. The story of Beth 
is about a forbidden love between a boy and a general’s daughter who meet each other again 
in a mental institution. But, the director argued, the film really is a comment on Indonesian 
society in which there is a thin line between sane and insane behaviour. In Beth the mental 
institution and its inhabitants form a representation of Indonesia in miniature, exposing 
characteristics of different members of Indonesian society. Here, no one is what he or she 
seems to be. The mad really are sane, the sane really are mad, and almost everyone can be 
bribed. The director, crew, actors and actresses financed the production of Beth themselves, 
but a lack of funding meant its completion took a few years. To save production costs Beth, 
as was Jelangkung, was shot on digital video. 
For a trailer of Beth see Disc One 2.2.
It was planned to have the national premiere of Beth at the Jakarta International Film 
Festival (Jiffest) in October 2001. Jiffest was organized for the first time in November 1999, 
as a forum to screen both international and Indonesian films, which were not likely to enter 
mainstream channels of distribution and exhibition. After Jiffest, the film would be distributed 
to Cinema 21 in Jakarta, and thereafter to other cities in Indonesia via alternative networks. 
This was not to be, as the screening of Beth at Jiffest turned into a controversy. When the 
director discovered that the organizers of Jiffest paid a screening fee for some foreign films, 
he demanded the same treatment for his film. In a discussion between Aria and the organizing 
committee of Jiffest, it was explained that only some films which were entered in the festival 
received a screening fee. These were films that proved to be very successful abroad and were 
likely to attract large audiences at the festival. The committee assumed Beth could never 
compete with these films, and even considered its screening at the festival a complimentary 
promotion. Moreover, since Jiffest would require a digital video projector to screen it, the 
committee saw no need to pay extra for its screening. Frustrated, Aria felt that his film was 
not valued as much as foreign films and decided to withdraw Beth from screening at Jiffest. 
In the local mass media, he voiced the criticism that Jiffest favoured foreign films above 
domestic productions, and thereby showed contempt for Indonesian film.
Although the premiere of Beth at Jiffest did not happen, other options for screening the 
film were still open. A few days before Beth was withdrawn, a message had already been 
posted on the Internet stating that Aria was looking for partners outside Jakarta to screen his 
film. Soon after this posting various film indie communities from different regions showed 
their interest to collaborate with Aria. Besides these alternative offers, Aria had settled with 
the management of Cinema 21 that his film was going to be screened in the Pondok Indah 
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theatre at the end of November. But here the screening of Beth ran into another problem, 
leading to a second controversy. Riding the crest of its unexpected success Jelangkung, which 
had only been expected to last ten days at the most, was still being screened in the Pondok 
Indah theatre in November. As the Pondok Indah theatre was the only cinema where films in 
digital video format could be operated, the screening of Beth was initially postponed to the 
first week of December, and thereafter indefinitely.
This was a huge problem for Aria. He had to rent a digital video projector (LCD), at 
that time around Rp. 2.5 million (US$ 200) for one day up to Rp. 6 million (US$ 480) for 
seven days, and pay for film posters and other promotion material for screening at Cinema 
21. To cover these costs, Aria needed sponsoring, but to obtain funding from a potential 
sponsor, he needed to know the exact screening schedule. Several times he tried to obtain 
a fixed schedule from the management of Cinema 21 but did not succeed. Instead, he was 
told that the policy of Cinema 21 did not permit for two Indonesian films to be screened at 
the same time. As long as Jelangkung was still popular, Beth would be put on hold. Faced 
with the uncertainty of the film’s screening schedule, it was impossible for Aria to negotiate 
with sponsors. At the end of December 2001, out of sheer frustration and disappointment, 
he withdrew the proposed screening of Beth from Cinema 21. Instead, Aria decided to focus 
fully on distributing and screening the film via alternative channels. 
The discord between Aria Kusumadewa and Cinema 21 erupted into a controversy in the 
Indonesian mass media. In entertainment and celebrity infotainment television programmes 
Aria and two of the leading actresses of Beth, Lola Amaria and Ine Febriyanti, spoke their minds 
about what they perceived to be the unfair treatment of Indonesian film by the management 
of Cinema 21. They supposed that the policy of Cinema 21 to not screen two Indonesian films 
at the same time was related to business deals on film distribution and exhibition between 
the Subentra 21 Group and the American Motion Picture Association. Hollywood films were 
scheduled months in advance and entered many different cinemas simultaneously, whereas 
Indonesian films had to line up to be screened one at the time. The case of Beth led to 
heated debates about the position of domestic film in Indonesian cinemas and even drew the 
attention of the non-governmental organization Media Watch, resulting in an investigation 
into an alleged monopoly on film distribution and exhibition in Indonesia by the 21 Group.6 
Tied to the accusations of nepotism, the theatre management of Cinema 21 blamed the failure 
to screen Beth in its theatres on problems of adaptation to new media technologies. With the 
exception of one Pondok Indah theatre, all other cinemas could operate the 35 mm film format 
only. As such, the case of Beth could basically be perceived as a problem of adjustment of 
conventional technologies of film exhibition to new film media and formats. The problem of 
adaptation of established cinemas to new audio-visual media technologies was not a problem 
of Cinema 21 alone. All over the world cinemas equipped with 35 mm projectors for film 
exhibition had difficulties in adapting to the new developments in film productions in digital 
video format. In most cases digital films were first transferred to 35 mm before they reached 
the screens of cinemas or film festivals. Nevertheless, discussions about Beth’s failure to 
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reach Cinema 21 tended to overlook this point. Instead the discourse focused on issues raised 
before, such as the link between trade and power, structures of nepotism, and the domination 
of the Indonesian film industry by the middle classes.
The failure to distribute Beth through mainstream distribution channels was a particularly 
hot topic in discussions about film on the Internet and at gatherings of film independen 
communities. Here, many discussions again emphasized that there was an imperative need to 
set up a diverse and competitive system of film distribution and exhibition, free of business 
interests and state control. The growing appeal for alternative networks which would show 
a diversity of films in opposition to the unity on offer in Cinema 21 fuelled discussions 
about the potential of local film productions. As mentioned earlier, the idea was that local 
films could articulate free artistic expressions and specific local identities. Learning from 
the problem of distribution of Beth, members of film indie communities developed this idea 
further into the concept of the creation of regional cinemas (sinema daerah). In regional 
cinemas, the production of local films would challenge, what Yogyakarta film-maker Doni 
Kus called, ‘the colonization of [film] aesthetics’ (‘penjajahan estetis’) by Jakarta and the rest 
of the world.  Kus’ point was that regional cinema had the potential to be individual, original, 
and resistant to both Hollywood mass products imported into Indonesia, and commercial 
films and television soaps produced in the Jakarta-based film industry.7 The potential rise of 
regional cinema was hoped to break with the policy of the 21 Group, which prioritized the 
screening of films in Jakarta before distributing these to the regions.
In discussions about the failure of Beth to reach Cinema 21, both in mass media and among 
film indie communities, the problem of adjustment to new technologies for film production 
and exhibition was hardly raised. The claim by Cinema 21 that the case of Beth arose from 
problems of adaptation to new media technologies was valid. Yet the discourse concentrated 
mainly on what Indonesian mainstream film mediation practices and alternative, independent 
ones represented. In the discussions the mainstream cinema network Cinema 21 epitomized 
entrenched structures of domination, related to national (New Order) and transnational 
(Hollywood) identities. These structures were set against alternative independent networks, 
which connoted local resistance. The juxtaposition of local against national and transnational 
identities is exemplified in the contrast between Jelangkung and Beth. Jelangkung stands 
for perceptions of power, commerce, elites, and a combination of transnational and national 
culture and identities. These features are pitched against Beth, which represents the discourses 
on a lack of power, idealism, and common people, which supposedly corresponds with local 
culture and identities.
The issues raised in discussions on Beth correspond with themes found in discourses of 
Third Cinema. The goal of Third Cinema was to raise questions about domination and 
resistance in ‘non-Western’ film cultures. The political disposition of economic domination, 
and concomitantly the global distribution of power of First over Third Worlds was an 
important aspect of its theories. Ella Shohat and Robert Stam identified forces of neo-colonial 
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globalization and domination by a group of powerful nation-states consisting basically of 
Western Europe, the US, and Japan. This domination, they argued, was economic (‘the Group 
of Seven’, IMF, the World Bank, GATT), political (the five veto-holding members of the 
UN Security Council), military (new ‘unipolar’ NATO), and techno-informational-cultural 
(Hollywood, UPI, Reuters, France Presse, CNN). Neo-colonial domination, Shohat and Stam 
asserted, was ‘enforced through deteriorating terms of trade and the ‘austerity programs’ 
by which the World Bank and IMF, often with the self-serving complicity of Third-World 
elites, imposed rules that First-World countries would themselves never tolerate’ (Shohat and 
Stam 1994:17). Challenging such hypocrisy, they addressed the unequal terms of exchange 
of global distribution of cultural productions, pointing out that the economic dependency of 
Third World countries made their cinemas vulnerable to neo-colonial pressures. Hollywood 
films which covered their costs in the domestic market could be profitably ‘dumped’ on 
Third World markets at very low prices. When dependent countries tried to strengthen their 
own film industries by setting up trade barriers for foreign films, First World countries could 
threaten retaliation in some other economic area such as the export or pricing of raw materials 
(Shohat and Stam 1994:30).
As did Third Cinema, the majority of discourses about film independen, and those 
about post-Soeharto film mediation practices during and after the case of Beth, addressed 
the position of nationally hegemonic dominant film practices and the modes of resistance 
open to minoritarian regional cinemas. Discussions about the position and treatment of 
non-commercial domestic film in the Indonesian mediascape (mainly in cinemas, but also 
at Jiffest and on national television) and the need for oppositional regional cinemas and 
alternative distribution and exhibition networks, revealed the efforts made to shed the 
legacies of New Order hegemonic rule in film and society. Several discourses implied that 
the post-Soeharto mediascape was a post-neo-colonial setting. In film, the New Order was 
marked as an imperialist force in its own right, a part of a process of neo-colonization of 
hegemonic Western culture through the connections and business deals of Soeharto cronies 
with transnational media corporations.
In Indonesian studies, the idea of the New Order as neo-colonizer is not new. Benedict 
Anderson has said that the struggle for independence and the years which followed represented 
the defeat of the colonial state by a newly imagined nation. Soeharto’s New Order, on the 
other hand, ‘is best understood as the resurrection of the State [founded in Dutch colonialism] 
and its triumph vis-à-vis society and nation’ (1990:109). Speaking of Third Cinema theories, 
Krishna Sen also treated the New Order as a neo-colonial force which disseminated national 
culture in the same way neo-imperialistic forces distributed global Western culture. Sen 
argues that under the New Order local or global culture, rather than hegemonic national 
culture could be perceived as modes of resistance (2003:156,163).
Sen felt that the globalist paradigm of Third Cinema theorizing did not quite capture the 
radical drives within Indonesian cinema. Instead, she argued, Indonesian cinema’s radicalism 
needed to be defined in terms of the political constellations within the nation and could 
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not be read in any generalized way in relation to Hollywood, global culture, or capitalism 
(Sen 2003:147). There is more than a grain of truth in this, but in discourses on the case of 
Beth, Hollywood was equated with political constellations within the nation. Hollywood and 
concomitantly the domination of global culture was seen as one of the structures of New 
Order rule that supported crony capitalism. A tangible example of this was the involvement 
of Soeharto cronies in import and export deals with the US. The most glaring case in point 
was that Soeharto’s foster brother Sudwikatmono, owner of Subentra 21, had secured the 
exclusive distribution and exhibition rights of the imported US films. Yet another such link 
occurred when Soeharto’s business partner Bob Hassan was involved in a deal between 
Indonesia and the US at the beginning of the 1990s. In exchange for Indonesia importing 
Hollywood films, the US agreed to import batik and timber from Indonesia. In this light, 
the representation of Beth and its connection to alternative film cultures and side-stream, 
independent, or underground networks of film distribution and exhibition can be seen as 
part of Third Cinema discourses, which set minority oppositional cinemas against their 
counterparts of domination. In the post-Soeharto mediascape, the mediation practices of film 
independen as a movement of oppositional cinema were perceived to be a counterpoise to 
the enduring structures of the New Order and its incorporation of Hollywood/First World 
domination in Indonesian cinema. In post-Soeharto cinema, ‘Third’ as a denominator of 
opposition stood for local Indonesian film cultures and identities, whereas ‘First’ represented 
both hegemonic global and national culture.
The emphasis on the local as subversive or oppositional to national or global culture 
and identities in post-Soeharto cultural discourses, can be linked to Arif Dirlik’s views about 
the re-emergence of the local as a site of resistance and struggle for liberation. While Dirlik 
(1996:35) notes that such struggles are informed by the modernity that groups suppressed 
or marginalized by modernization reject, the local film indie communities felt that they 
were neither suppressed by modernization, nor were they rejecting it. Instead, in step with 
movements of Third Cinema, the communities highlighted localism as a point of departure 
and goal of liberation which questioned and opposed the imbalanced access to national and 
transnational film distribution and exhibition networks. 
2.3  Alternative sites of film consumption: Additional identifications and  
modes of resistance
Besides mainstream Cinema 21 and complementary film indie networks for distribution and 
exhibition, there were more sites in the post-Soeharto mediascape in which both domestic 
and foreign films circulated. These sites were not mentioned in any of the discourses which 
linked mainstream film channels to New Order constellations of power and national and 
transnational identities, setting them in opposition to local identities connected to alternative 
channels of oppositional film mediation practices. In part, these other sites consisted of a 
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variety of new film festivals. Another alternative for film distribution and reception was based 
on a particular film format: the Video Compact Disc. Alongside television this format provided 
the easiest and, particularly in the form of pirated VCDs, an even wider access to film in post-
Soeharto Indonesia. In this section I argue that the distinction between mainstream Cinema 
21, as representative for the distribution of global Hollywood culture, and ‘side-stream’ or 
underground film indie networks representing local cultures, is far from clear-cut.
In the years following Reformasi, film festivals began to proliferate everywhere in Indonesia. 
Besides the movement of film independen with its various film screenings, discussions, 
workshops, and festivals, after 1999 other groups and communities also undertook the 
organization of film festivals. Some festivals with special themes saw the light of day only 
once, for example the 2002 Peace Film Festival (Festival Film Perdamaian), which screened 
domestic and international films about human rights issues. Other festivals were held annually. 
Most festivals emerged from communities which either drew on or claimed particular film 
genres or formats. Sometimes new genres were formed or co-opted – ‘Peace’ or ‘Gay and 
Lesbian’ films spring to mind – or concepts of existing genres were changed. Documentary 
film, which was equated with propaganda under the New Order, was now transformed into a 
genre which epitomized the advocacy of human rights issues and the deconstruction of New 
Order narratives on history and society. The various new film festivals catered for different 
imagined audiences and were connected to a new set of discourses, related to concerns in 
society or daily live.8 Besides the specific choice for a film genre or format, another important 
feature of the new festivals was that nearly all of these combined the screening of domestic 
and foreign films.
The most important post-Soeharto festival on a national scale was the Jakarta International 
Film Festival Jiffest. Jiffest was organized for the first time from 20 to 28 November 1999, 
a month after the first independent film festival by Konfiden. Two women, the Indonesian 
producer and documentary film-maker Shanty Harmayn and the Franco-American festival 
organizer Natacha Devillers founded the festival to provide audiences with foreign films and 
art films which were hard to find in Indonesia. In his review on the first Jiffest, cultural critic 
Seno Gumira Adjidarma spoke of the rise of a new film generation and new film audiences 
(personal communication 2001). Over the years Jiffest grew into a big event which screened 
all sorts of classic, modern, short, and experimental films and documentaries, both from 
Indonesia and abroad. Alongside its annually changing theme, different workshops and 
discussions were also organized during the festival. After 2001 a section of Jiffest travelled 
throughout Indonesia to screen part of its film programme in cities across the country. In its 
fourth year, Jiffest expanded this section by having local film-makers in each city enter their 
films and screen these along with the regular programme.
Another new Jakarta-based film festival which was held annually and which also 
travelled to other cities was the Queer Film Festival (QFF). The QFF was organized for the 
first time by the ‘Q-munity’ in September 2002. Q-munity was a community which consisted 
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of gays and lesbians and other people with an interest in film and arts. The QFF was the 
first Indonesian film festival which covered the genres Gay, Lesbian, and Aids films. The 
festival was non-competitive and screened both international and domestic films. Beyond its 
core screenings, at the fringes of the festival there were discussions with film-makers, photo 
and painting exhibitions, and seminars about such topics as information on Aids. QFF tried 
to keep a low profile because various groups in Indonesia do not accept homosexuality. To 
reduce the focus on homosexuality, the committee strategically tied its festival to campaigns 
about Aids awareness and the dangers of free sex. Despite such manoeuvres, Q’s director 
John Badalu regularly received threats from Muslim fundamentalists who tried to stop the 
event each year.
Other recurring film festivals, which were tied to either a certain format or a particular 
genre, were the Feast of Indonesian Cinema (Pesta Sinema Indonesia, PSI), the Documentary 
Film Festival (Festival Film Dokumenter, FFD), and Hello;fest. From 2001 to 2005 PSI 
was held each June in Purwokerto. It was organized by a group of students who formed 
a community called Youth Power, which was also active in the field of theatre, arts, and 
photography. The festival exclusively covered the screening of films which were produced 
in video format. These films consisted of domestic as well as foreign films. In 2005 the PSI 
added a ‘one minute film’-competition for local Purwokerto film-makers to its programme. 
Since 2002, the documentary film community (komunitas film dokumenter) has organized 
FFD each year in December in Yogyakarta. This festival has screened both international and 
domestic documentaries, and organized a competition for documentaries produced by novice 
domestic film-makers. Besides the screening of documentary films, it has also organized 
workshops on documentary making and discussions. In 2005, FFD added a competition for 
Indonesian professional documentary film-makers to its programme. Hello;fest commenced 
in 2004 when it was organized by the film school Hello;Motion in Jakarta. It then focused 
on short and animation films. It began as a festival to screen the work of its students at the 
end of their four-month courses, but because many outsiders also wanted to participate in 
the festival it changed into an open forum. Besides the screening of films by students and 
outsiders, each year some domestic and foreign films are invited to compete for four awards, 
for which the viewers at the festival could vote (Ratna 2005). 
For pictures of Q, FFD and PSI see Disc One 2.3.  
Another alternative site of film distribution and consumption was connected to the 
networks of the VCD format. This format was preceded by video cassettes and laser discs 
(LD), and followed later by Digital Video/Versatile Discs (DVD). The distribution of these 
new film formats in Indonesia started in the mid-1980s under the New Order with the 
introduction of video players and cassettes onto the Indonesian film market. Instantly people, 
mainly from the middle classes, embraced this medium. In next to no time, video began to 
compete with cinemas and layar tancep. Many retired high-ranking military officers, who 
had often occupied a position in local offices of the Department of Information, set up mobile 
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video companies in provincial areas backed by the licenses they handed out themselves 
(Adityo 1996). At the beginning of the 1990s a new format, LD, was added to the distribution 
of video. In 1996 the LD format was increasingly replaced by VCD, which in 2000 was 
followed by the DVD format. However, in Indonesia DVDs did not immediately substitute 
the circulation of the much cheaper VCDs.
With the introduction of video, film piracy was launched with a vengeance on the 
Indonesian market. Pirated films were very popular. Beside their low price, about one-half to 
one-third of the price of original products, pirated films often circulated before the original 
film reached Indonesian cinemas. Unquestionably, part of their popularity was that pirated 
films were not censored (‘Akan dicari.’1997; cam/kris/2 1996; ‘VCD hasil bajakan.’1999). 
Compared to films in cinemas and the original products sold in shopping malls, which 
mainly consisted of the same Hollywood and local products, the variety obtainable in pirated 
films was more diverse. Pirated films included classic and art house films, Mandarin, Hong 
Kong, and Bollywood film productions, and to a large extent consisted of pornographic or 
semi-pornographic films. The piracy of films in video, LD, and later VCD and DVD format 
launched an extensive underground economy (F.Y. 1993). In August 1997, Wihadi Wiyanto, 
Secretary General of the Indonesian Video Recording Importers Association (Asosiasi 
Importir Rekaman Video, Asirevi), stated that 90 per cent of the VCDs circulating in Indonesia 
were illegal copies (Anspek/2.4 1997).
VCD was perceived as a medium and format which was accessible to all people. Even 
though the quality of VCD was second rate compared to videotapes and LD, it was cheap. 
Because of their price and quality, videotapes and LD were perceived as formats used by 
the middle classes (Nurhan and Theodore 1999a). In contrast, especially because of film 
piracy, even the poorest people could watch a VCD. Indeed pirated VCDs were even cheaper 
than their originals, but often of inferior quality. With the exception of fairly professional 
reproductions of a master copy, many pirated films had indistinct, blurred images and sound. 
Some of these pirated films were digital video recordings of films which were screened in 
cinemas or on videotape or LD at home. This was betrayed by the fact that movie theatre 
audiences could be heard commenting on the film; other nuisances that had been inadvertently 
recorded included people walking by the screen, kitchen noises, the crowing of a cock, or 
children playing in the background. Because of their inferior quality it was said that pirated 
VCDs had their own market segment, consisting mainly of the lower classes (len 1999). It 
was asserted that the number of pirated products circulating in rural areas was much higher 
than in cities (Ek-16 2000), but in my experience virtually everyone, rich and poor, nearly 
everywhere in the city or countryside consumed pirated VCDs.
Until 1997 pirated films were imported mainly through transnational underground 
networks which operated in Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong. Until 1998 most pirated 
films sold in Indonesia were first distributed by sea from Singapore with a transit on the 
island of Batam. After transportation by boat from Batam the films were distributed overland 
to Medan, Jakarta, Semarang and Surabaya, and then to the rest of Indonesia. By 1998 not just 
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pirated films, mostly in VCD format, were imported through these networks; the technologies 
to produce them were also insinuating themselves via the networks. In November 1998, 
it was estimated there were approximately ten factories based in Jakarta, Semarang, and 
Surabaya producing pirated VCDs (Untung SP/J-2 1998). The production of illegal VCD 
copies soon expanded, eventually transforming into an export commodity for markets in 
Malaysia, Singapore, India, and the Philippines.9 In the short space of a few years, film piracy 
was established as a substantial home industry business. In 2001, it was officially estimated 
that in Jakarta alone around one hundred copy machines were operating; however, in reality 
there were presumably many more (ema 2001a).
With the exception of pornographic films, pirated VCDs, both imported and domestically 
produced, were sold on the open market. The centre for pirated products in Indonesia was 
the Glodok area in Jakarta, but also in other cities and more rural towns pirated films were 
openly on offer in shops and stalls in shopping malls and on the streets. Similar to ordering 
a pizza, there were identical services by which pirated films could be ordered by phone (ric 
1997). Even though the government lost an estimated amount of Rp. 5 billion (US$ 400,000) 
per year in taxes, media piracy was big business in Indonesia.10 Besides the vendors of the 
illegal film copies, those benefitting from this alternative film distribution and consumption 
site were producers, importers, and distributors of pirated films, not to mention the police, 
government officials, and Soeharto business cronies. In short, many businesses and members 
of official organizations and the bureaucracy in Indonesia were involved in the production 
or distribution of pirated VCDs. Between 1997 and 2003 at various times Indonesian media 
mentioned that producers, distributors, and importers of established media organizations were 
also involved in the trade in illegal copies. It was said, and sometimes proven, that factories 
which produced original VCDs simultaneously produced copies for the underground market 
(agi 2002; m6 2002; Nurhan and Theodore 1999b). Certified film import and distribution 
networks, as well as cinema workers and staff, were rumoured to be part of the pirated film 
network, passing on master copies to illegal copiers. In addition to companies, others who 
profited from the production and distribution of pirated VCDs were the ‘rotten elements’ 
(oknum) in the police forces and ruling elites. It was common knowledge that small-scale 
producers, distributors, and sales people regularly paid policemen a fee so as to continue 
their business undisturbed. Vendors of pirated VCDs were especially prone to handing 
out payments to pre-empt police raids, or at least to be warned prior to any police actions. 
Allegedly, large business empires in the illegal film industry were backed either by Soeharto 
cronies, high-ranking army officers, or legislative officials.11
Despite the fact that these goods were sold openly, piracy in Indonesia was officially 
illegal. Between 1993 and 1997 several new intellectual property laws and sanctions against 
offenders were approved in Parliament. In 1997 a law on intellectual property rights was 
passed. Offenders against this law could be sentenced to five years imprisonment or a 
payment of Rp. 50 million (US$ 4,000) fine. In the same period sporadic raids were mounted 
by police forces, mainly in the Glodok area in Jakarta. These raids were primarily pro-forma 
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to show there was police action against piracy and as a reminder to vendors to continue to 
pay their ‘safety fees’ (uang keamanan). During these raids thousands of pirated films were 
confiscated, some of which were later publicly destroyed. Every few months in a ceremony 
attended by members of the Film Censor Board, police, and government officials, confiscated 
pirated films and cuts of censored films were run over by trucks or destroyed by fire. This 
sanctioned destruction was filmed and featured in news programmes on television and details 
were published in newspapers. In reality the ceremony was just as much fiction as the films 
themselves. Only a day after piracy raids took place, if not the same evening, the same number 
and variety of films was again on offer and it was business as usual.12 Occasionally producers 
or distributors of pirated films were arrested. These culprits were mainly middlemen, who 
were back in business in no time after the payment of their bail.
Around 1998 the raids began to increase. By then, Indonesia had achieved the third 
position on the ‘priority watch list’ of the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), 
an industry lobby group from the US. The principal reason for the increase in police raids 
against film piracy were the conditions set for foreign aid and funding by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). To facilitate loans and foreign aid after the Asian monetary crisis in 
1997, Indonesia had to agree to fifty stipulations drawn up by IMF.13 One of these demanded 
that the Indonesian government seriously combat offenders against intellectual property 
rights.14 However, even though the number of raids increased and concomitantly the number 
of films which were burned or run over by trucks at the broadcasted public ceremonies, the 
piracy industry in Indonesia, as in other Asian countries, in no way diminished. In 2003 
the Motion Picture Association (MPA), the international division of the Motion Picture 
Association of America (MPAA), launched an anti-piracy media campaign in eight countries 
in Asia. Besides Indonesia, the campaign covered South Korea, Chinese Taiwan, India, 
Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand. MPA estimated that the US motion 
picture industry lost more than $ 3 billion annually in potential worldwide revenue as a result 
of piracy. In 2002 six million DVDs, or 87 per cent of pirated DVDs the world over, were 
seized in Asia. Hence 2003 was declared the ‘Anti-Piracy Action Year in Asia’, with the 
tagline ‘Nothing Beats the Real Thing: Say ‘No’ to Piracy’ (Santosa 2003).
Both the post-Soeharto film festivals and networks of, mainly pirated, VCDs provided 
alternative sites of film distribution and consumption. Particularly the pirated VCDs gave 
wide access to all sorts of uncensored, mainstream and non-mainstream, domestic and foreign 
film productions. Furthermore, the different film festivals screened various films which 
never reached Indonesian television or cinemas. The discourses which linked local cultures 
to independent or ‘side-stream’ film and its distribution and exhibition networks, cannot 
be applied to the alternative sites without some difficulty. The first hurdle is that the post-
Soeharto film festivals and VCD networks circulated both domestic and transnational films. 
As such, they did not represent either domestic or transnational culture, but a combination 
of both. Moreover, at the new film festivals identifications and issues of representations did 
not spring from global, national or local concerns or cultures. Instead, these were based on 
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particular film genres and film formats and the domestic and transnational discourses into 
which these genres and formats tied. Hence Q stood for discourses on gay-and-lesbian films 
and homosexuality both in Indonesia and abroad; FFD stood for discourses on the specificity 
of documentary film in Indonesia, as well as worldwide contemporary discourses on the 
genre; and PSI and Hello;fest were connected to discourses on the development, position, 
and implications of the video format in Indonesia and at other comparable festivals in the 
world. Jiffest, which screened all genres and formats, in this sense was all-inclusive, but 
through its annual changing festival theme each year it related to a specific discourse.15 
The second problem in defining post-Soeharto film festivals and VCD networks is that 
it is difficult to determine which distribution and consumption channels were mainstream, 
side-stream, or underground. The understanding of these notions is multifaceted, as it consists 
of networks of distribution and consumption of original VCDs and of pirated films. Which 
networks represented mainstream distribution channels, those of legal films because these were 
legal? Or conversely, the networks of pirated VCDs?  Even though piracy was an illegal activity 
in Indonesia, pirated films were openly on sale everywhere. Strictly speaking, from the point 
of view of availability and market shares, pirated films with a share of 90 per cent against 
a mere 10 per cent of legal films, were more mainstream than their original counterpart. As 
such, the network and sales of original films could be perceived as a ‘side-stream’ channel of 
film distribution and consumption. Furthermore, because of the wide-ranging setup of home 
industries which produced pirated films, the vast transnational networks distributing them, the 
numerous vendors who sold these films all over Indonesia, and the substantial involvement of 
‘infiltrators’ in official film production and distribution companies and organizations, police 
forces, and the judicial system, pirated VCDs could hardly be said to have constituted an 
underground economy; rather, they formed a parallel economy.
Looking at the film festivals the notion of mainstream versus side-stream sites of 
distribution and consumption is less complex in the sense that all festivals could be perceived 
as side-stream distribution channels because these were not initiated, supported, or run by 
the Indonesian state or film industry. However, on the basis of their visibility, or the amount 
of publicity they generated, some could be perceived as more ‘side-stream’ or underground 
than others. Instead of a division into mainstream, side-stream, or underground events, in this 
context it might be better to speak of events which were on or off the map. Or, to use the term 
of the former co-founder of Konfiden and film-maker and distributor Lulu Ratna, ‘festivals 
below the radar’. This term refers to low profile festivals, as opposed to festivals which 
were easily detectible (Ratna 2005). In this context, Jiffest was an on the map high-profile 
event which generated a wealth of national publicity. In comparison, Q, which remained low 
profile, could be perceived as a festival that was more distinctly non-establishment. PSI, 
which was not of any interest to the national media, was an off the map, below the radar, 
underground event. 
The discourses about local forms of resistance to processes of transnational cinematic 
neo-imperialism cannot be simply applied to the alternative sites of post-Soeharto film 
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festivals and VCDs.Yet, on another level these alternative channels of film distribution 
and exhibition do represent tactics that resisted or evaded hegemonic structures of film 
circulation. In this context, the festivals can be connected to the organization of film 
festivals worldwide as forums for alternative, off-beat film productions. Undoubtedly, on 
another level the circulation of particularly pirated VCDs does represent tactics which 
resisted or evaded hegemonic structures of film circulation. The circulation of pirated 
VCDs can be seen as a form of resistance which Ella Shohat and Robert Stam (2004) call 
‘media jujitsu’. 
As mentioned earlier, the political disposition of economic domination of First over 
Third Worlds and its concomitant global distribution of power, was an important aspect in 
Third Cinema theories.16 Assessments of Third Cinema pointed to various film formulas 
which challenged First World domination of culture and esthetics. These included films 
and videos which eschewed formal conventions of dramatic realism and chose modes and 
strategies of alternative aesthetics rooted in non-realist, often non-Western, or para-Western 
cultural traditions. Among the range of modes and strategies were the carnivalesque, the 
anthropophagic, the magic realist, the reflexive modernist, and the resistant post-modernist. 
These featured other historical rhythms, other narrative structures, and other views of 
collective life (Shohat and Stam 2004:292).17
Shohat and Stam indicate that many of these modes and strategies appropriated existing 
discourses to their own ends. In this, Shohat and Stam argue, the power of dominant First 
World discourses was assumed only to deploy its force through a kind of artistic jujitsu against 
domination. As did the Brazilian anthropophagic movement, which ‘called for an art that 
would devour European techniques the better to struggle against European domination’, most 
alternative aesthetics revalorized what was seen as negative, and turned tactical weakness into 
strategic strength (Ibid:328). As mentioned above, Shohat and Stam call the appropriation of 
elements of dominant culture to redeploy them in the interests of oppositional praxis ‘media 
jujitsu’.
The concept of media jujitsu can be extended to the distribution and consumption practices 
of pirated VCDs. Similar to strategies which appropriated dominant discourses and aesthetics 
only to transform these into a force against domination, the alternative site of distribution 
and consumption of pirated VCDs is one which incorporated First World cultural domination 
and supported the dissemination of its foreign hegemony, but simultaneously undermined 
it. Paradoxically, the networks of pirated VCDs represented the most accessible channels 
to hegemonic First World culture, while they simultaneously destabilized the disposition of 
First World economic domination. Pirated VCDs can be perceived as a form of resistance 
to both national control and structures of film: they evade state censorship and sidestep the 
lack of choice in films that are available via mainstream channels. These VCDs also resist 
the global economic domination and distribution of power of the West by undermining legal 
sales and copyrights. The format and its cursive mediation practices dispersed hegemonies of 




Discourses on post-Soeharto film mediation practices depended on reconstituted frames 
of reference. New media technologies and changes on the political scene led to new film 
practices, cultures, and imaginations of identities, but old practices, cultures, and identities 
were not entirely disposed of.
Ironically, the democratization process of audio-visual media launched by the advance 
in new technologies caused another divide in film formats, audiences, and communities. This 
time, instead of 16 mm film, the new digital video format was in conflict with Cinema 21’s 
35 mm format. Since the overwhelming interest in the affair surrounding Beth, Cinema 21 
stopped screening films in digital format. These now had to be transferred to 35 mm before 
they could be shown in its cinemas. The new policy strengthened the impression that the 
network supported long-standing power structures, as it limited the number of domestic films 
to reach top-end cinemas. Only film-makers or producers who could pay for the production 
or blow-up of their film in the 35 mm format could be screened in Cinema 21. Consequently, 
film-makers with proficient business know-how and ‘connections’, or sufficient financial 
backing had an advantage.
Nevertheless, the film format alone was not the reason that not all domestic films reached 
the Indonesian top-end theatres. The duration, content, and style of the films had to comply 
with the criteria set by Cinema 21. Those who could not live up to these conditions had the 
old alternative of ‘going international’ and screening films at foreign film festivals. The new 
alternative was to ‘go independent’ and distribute and screen films via alternative networks, 
or to distribute them directly in VCD format.19 The choice for old, new, established, or 
alternative channels of film distribution and exhibition was based not merely on practical 
considerations, but also on what these channels were perceived to represent in post-Soeharto 
Indonesia.
The distribution and consumption of film in VCD format undermined the aforementioned 
connotations of mainstream, ‘side-stream’, and underground film mediation practices. The 
specific conditions and socio-political implications of pirated VCDs challenged the hegemony 
and rules of dominant national and transnational media networks. The cursive mediation practices 
evaded film censorship and circumvented the lack of choice in films that were available through 
national mainstream channels. They moreover resisted global economic domination and power 
of the West by subverting legal sales and copyrights. However, the VCD circuit as an alternative 
site for film distribution and consumption did not weaken the position and influence of Indonesian 
elites. As before, they appropriated the networks and profited from piracy through the production, 
distribution, and sales of illegal films, or by having their share in ‘security’ levies. Beth and film 
independen, Jelangkung and Cinema 21, as well as post-Soeharto film festivals and (pirated) 
VCDs were all part of and shaped Indonesian film mediation practices and discourses on audio-
visual media. They illustrate how alternative film cultures and the powers that be opposed and also 







3 Histories, heroes, and monumental frameworks
Introduction
From at least two vantage points, a connection can be made between film and historiography. 
The link between the two can be discussed either from the point of view of film history 
or by extrapolating on the use of film in representations of history. In this chapter, I focus 
on the production and distribution of specific film genres which can be accepted as major 
representations of concepts and inventions of history by the regime. The inventions and 
modes of engagement, that is, the dominant representations of discourses on history, are 
studied from both these perspectives. Each of these is utilized to give an insight into the 
mechanisms of certain film discourse practices employed by the New Order regime.
3.1. Film history: New Order patronage of film perjuangan and film pembangunan
Historiography is as much about contemporaneous imaginations of society as it is about the 
past. In this section I discuss representations of Indonesian film history of the New Order and 
the film genres which represented its ideologies and discourses about the past. I have chosen 
to focus on two specific time-bound genres which typified New Order rule and historiography: 
film perjuangan (struggle [for Independence] film), which was actually created under the Old 
Order of President Soekarno, and film pembangunan (development films). 
Film-maker, writer, and academic Trinh Minh-ha has argued that the color red symbolizes 
different things in different cultures (for instance: joy, anger, warmth, or impurity): ‘To 
say red, to show red, is already to open up vistas of disagreement. Not only because red 
conveys different meanings in different contexts, but also because red comes in many hues, 
saturations and brightnesses, and no two reds are alike’ (1993:190). Picking up on this theme, 
I study the context of such dominant modes of engagement as the use of heroes and authority 
figures in perjuangan and pembangunan films under the New Order. In addition, I analyse the 
creation of particular connotations of these aspects both in national and transnational political 
discourses. At the conclusion of this section I compare the traits of the pembangunan genre 
with those employed in films which were part of the political strategies of development of the 
United States in Iran in the 1950s. 
The first film perjuangan, fictional films with plots which revolved around the struggle to win 
Indonesian Independence from Dutch colonial rule, were produced around 1954. The majority 
of these films recounted stories of Indonesian heroes fighting against the Dutch colonizers 
throughout the whole of the colonial period. Between 1958 and 1965 in particular, films 
extolling the struggle for Independence were produced in large numbers. This production 
Part Two
58
ran parallel to and supported Soekarno’s national political rhetoric. In 1958 his call for a 
‘Return to the Rails of the Revolution’, a slogan which involved the assertion that the ‘right 
to wield governmental power […] lay with those who led the Revolution’, and the consequent 
availability of funding for films about the struggle for Independence strongly stimulated their 
production (Feith 1962:554 as quoted in Sen 1994:36). 
Quite apart from the President’s rhetoric, the broader political setting also exerted an 
enormous influence on film production and other aspects of the world of cinema. In the early 
1960s, Indonesian cinema was caught up in the national polemics which divided Indonesia 
starkly into ‘left’ and ‘right’. The thought behind this division can be traced to Soekarno’s 
increasingly radical national politics. In 1957, relying on the support of the army he overthrew 
the multiparty democracy which had been established in Indonesia after 1949, replacing it 
with what he called ‘Guided Democracy’.1 In the following years, the government grew 
more authoritarian, more nationalistic, and more anti-Western. In a very intricate juggling act 
Soekarno tried to balance power between the Indonesian army, which had made enormous 
political and economic gains in the early years of Guided Democracy, and the Indonesian 
Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI), which could be counted on to provide a 
portion of Soekarno’s mass support base. By 1959 PKI was ‘the most energetic and militant 
supporter’ of Soekarno’s radical nationalist politics, which championed anti-imperialism and 
anti-feudalism (Mortimer 1974:79 as quoted in Sen 1994:28).
The nation was polarized into left and right. The left was connected to the Communist 
Party, which displayed a growing tendency to align itself with the President. The right was 
associated with a number of army, liberal, and Islamic parties which were enjoying growing 
support from the governments of Western capitalist nations, particularly the United States 
and Great Britain. Mirroring the politics of the time, film-makers were also divided into 
the left and the right. Leftist film-makers and members of cultural organizations affiliated 
with PKI especially tended to be actively engaged in linking film to national and nationalist 
politics. They saw their role as trying to articulate a cultural critique and model for a film 
culture of opposition to Hollywood cinema. Leftist film organizations and film-makers also 
vociferously supported the periodic bans which were imposed on films from Hollywood 
and Britain, as part of Soekarno’s policies of Confrontation against what he perceived as the 
encroachment of Anglo-American power in Asia (Sen 2003:149-150).2
Krishna Sen has shown that in this setting, films about the revolution made by film-
makers on either side of the divide articulated differences in constructing post-Independence 
imaginations of Indonesian society. She points out that the two most prominent film-makers of 
the time, Usmar Ismail and Bachtiar Siagian, produced different narratives about the revolution. 
In historical films set in the context of the revolutionary war, Usmar Ismail, who received 
his film education in the United States and could be associated with the right, focused on the 
private psychological world of his characters, who were without exception heroic fighters. In 
each of his films Ismail used a standard pattern in which the ‘hero-villain’ represented a ‘good-
evil’ juxtaposition of the pejuang (revolutionary) versus the penjajah (the colonial rulers) (Sen 
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1994:45-6). Alternatively, leftist film-maker Bachtiar Siagian chose to explore the historical and 
social situation of his characters. He deviated from the common nationalist narrative formula 
in not representing ‘us’, the Indonesian nation, against ‘them’, the Dutch, but in focusing on a 
social revolution in which the struggle against foreigners included an attempt to identify and 
challenge the structure of repression within Indonesian society itself (Sen 1994:45).
President Soeharto and his New Order regime came to power after the coup of 30 September 
1965. During that night six senior generals and, by mistake, one lower-ranking officer were 
killed. The New Order blamed PKI for staging the coup and with the coming to power of this 
regime, leftist film texts were erased. In the aftermath of the coup, films produced by leftist film-
makers were banned or destroyed, and many alleged communist film-makers were killed or 
imprisoned. Simultaneously a total reversal of anti-imperialistic film policy was set in motion, 
and the ban on films from Hollywood and Britain was lifted. In New Order national film history, 
nationalist cinema and the film perjuangan films which contained stereotypical juxtapositions 
were assiduously cultivated. Usmar Ismail was transmogrified into a tokoh (prominent figure) in 
Indonesian cinema, and the films about the revolution which he had produced were held up as 
examples of what the basis of national cinema should be. Other kinds of film texts, such as those 
of Bachtiar Siagian and other ‘leftist’ film-makers, were consigned to oblivion. 
Under the New Order, Usmar Ismail and his films about the revolution came to represent 
the basis of national cinema in Indonesian film history.3 After 1965 he was hailed as the father 
of Indonesian cinema. Furthermore, the day on which the shooting of his film Darah Dan 
Doa (entitled ‘The Long March’ in English) commenced, 30 March 1950, was marked as the 
Day of National Film (Hari Film Nasional).4 
For pictures of Usmar Ismail see Disc Two 3.1.
Usmar Ismail was appointed the father of Indonesian cinema for two reasons: on account 
of the subject matter of his films and because of his anti-leftist pro-Western position in the 
politics of the film industry in the 1960s. Usmar’s political stance was particularly apparent in 
an article he wrote in 1970 called ‘The Dark Era of National Film History’. In this article he 
placed the forces led by Lekra (Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat, Institute of People’s Culture, 
the key cultural mass organization affiliated to PKI) and PKI in opposition to the forces of 
democracy in the film world (Usmar Ismail 1983).5 Sen mentions that the spirit and words of 
the title of that article have since been reproduced in almost every account of Indonesian film 
history under the New Order (Sen 1994:35).
Under this regime there were numerous plaudits for the revolution films produced by 
Usmar Ismail and he had many imitators creating the same type of film perjuangan. With a few 
exceptions, these New Order perjuangan films either consisted of narratives about heroes of (New 
Order) Indonesian history, or were based on folk stories about such fictitious heroes as Si Pitung 
and Jaka Sembung. Films of the latter type tended to feature stereotypical images of aggressive, 
bearded, red-headed, swearing Dutchmen. A phrase very often used by colonial rulers in these 
films was ‘Gotvedomseg’ (Dutch for ‘Goddamnit’ pronounced in an Indonesian way). 
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For a few examples of ‘Gotvedomseg’ in Si Pitung Banteng Betawi see Disc Two 3.1. 
As the background to the films about the fictitious heroes was also the struggle for 
Independence, many schoolchildren and Indonesians in general accepted these fictional tales 
as real historical accounts (Eddy 1993). The basic ingredient of all perjuangan films, whether 
those which survived the coup of 1965 or those produced under New Order rule, was that 
their themes were about heroes and heroism, as were those in the films by Usmar Ismail.
Whereas the foundation of Indonesian film history was represented by the production 
of film perjuangan, the New Order was represented by the genre of film pembangunan 
(development films). Films in this genre epitomized the political strategy and vision of the 
New Order government, which was based on the encouragement of economic development 
and modernization. Particularly during Ali Murtopo’s term of office as Minister of Information 
(1978-1983), the Film Council (Dewan Film) stimulated the idea that films should portray 
‘the struggle of scientists, technocrats, and others to improve the prestige of the nation’ (Sen 
1994:120). Once again in the New Order pembangunan films the focal points were heroes; 
but now the protagonists were heroes of development who came to the village to teach 
the local, traditional people how to become modern, to trust the national government, and 
distrust the villain, usually represented by local, traditional, spiritual leaders or shamans (Sen 
1994:120-2). These propagandist pembangunan films particularly were screened by mobile 
cinemas going from one village to another.
Both in their content and in the practice of their distribution, films in this genre ran parallel 
with the course adopted in the promotion of films and development policies of the United 
States Information Agency (USIA) in the early 1950s. In 1953 the agency was assigned the 
task of producing and distributing a massive number of political and ‘pedagogical’ films to 
so-called Third World countries. Set in the rivalry of the Cold War between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, the distribution of these films was part of the official development 
policy of the US government. Linked to the Point 4 Development Programme which was 
launched by President Truman in 1949, this policy was implemented to ‘win the hearts and 
minds of the non-Communist world’ (Naficy 2003:192). In August 1953 Truman initiated 
USIA policy contrived to: 
[t]ell people throughout the world the truth about official aims and acts of the U.S., to expose 
and counter hostile efforts to distort those aims and acts to present a broad and accurate picture 
of the life and culture of American people.
(Naficy 1984:190)6
As a consequence, specific countries in the Third World, primarily those thought to be 
susceptible to communist ideology, were subjected to an enhanced marketing campaign, 
which included the distribution of American films and documentaries (Naficy 2003:192). 
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Iranian film-maker Hamid Naficy wrote that in Iran this meant that American-made films 
were shown to schoolchildren and rural populations using mobile film vans, as well as being 
presented to the general public in commercial cinemas.
The USIA films which Naficy had to watch and review when he was a schoolboy show a 
remarkable resemblance to New Order development films. Naficy states that USIA films used 
a certain formula: ‘The world of the village is shown to be disturbed by a disease, such as 
tuberculosis or dysentery, but soon stability and calm is restored thanks to an external agent’ 
(Naficy 2003:193). Furthermore, Naficy puts forward: ‘The diegesis of these films was peopled 
with a central character (usually a young boy such as Said who suffers from tuberculosis), 
and a central authority figure (such as Doctor Khoshqadam) who treats him’ (Ibid.). Both 
the restoration of order and the central role of an (external) authority figure are identical 
to the New Order development films. Sen has remarked that: ‘In serious films dealing with 
social issues […] the solution to rural anarchy comes from outsiders who are professionals’ 
(Sen 1994:121). Under the New Order, the restoration of order was a fundamental part of 
development and other films. As Sen argues, almost every film produced during the New 
Order followed the same pattern. They depicted a situation in which order was overturned, 
requiring the combat of disorder, followed by a restoration of order at the end of the film (Sen 
1994:159, Sen and Hill 2000:146). In short, they were cast in the same mold as the USIA 
films. In films such as Desa di Kaki Bukit (Village at the Foot of the Hill, Asrul Sani, 1972), 
Dr. Siti Pertiwi Kembali ke Desa (Dr Siti Pertiwi Returns to the Village, Ami Prijono, 1979), 
and Joe Turun ke Desa (Joe Comes Back to the Village, Chaerul Umam, 1989) such external 
authority figures as doctors and engineers safeguard village life from harm.7
Parallel to the political discourse and stance of the United States government in the 
promotion of USIA policy films in the early 1950s, the modes of engagement of film 
pembangunan of the post-1965 New Order government can be linked to the political 
discourses and policies which were dominated by anti-communism and pro-development 
ideologies. It is very likely that USIA policy also was implemented in Indonesia in the 
1950s. Presumably the production and distribution of Gelora Pembangunan films, mostly 
documentaries and newsreels about successes in development screened in cinemas and 
shown in villages by mobile cinema units under the auspices of the National Film Company 
(Perusahaan Film Nasional, PFN) were stimulated by USIA policy. The financial aid and 
assistance granted by America in the 1950s to help establish the Indonesian film industry 
was conceivably also part of USIA strategies. Krishna Sen mentions that under the Technical 
Cooperation Administration (TCA) programme, in 1950 the PFN received US$ 500,000 from 
the American government for new film equipment. In addition, the US government paid for 
ten experts to be stationed in Indonesia for six years to oversee the implementation of the 
scheme. Moreover, a number of Indonesians working in cinema were sent to the US to train 
in various aspects of film-making under the Colombo Plan and TCA (Sen 1994:25).
Besides Usmar Ismail, such other film professionals as Asrul Sani (poet, intellectual 
and film director), Jayakusuma (academic and expert on traditional theatre), Nya Abbas 
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Acup, Wahyu Sihombing (both film directors), and Soemardjono (highly respected senior 
film editor) who had all received their education in American academic and professional 
institutions too, and were also committed to anti-leftist pro-Western film politics, held some of 
the key positions in film schools and professional cinematic bodies after 1965 (Sen 1994:38). 
However, I was not able to find any data which explicitly mention USIA involvement in 
supporting the Indonesian film industry, the training of film-makers, or production and 
distribution of propaganda development films. Still, if the same kind of film texts were 
produced, inspired by the same kind of political discourses and policies, it would seem fair to 
draw the conclusion that film pembangunan must have been produced for similar reasons.
Naficy argues that the US policy of technological transfer and development aid was 
based on the perception of ‘underdevelopment’ as a threat to the homogenization of 
the world in the interests of creating global markets founded on Western consumerist 
ideology (Naficy 2003:193). Naficy described how the majority of the chief authorities 
in the USIA films dispensing well-being and prosperity were Point 4 development 
agents and physicians. He argues that: ‘[These] figures invoked and legitimized by 
proxy the power, knowledge, competence, authority, and, indeed, the right of both the 
Iranian government (by whom they were employed) and the entire Western economic 
and industrial apparatus (which trained and sponsored them) to solve indigenous 
local problems’ (Naficy 2003:194). The heroes of film perjuangan and particularly the 
authority figures in film pembangunan of the New Order were used in the same way 
and endorsed the same ideology. They legitimized and supported New Order rule and 
its development policies, driven by the desire to become part of the modern globalized 
(capitalist) consumerist world. 
3.2. Film and historiography: Promotion and representations of New Order history 
As well as promoting its development policy through film, the regime used propaganda films 
to present its version of national history. Both the production and distribution of films which 
contained propaganda messages had been part of the mediascape ever since the medium of film 
entered Indonesia. First under Dutch colonial rule (1900-1942) and later under the Japanese 
occupation (1942-1945), various propaganda films were produced for the edification of national 
and transnational audiences. After Indonesian Independence in the 1950s, the State Film 
Corporation (Perusahaan Film Negara, PFN) began to produce short propaganda films. These 
films were generally designated Zeal for Development Films (Film Gelora Pembangunan), 
and were intended to arouse enthusiasm for modernization among the Indonesian rural masses 
(Prakosa 1997:184).8 These films, and later under the New Order other films produced by 
different government institutions, tended to be crammed with messages about the benefits of 
development. They also included instructional films that showed how the development policies 
of the different government departments should be implemented (Prakosa 1997:185).
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Gelora Pembangunan films and instructional films that encouraged development were 
shown either at mobile cinema screenings or in cinemas before the feature film was screened. 
In the 1980s, the films also began to be broadcast on the state television channel TVRI. Most 
of these films were labelled documentaries. As they overtly promoted government doctrines, 
the genre of documentaries was equated with propaganda (Prakosa 1997:190, 198). The 
films were all much of a muchness. Nearly all documentaries opened with the image of an 
aeroplane, followed by a map which set out the compass bearings, the plane landing in some 
remote area, and the image of native people doing their local dance to welcome the plane 
and the visitors it had brought (Garin Nugroho, personal communication in 2003). The object 
of the documentary was to depict the success of some development project or the exoticism 
of the preferably remote area, or a combination of both. All was accompanied by a voice-
over, using a particular documentary pitch, with some ‘cheery’ music typically associated 
with this type of film in the background. Gotot Prakosa claims any viewers charmed by the 
New Order documentaries were few and far between. They were simply too predictably 
boring. Consequently, as this unpalatable fact dawned, a more sophisticated approach was 
embarked on and propaganda messages were wrapped up in drama fiction narratives. In 
1983 the majority of development instruction and propaganda films used drama to get the 
messages across (Prakosa 1997:194).
Around the same time at which drama documentaries (docudrama) or fiction films were 
being used to spread New Order propaganda, there was a heightened interest in producing 
films about Indonesian history. In 1978 Brigadier General Dwipayana, the chief presidential 
image-builder, was installed as head of the Centre for State Film Production (Pusat Produksi 
Film Negara, PPFN, the former PFN). After 1965, PPFN had produced only a trickle of 
newsreels and documentaries. It had been reduced to operating mainly as a film-processing 
studio. Resurrected under Dwipayana’s supervision, the state-run production company was 
given new tasks and resources (Sen 1994:66). Obsessed by ideas about the need to educate 
the young in their national history because of an imminent shift of generations, Dwipayana 
was committed to big budget feature films about New Order history and the heroic role of 
the head of state. In 1979 the production of films which represented key narratives of New 
Order history commenced.
Krishna Sen and David Hill (2000:11) have noted that: ‘Explicitly in film and television 
the New Order defined the media as vehicles for the creation of a ‘national culture’ that 
would allow uncontested implementation of its development policies and more generally its 
authoritarian rule’. Next to this creation of a ‘national culture’, film also was an instrument to 
portray and strengthen the ‘national fiction’ (Anderson 1983) of the regime. The New Order 
based its legitimacy to rule on certain key narratives which were rooted in a constructed 
past. These key narratives developed into a ‘national fiction’ which shaped the depiction 
and imaginations of the nation. The most insistent of these narratives were based on three 
historical events. Under the New Order, these events were referred to as though they were 
film titles themselves: the Serangan Umum (‘General Attack’; the six-hour penetration of 
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Yogyakarta by the Indonesian forces on 1 March 1949 led by Soeharto); the Peristiwa G30S/
PKI (‘The Incident of the 30 September Movement/Indonesian Communist Party’); and 
Supersemar, the acronym for Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret (11 March Instruction), which 
placed the mandate to rule Indonesia firmly in Soeharto’s hands in 1966.9
A film was made featuring each of these three ‘highlights’ of history. These were intended 
to represent, pass on, and sanction the New Order version of the said historical events. The 
General Attack was actually represented twice. The first film about this event was produced 
in 1979. Janur Kuning (Yellow Coconut Frond, Alam Surawijaya) focuses on Soeharto as the 
historical and narrative hero. The second film was produced in 1982. Serangan Fajar (The 
Dawn Attack, Arifin C. Noer) is also about the General Attack, but not only about Soeharto. 
The film has three interlinked stories –‘the aristocratic family, ‘the poor family’, and the 
‘war of Independence’ – and depicts Soeharto in a more symbolic role.10 Both films were 
big-budget productions. The first was funded by revenues from the President himself, and 
even though not acknowledged officially, from the state oil company Pertamina. The second 
film was produced by PPFN (Sen 1994:90, 97), which also produced the film Djakarta 1966 
(Arifin C. Noer, 1982), about the signing of the instruction of 11 March 1966. Djakarta 1966 
concentrated on the chronological structure of this event (Kristanto 2005:227). However, 
soon after its premiere the film was taken out of circulation and today it appears impossible 
to retrieve the film in the archive of the Haji Usmar Ismail Film Center (Pusat Perfilman 
Haji Usmar Ismail, PPHUI) in Jakarta. Presumably the reasons for its vanishing act were 
some very positive reviews of the film praising the representation of President Soekarno, its 
storyline focusing on the lives of two fictitious students and not on particular tokoh, and the 
nuanced depiction of good and bad (Arifin 1989; Anirun 1989).
The most important historical narrative and film of the New Order regime was about the 
coup of 1965. The film Penumpasan Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI (Eradication of the Treason 
of the 30 September Movement/Indonesian Communist Party, Arifin C Noer, 1982), 271 
minutes long, is a docudrama which followed exactly the details of the official New Order 
history of the events surrounding the coup (Kristanto 2005:231). The account of the 1965 
coup was extremely relevant to the way in which the country was ruled under Soeharto. 
In her book History in uniform about the central role of the Indonesian military in the 
production of official history, Katharine McGregor has argued that: ‘The official version 
of the coup attempt was used to define Indonesian core values, including a commitment 
to religion and morality’ (McGregor 2007:109). The New Order version stated that PKI 
and it alone was the mastermind behind the coup and was therefore totally culpable. New 
Order official history, as it was printed in history books and taught in schools, suggested that 
after the Madiun Affair in 1948, in which PKI had rebelled against the central government, 
the Communist Party insidiously built up its strength. Over the years, the party infiltrated 
and indoctrinated leftist and Communist members of the military forces and directed the 
latter to rebel against the legitimate authority (Sulistiyo 1997:55-6) .11 Plans were made to 
overthrow the government of President Soekarno and install PKI in power. On the night of 
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30 September 1965 a group of young army officers under the leadership of Colonel Untung, 
aided and abetted by members of  PKI, abducted six senior generals and one lower-ranking 
officer, and brutally slaughtered them. Chaos followed, but order was restored when troops 
under the control of Major-General Soeharto captured Untung and crushed the communist 
leadership (Mackie and MacIntyre 1994:10).
The urgent need for the restoration of ‘peace and order’ in the wake of events of 1965-
1966 was the imperative factor cited to validate the repressive rule of the Soeharto regime. 
Passed over in silence in New Order history, but providing the very basis of its rule, was 
the purging and subsequent mass slaughter of presumed communists and leftist-orientated 
individuals which was unleashed by the coup of 1965. The post-G30S terror campaign of 
1965-1966 is estimated to have led to the massacre of between 500,000 and one million 
people. Another half a million people were imprisoned without trial, many for more than 
a decade. The New Order diligently fuelled the fear of a possible recurrence of the chaos 
which had proved so destructive in the aftermath of the coup. PKI was accused of being 
a seething source of evil, opposed to the state ideology Pancasila, and was subsequently 
demonized in the mass media.12 Accusations of being a communist had repercussions on 
whole families, a contagion passing on from one generation to the next. To the very end of 
Soeharto’s rule Indonesian people were repeatedly warned about the persistent ‘latent danger 
of communism’. When forces opposed the New Order government they were invariably 
accused of espousing communist ideologies. The fear of a recurrence of the events of 1965-
1966 and of the harsh repercussions which befell anyone accused of being a communist, was 
a powerful tool wielded to achieve the precious order so desired by the New Order.13 
The film Penumpasan Pengkhianatan G30S PKI was produced by PPFN. Its production 
commenced in 1982 and it was finished two years later. The film, with the revealing initial 
title Sejarah Orde Baru (History of the New Order, SOB), was based on the work of the 
military historian Nugroho Notosusanto. In 1981, when plans were made for the production 
of the film, the head of PPFN Dwipayana believed such a film could only be made under close 
government supervision (Sen 1994:82). G30S/PKI was produced to present the ‘historical 
facts’ behind the coup. In a speech which President Soeharto delivered to the Parliament of 
the Fourth Development government in 1984 before the compulsory screening of the film, he 
stated that the purpose behind the making of G30S/PKI was to inform the people, particularly 
the younger generation, about the dark side of Indonesian history, urging them to exercise 
vigilance so as to ensure that such an incident would never happen again (Atmowiloto 
1986:6). Dwipayana supported the President’s standpoint and argued that now that the older 
echelon of army officers and bureaucrats had been replaced by a younger generation, it was 
essential that those who were infants at the time of the coup in 1965 be informed of the ‘facts’ 
about ‘the viciousness of PKI’. He believed that by watching the film they would not err into 
and be seduced by communist ideologies (Ibid:5).
Dwipayana was not alone in his idea. Within a few months of its release, many government 
officials and bureaucrats began the task of organizing mandatory screenings for members of 
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the Indonesian Army (ABRI), government officials and bureaucrats, and schoolchildren. The 
New Order government never actually initiated these first screenings formally. However, it 
was not very long before the film was being used officially as a vehicle to transmit the New 
Order’s representation of the past. In 1984, G30S/PKI was made part of a compulsory screening 
programme in schools and government departments around 30 September. Moreover, it was 
also made part of the curriculum of the ‘Education in the History of the Struggle of the Nation’ 
(Pendidikan Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa, PSPB) for history classes in schools. In this guise it 
was screened in ‘P4 Pancasila’, state ideology indoctrination courses which were also obligatory 
for university students and civil servants.14 To date, the film is the single most screened, and 
presumably most-watched of all Indonesian films (Kristanto 2005:231; Sen and Hill 2000:148). 
A crucial aspect of the distribution and exhibition of G30S/PKI was the government’s ceaseless 
propaganda that the film depicted historical facts, and showed the one and only true version of 
the events surrounding the 1965 coup.
Under New Order rule, no other films which dealt directly with the 1965 coup were 
produced. As the film G30S/PKI was already there to represent the historical facts of the 
coup, all other films which might present other versions of the subject were precluded. There 
were only three other films which were set in the context of the struggle against communism. 
The first of these, Operasi X (Operation X), was produced in 1968 by the ‘devoutly Islamic 
and anti-communist’ Misbach Yusa Biran (Kristanto 2005:73; Sen 1994:81). The second, 
Penumpasan Sisa-sisa PKI Blitar Selatan (Operasi Trisula) (Extermination of the Remnants 
of PKI of South Blitar (Operation Trisula), BZ Kadaryono), was produced by PPFN in 1986. 
It dealt with the capture of communists in East Java in 1965-1966 and was presented in the 
form of a docudrama. As the plot of the film was so startlingly black and white, completely 
devoid of any nuances, it was perceived to be pure, unadulterated propaganda (Kristanto 
2005:290).15 The third film, a television soap with the title Terjebak (Trapped), directed 
by Dedi Setiadi, was produced in 1996. The soap’s production was initiated by the 1996 
Committee of the ‘Day of Commemoration of the Sacred Pancasila’, which also supplied the 
outline of the screenplay. Its theme was the riots which flared up after state troops attacked 
the office of the political opposition party Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia, PDI) on 27 July 1996 and it unashamedly represented the members of this party 
as part of ‘current communist activities’ (bud 1996; Iwan 1996).16
Above I mentioned the important role of heroes and authority figures in film perjuangan 
and film pembangunan. Furthermore, I alluded to the stress on the restoration of order as 
an inevitable ingredient in all New Order films. New Order history films shared both these 
traits. Obviously, in films about the highlights of New Order history the hero was Soeharto. 
The head of state was represented as both the hero of the struggle for independence and of 
the 1965 coup. Importantly, the films emphasized that after the coming to power of the New 
Order after 1965 order was restored in the nation. Another recurrent feature in New Order 
films which dealt with history was the juxtaposition of all sources of ‘evil’ against ‘good’, 
which was associated with Islam. In many films set in the past, both those dealing with New 
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Order historiography and in fictional historical tales, the protagonists were pious men or 
women. To give an example, both G30S/PKI and Operasi Trisula contain a scene in which 
brutal men (communists) violently storm into a Mosque and the house of pious Muslims 
respectively. There they attack innocent people who are praying, and trample on the Quran. 
These antagonists are depicted clearly showing contempt for Islam. 
For the beginning of G30S/PKI and an excerpt from Operasi Trisula see Disc Two 3.2.
In other scenes in both films there is no doubt that the good are religious. In Operasi Trisula 
all protagonists are adherents of Islam as indeed they are in the film G30S/PKI. However, the 
latter is more subtle in that it also highlights the Christian background of General Pandjaitan. 
In the scenes in the film which feature Pandjaitan and his family at home, Western classical 
music (which many Indonesians may assume to be ‘Church music’) is played. The camera 
also captures crosses on the wall. Likewise, in New Order films which were set in the past 
and based on fictional heroes, Islam was depicted as the nurturing source of the good which 
defeats all evil. For example, the films about Betawi (native Jakarta) folk legend Si Pitung 
and comic book character Jaka Sembung, which were produced in the 1980s, refer to Islam 
as an aid to overcoming problems.17
For an excerpt from Si Pitung Banteng Betawi see Disc Two 3.2.
The opposition between evil communism and good Islam in the historical films was 
part of the political discourses of the regime. Communists were accused of not believing in 
God, and generally speaking atheism was equated with communism. In History in uniform 
McGregor suggested that the manner in which the bodies of Army generals and lieutenant 
were dumped in the well at Lubang Buaya was particularly offensive to followers of Islam. 
Moreover she mentioned that in the first published Army version of the coup attempt it was 
noted that the coup had failed first and foremost because of ‘the hands of God’ (2007:69-70). 
However, McGregor pointed out that particularly in New Order historiography of the late 
1970s and early 1980s, Islam, mainly in its radical form, was also represented as a threat 
to the Pancasila and national stability. Only by the late 1980s concessions were made to 
support the promotion and practice of Islam as a religion, as opposed to political Islam. At 
that time President Soeharto had re-evaluated the Muslim vote after the implementation of 
the ‘sole foundation’ (asas tunggal) legislation – which required all organizations to make 
Pancasila their sole basis – and had made a move towards embracing Islam personally 
(Liddle 1996:614). Accordingly, in New Order representations in film, but also in museums 
and textbooks, followers of such ‘extremist’ and political Islamic groups as Darul Islam 
(House of Islam), who strove for an Islamic State after Independence, were presented as 
‘crazed bandits devoid of religious feelings’ (Heider 1991:105) rather than as Muslims who 
used the religious teachings properly (McGregor 2007:187, 191-2).18 
 The use of religion (mostly Islam) as the source of good in films was also part of a 
new code of ethics for film-making, which was launched by the Film Council (Dewan Film 
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Nasional, DFN) in 1981. One of the instructions in this Ethical Code was that ‘Dialogue, scenes, 
visualization, and conflicts between the protagonist and antagonist in the story have to focus on 
devotion to and the glorification of the One and Only God.’19 New Order historical films represented 
the past with modes of engagement which stressed heroism and contrasted the sources of evil with 
religion. Hence, it may come as no surprise that, as mentioned in the first section, some believed 
that films about the fictional characters Pitung and Jaka Sembung, which applied similar narrative 
devices, represented real-life national heroes. In Chapter Five and Six, I shall examine ideas and 
representations of heroes, reality, and religion in film in more detail.
3.3. ‘Film in the framework of’: G30S/PKI and Hapsak
The ways in which audiences read films do not necessarily coincide with the intention of film-
makers.20 Presumably to safeguard and drive home one particular reading of (propaganda) 
films as much as possible, under the New Order these films were subjected to the practice of 
‘framing’. The films were screened in the ‘framework’ (dalam rangka) of a particular event or 
(special) occasion. In 1997 the writer and scholar Umar Kayam launched the notion ‘art in the 
framework of’ (kesenian dalam rangka). In his article Kayam pointed out the practices of neo-
feudalism which were rooted in such different fields of Indonesian society as politics, business, 
bureaucracy, education, and the arts. Referring to the latter, Kayam argued: ‘In the field of the 
arts, these are constructed with reference to the supremacy of the authority in power and within 
a colossal presentation of ‘art in the framework of’ the ritualization of the nation’ (Kayam 
1997).21 Kayam’s phrase ‘art in the framework of’ can be easily transferred to the convention 
of screening ‘films in the framework of’: the practice of positioning and framing films in a 
specific context among other things to influence their assessment by their audience. New Order 
history films in particular lent themselves to screening in specific frameworks connected to 
national celebrations and commemorations of historical events. On national holidays, or on 
other particular occasions of collective remembrance, these films featured on television, in 
cinemas, and at mobile cinema screenings. This linking of films to the commemorations or 
celebrations of historical events was one element in a strategy to furnish and empower the New 
Order’s ‘invention’ of the past (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983).
In this section, I analyse the ‘frames’ and practice of ‘framing’ films connected to the 
concept of ‘film in the framework of’. My analysis covers the most extreme example of the 
practice of framing a film under the New Order: the role of the film G30S/PKI as part of the 
annual celebration, and media event, of the ‘Day of Commemoration of the Sacred Pancasila’ 
(Hari Peringatan Kesaktian Pancasila, henceforth Hapsak). I use the term ‘media event’ 
as it was coined by Dayan and Katz (1992). However, in contrast to Dayan and Katz, who 
discussed live events in democratic nations (1992:22), the media events of the New Order 
had a totalitarian background. Therefore some traits in the media events which Dayan and 
Katz postulated will be alien to Hapsak.22 
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The production of films to promote key narratives of the history of the New Order alone 
was not enough. To reach the goal of consolidating the New Order version of history, the 
films about the 1949 General Attack on Yogyakarta and the Incident of G30S/PKI were also 
assimilated into celebrations of collective remembrance. One exception was the film about 
the 11 March Instruction, which was denied the same treatment and status as the other films. 
As mentioned earlier, soon after production Djakarta 1966 somehow disappeared. The first 
special screening of the film Janur Kuning was held on 1 March 1980, in the context of the 
commemoration of the General Attack. Ten days later, on 11 March, the film was presented to 
the public as part of the celebration of the 11 March Instruction. Until the mid-1980s, every 
1 March Janur Kuning was shown on television to commemorate and pass on New Order 
images of national history. Thereafter the more successful film Serangan Fajar replaced 
Janur Kuning. Because of the more modest role of Soeharto, audiences perceived Serangan 
Fajar to be less blatant propaganda. Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI was also connected to the 
commemoration of a historical event: the coup of 1965. Every year from the mid-1980s 
until 1997 the film was broadcast simultaneously on all national television channels on the 
evening of 30 September as part of the annual commemoration and celebration of Hapsak 
on 1 October. 
G30S/PKI was screened for the first time on the Indonesian state television channel 
TVRI in the framework of Hapsak on 30 September 1985. After the advent of private 
television stations in 1993, all commercial broadcasters participated without exception. The 
simultaneous screenings became part of the ritual of Hapsak as a national holiday of the New 
Order. Ever since 1967, every year early in the morning on 1 October a military ceremony 
was held at the Monumen Pancasila Sakti (Sacred Pancasila Monument). The ceremony was 
broadcast live on television, and rerun a couple of times during the day.23 The Pancasila 
monument was built in Jakarta in 1973 near Lubang Buaya (Crocodile Hole), the dry well in 
which the bodies of the murdered Generals were found. A marble column was constructed 
around the well-head, and at some distance from the well stands the Pancasila monument. 
It consists of a huge stone shrine with a bronze relief of the New Order version of events as 
they took place on the night of 30 September 1965. Embellishing the top of the shrine are 
statues of the murdered generals and officer in a defiant stance, with the national symbol of 
the mythical eagle-like bird Garuda bearing a plaque with the five symbols of Pancasila on its 
chest in the background. There is another plaque which reads that ‘We the Generals perished 
to defend the honour of the sacred Pancasila’. Furthermore, an old wooden school building, 
the place where according to New Order history the abducted generals were tortured and 
mutilated by members of PKI, has been made into a museum with a diorama. On display are 
human size puppets of the abducted Generals, tied to chairs and bleeding as they are tortured 
by male and female ‘communists’. In the background an audiocassette plays sound fragments 
of the film G30S/PKI.
 Every October 1 the field around Lubang Buaya would be filled with representatives of 
the military and groups of schoolchildren who were lined up in regimented fashion. At the 
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back of the ranks of the military and schoolchildren, enormous placards bearing the images 
of the murdered Generals were erected. Under the trees near the old school building, an 
orchestra consisting of around 200 children drawn from both primary and high school played 
the national anthem and other songs extolling bravery and urging remembrance. The guests 
invited to attend the ceremony were the President, military officials, members of Parliament, 
foreign diplomats, and relatives of the murdered generals.
The broadcast of Hapsak invariably followed the same pattern. Before the ceremony 
commenced, either a studio discussion was held or such old archive material as newsreel 
footage was shown while a voice-over recounted the New Order account of the events; 
sometimes there was a combination of both. Every time this account began by enumerating 
particular events leading to the 1965 coup, and then passed on to the coup itself and the 
heroic deeds of Major-General Soeharto. It always ended with a warning about the ever-
present latent danger of those who sympathized with communist ideologies. Thereupon the 
studio switched over to Lubang Buaya to show the arrival of the President and Vice-President 
and their wives. Each year the composition of the ceremony consisted of two parts, beginning 
with a solemn service of observance and ending with a livelier commemorative component. 
The former commenced with the arrival of the President who advanced to a podium where, 
once he had taken up his position, a colonel asked for his permission to begin the service. After 
that, the national anthem was played and the President, as master of ceremonies, authorized 
the beginning of the observance by ordering the participants to bow their heads. Following 
a minute’s silence the national anthem was played again, after which another component of 
the service began. In this section, four documents – the text of the Pancasila, the first lines 
of the National Constitution of 1945, the Ikrar (pledge, or charter to honour and defend the 
Pancasila), and a prayer – were read by Parliamentary ministers. The Ikrar document was 
signed as proof that the ceremony had taken place that year. The documents were handed over 
by high school students, two boys and two girls, dressed in uniforms resembling those worn 
by the navy, who would march to the officials, hand over the documents, and then march back 
to their places in military fashion. The service was closed by order of the President and was 
concluded by playing the national anthem.
In the second part of Hapsak the President, Vice-President, and their wives, followed by 
foreign diplomats, paid a visit to the well, the monument, and the old school building-cum-
museum. This completed, the President shook the hands of the wives and relatives of the 
murdered Generals. Finally, at the end of the ceremony he listened to the orchestra of school 
children. Often the President would shake the hand of the conductor and pat the soloist (a 
small boy either singing or playing violin) who had just performed the touching melody 
‘Gugur Bunga di Taman Bakti’ (Fallen Flowers in the Garden of Devotion, composed by 
Ismail Marzuki) on the shoulder. As the President left Lubang Buaya the orchestra played 
an upbeat song paying tribute to bravery. In this second part of the ceremony every year the 
television commentator could be heard to repeat the same ‘mantras’ as the President and his 
company were filmed walking from one site to another. These mantras began by mentioning 
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various treacheries perpetrated by communists, starting with the rebellion against the Central 
government in Madiun in 1948, up to the coup of 1965. Then he or she summed up the content 
of the pledge which stated that those who attended the ceremony (and watched the television 
programme) were aware of the coup perpetrated against the legitimate government attempted 
by PKI and its 30 September Movement. It ushered in ‘a national tragedy culminating in the 
vicious and inhumane death of the heroes of the Revolution’.24 This national tragedy had 
been allowed to occur as the result of a lack of caution about the actions of PKI, which had 
deliberately deceived a part of the Indonesian people in its attempts to eradicate Pancasila 
and its denial of the oneness of the Indonesian nation. In conclusion, the commentator warned 
that the Indonesian people should remain vigilant to the latent danger of communism. In the 
meantime, as a background to the voice of the commentator, the orchestra of schoolchildren 
could be heard playing national songs of remembrance and bravery.
For an excerpt from Hapsak 1995 see Disc Two 3.3.
Both the outline and gist of the media event Hapsak and the screening of the 
film G30SPKI as part of the commemoration of the 1965 coup were components in a 
conscious device to refurbish collective memories.25 Dayan and Katz argued that media 
events can be perceived as electronic monuments (1992:211-212), and this label can 
also be applied to the film G3OS/PKI. As an annual rite commemorating the 1965 coup 
it served to buttress the power bases of the New Order regime. The four elements which 
formed the nucleus of the Hapsak media event were: the frequent screening of the same 
newsreel images before the Hapsak commemoration would begin; the standard use of 
specific nationalist songs; the repeated citation of certain ‘mantras’ and the seemingly 
endless reiteration by the commentator that the account consisted of historical ‘facts’; 
and the emphasis on the ‘latent danger of communists’. The event was to ensure that 
history would be remembered in a particular way, thereby propagating and fertilizing 
New Order representations of Indonesian history. However, these elements were 
also responsive to contemporaneous political needs. In an article about the basis for 
and changing context of commemoration of Hapsak, McGregor points out the subtle 
changes of the meaning of the day during the course of the New Order. She shows how 
over time the day became an occasion on which such new enemies of the regime as 
extremist Islam and other possible political threats to the regime, labelled ‘atheists’, 
were defined in response to changing political circumstances (McGregor 2002).26
The film G30S/PKI as an electronic or audio-visual monument to the New Order 
was founded to create and bolster collective memories. Initially it was used to serve 
as a ‘medium of memory’ which transferred ‘sets of images’ of a social understanding 
of events, represented as memory (Watson 1994:8); later it was transformed into a 
monument. It can be accepted as a monument of the New Order not least because of the 
status it achieved and the position it assumed as part of official discourses and strategies 
advocating a certain version of history. This bestowed on it an enormously influential 
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position in Indonesian collective memory. In 2001, the senior journalist and founder of 
Tempo magazine Goenawan Mohammad quoted a survey which showed that more than 
80 per cent of the respondents believed that the film presented a factual account of the 
event (Lloyd and Smith, 2001:131).27 The film was made widely known through the 
mechanisms of its distribution and exhibition as an essential part of Hapsak, as well as 
through the extensive compulsory screening programmes mentioned earlier.
In contrast to the Pancasila monument, which was physically confined to Lubang 
Buaya, Hapsak and the film G30S/PKI were not bound to a place, but were mobile. 
Hapsak, and the screening of G30S/PKI on the eve of Hapsak, travelled to its audiences; 
if the television happened to be turned on, the event entered the space of Indonesian 
households through its simultaneous broadcast on all national television channels. 
But, in contradistinction to Hapsak, the film G30S/PKI was not restricted to television 
alone. Every 30 September it was and could be attended in Indonesian cinemas across 
the country, in which the film was screened as part of the history curriculum, making 
it obligatory viewing for schoolchildren. G30S/PKI even travelled abroad where it 
was screened at Indonesian embassies as part of the state-constructed P4 Pancasila 
training course for Indonesian students and bureaucrats (Buana-R 1985; BY 1985; 
DI/4 1985). 
The films Janur Kuning and Serangan Fajar can also be interpreted as mobile 
audio-visual cultural monuments of the New Order. Both films represented historical 
key narratives of the regime and were accorded a treatment comparable to the film 
G30S/PKI. They were screened on 1 March in the framework of the commemoration 
of the General Attack, or at other celebrations or occasions connected to Indonesian 
Independence. In the case of Janur Kuning (1979) and Serangan Fajar (1982), the 
audio-visual monuments were produced even before the physically constructed version 
of the historical incident was founded: the monument dedicated to the General Attack, 
the Monumen Yogya Kembali (Return of Yogyakarta Monument), was built as late 
as 1985. However, because the films were never made a component in a compulsory 
screening programme in the scope of G30S/PKI, they never achieved the monumentality 
accorded that film.
The linking of New Order films about history to events which commemorate the 
past is an example of the use of film ‘in the framework of’. In its connection to Hapsak 
the film G30S/PKI offers an extreme example of this practice. Besides the New Order 
history films, there were other films also screened in particular frameworks. These 
frameworks were not necessarily connected to national holidays or celebrations of the 
past or of the state, even though they were often used in this fashion.28 In the case of 
the New Order history films, the rhetoric of framing was fashioned to provide a two-
pronged thrust: to give a form and context to the way the films were intended to be 
read, and to make these films part of or, alternatively, to turn the watching of these 




Certain genres emerge in certain times and reflect contemporaneous socio-political 
inclinations. This phenomenon can be found in the production of particular film genres and 
the traits they exhibit, the discourses about these genres and their meanings, and the position 
they are assigned in discourses and in national film history. In early discussions about the new 
genre of independent film in the autumn of 1998, confusion arose about how to understand 
this Reformasi genre. Because of its name, it was sometimes thought that the themes of film 
independen were drawn from the struggle for Indonesian independence, just as were the 
familiar film perjuangan. Film perjuangan, film pembangunan, and docudrama/propaganda 
documentaries were important film genres of the New Order. These genres reflected its rule 
and rhetoric, and were linked from the perspective of film history to New Order discursive 
practices. The genres acquired a meaning idiosyncratic to the way in which they were used 
during the Soeharto regime.
The New Order regime made use of film to secure and propagate its version of national 
history. It is no coincidence that a film was made on each of the three key narratives of history 
on which the New Order regime based its legitimacy to rule the nation. The most important 
of these historical narratives and films was inspired by the account of the coup of 1965 
upheld by the regime. With the passing of the years and as an inescapable part of compulsory 
film screenings and the practice of Hapsak, the film Penghianatan G30S/PKI was slowly 
but surely turned into an audio-visual monument of the New Order. The joint practices of 
promoting and framing gave G30S/PKI an almost mythical position in Indonesian popular 
collective memory. 
An analysis of the conventions in text production and consumption of New Order history 
and development films exposes the socio-political climate of the time. These genres contained 
parallel modes of engagement of the New Order version of the past and of its concomitant 
ideologies. History and development films invariably contained the same actors (heroes, 
authority figures), and themes (restoration of order, ‘good’ Islam combatting its selected 
source of evil (communism), and claims to represent factual reality). These features mirrored 
the dominant discourses on how to characterize society under New Order rule. I hasten to 
stress that the dominant narratives and generic conventions of heroes and authority figures, 
claims to factual reality, and the restoration of order are not restricted to either Indonesia as a 
nation or the New Order alone. On average, worldwide film texts feature heroes, the victory 
of good over evil, and a restoration of order. In performing this function, documentaries and 
films present truth claims in many different contexts. However, as Trinh Minh-ha (1993:195) 
has argued, there is no absolute elucidation of the significations and symbols of the colour 
red. The value it is attributed varies between one culture and another and also proliferates 
within the confines of each culture. 
Likewise, the film genres and films which were representative of New Order historiography 
and its ideologies delineated the dominant socio-political discourses of the regime. 
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They reveal the ideal espoused by the regime of how the past and present in Indonesian society 
should be represented or imagined. In this account, an important element was found in the 
socio-political context of New Order rule and how this resembled the political climate in Iran 
in the 1950s. Both countries espoused an anti-communist sentiment and exhibited virtually 
identical films promoted by USIA film policies.29 The logical corollary is that the production 
of film texts and the promotion of certain genres can be seen as part of a political discourse, 
outlook, and policy which involved, but simultaneously transcended, Indonesian boundaries. 
Another element which addressed the context of New Order politics was the unrelenting 
promotion and advocacy of the head of state (mainly in the film G30S/PKI) as a hero and 
an authority figure, who restored order after the 1965 coup, protected Indonesia against 
communism, and was therefore entitled to rule the nation. Examining discourse practices 
at the intersection of text production and consumption, the account of the convention of 
screening films in the framework of a particular event or occasion also opened a window to 
New Order political affairs. The examples of New Order historical films, and particularly the 
connection of G30S/PKI to the media event Hapsak, leave no doubt about the way the films, 
and indeed the past, should be read and remembered. To screen the films as part of rites of 
commemoration was to assign a uniform shade of red to historiography.
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4  Post-colonial histories, common people,  
and commercial frameworks 
Introduction
The New Order can be construed as a neo-imperialist or neo-colonialist regime (Anderson 
1990, Sen 2003). Particularly in the period immediately after the resignation of President 
Soeharto, discussions began to emerge in the world of film which addressed concepts of 
post-colonialism in cinema. This chapter examines a variety of post-colonial discourses 
and discourse practices in film after the eclipse of the New Order. The guiding theme is 
Fairclough’s premise that all ongoing changes in society and culture are expressed in the 
media’s diverse and conflicting shifts in discursive practices (1995:52). I analyse the way 
in which, after the stepping down of President Soeharto, new post-colonial discourses and 
imaginations of society were reflected in film discourse practices. I explore the emergence of 
alternative genres and try to pinpoint the continuations in particular modes of engagement, 
the dominant representations of topics which are part of the central discourses in a society, 
and the practice of framing films, which continued to survive during Reformasi. As argued 
by Fairclough, the discursive practices of an unsettled society are on average variable and 
unstable, while the discursive practices of a conservative and established society are unitary 
and conventional (Ibid:65). Using this argument, I will examine variations and continuities 
in representations of Indonesian history and society during the upsetting yet exciting times 
of Reform.
4.1.  Counter-history: Changes and continuities in Post-Soeharto modes of engagement
In the euphoric atmosphere of Reform that prevailed after the resignation of President 
Soeharto, in all kinds of fields attempts were enthusiastically made to adapt to changes in the 
socio-political conditions of the Indonesian nation or to set them in motion. Some debates 
addressed the problem of New Order historiography and the need to ‘set history straight’ 
(‘meluruskan sejarah’).1 Hence dominant representations of New Order film history also 
came under fire. In addition to questioning the highlights in film history, several debates 
concentrated on New Order propaganda historical films. The contents and compulsory 
screening of the film Penumpasan Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI in particular were targeted.
The excitement of Reform and the concomitant sudden freedom of expression generated 
new developments in discursive practices which inevitably involved the contents and 
mediation of films. Different film-makers, both professional and amateur, began to produce 
films in order to present new versions of history and society. In next to no time, there was 
a rise in the production of documentaries. A large number of the new documentaries told 
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alternative or counter-histories to those unfolded under the New Order. Generally speaking, 
these documentaries tended to focus on the victims of Soeharto rule. Those who had suffered 
were given a platform to tell their stories about the atrocities committed under the New Order. 
Several non-governmental organizations, both foreign and domestic, aided in producing 
and funding these documentaries. The film Kameng Gampoeng nyang Keunong Geulawa 
(The village goat takes the beating, Aryo Danusiri 1999), for example, was supported by the 
Indonesian Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy Elsham, and his film Penyair 
Negeri Linge (The poet of Linge homeland, 2000) by the Ford Foundation. 
For an excerpt from the documentary Kameng Gampoeng nyang Keunong Geulawa 
(Aryo Danusiri 1999) see Disc Two 4.1. 
The film Perempuan di Wilayah Konflik (Women in conflict zones, Gadis Arivia 2002) was 
produced by the Yayasan Jurnal Perempuan, Lahir di Aceh (Born in Aceh, Ariani Djalal 
2003) was produced by the Tifa Foundation and Offstream Production, Pena Pena Patah 
(Broken pens, Sarjev Faozan, 2002) was produced by the Coalition of NGO’s on Human 
Rights in Aceh, and Kado Buat Rakyat Indonesia (A present for the Indonesian People, 
Daniel Indra Kusuma 2003) was supported by the Centre for Democracy and Social Justice, 
and the Indonesia Centre for Reform and Social Emancipation.
Besides documentaries, a few fiction films based on true stories of human rights 
violations were also produced. For example, the docu-drama Puisi tak Terkuburkan (English 
title A Poet, Garin Nugroho, 1999) was about Ibrahim Kadir, a traditional poet from the 
village of Takengon in Aceh, who in 1965 was accused of being a Communist activist. He 
was imprisoned for twenty-two days and witnessed a variety of cruel executions. Marsinah 
(directed by Slamet Rahardjo, 2002) was about the murder of a woman factory worker by 
the authorities in East Java in May 1993. Kutunggu di Sudut Semanggi (I’ll be waiting at the 
corner of Semanggi, Lukmantoro 2004) was based on the Semanggi tragedy of November 
1998. Many counter-history film and documentary productions circulated at independent film 
screenings and film festivals both in Indonesia and abroad. Some even reached Indonesian 
cinemas, but hardly any of these films were ever screened on Indonesian television, enabling 
them to attract the same attention and reach enjoyed by the New Order history films in the 
past.
The new documentaries and their screening at film festivals and other venues gradually set 
in motion a shift in the meaning of the genre. From being a propaganda instrument under the 
New Order, documentary was transformed into a genre which gave a ‘voice to the voiceless’. 
Nevertheless, the notion that the documentary genre almost invariably contained propaganda 
lingered on for quite some time. The legacy of the New Order connotations of this genre 
was apparent in the choice different film-makers made to produce either a documentary or 
fiction film after the collapse of the New Order regime. If the objective was to make a claim 
that the contents of the film represented facts based on reality, some film-makers preferred to 
make a fiction film. To cite one example, in 2000 the Muhammadiyah University in Malang 
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(UMM) wanted to produce a film which would give an account of the propagation of Islam in 
Indonesia. This film was to be based on authentic historical evidence obtained from sources 
collected by the Muhammadiyah. The principal of the university, Mahadjir Effendi, said 
they had decided to make a fiction film instead of a documentary ‘to avoid the practices of 
manipulation, as had been done in the historical documentary G30S/PKI’. In his opinion a 
fiction film was not only easier to digest, it was also more ‘objective’ (FM/B-2 2000).
Although there was a discernible rise in documentaries which countered New Order 
propaganda and historiography, particularly in the first years of Reform many new productions 
employed structures, styles and formulas which did not deviate greatly from New Order 
propaganda and history films. In this section I begin with an example of two post-Soeharto 
documentaries which in certain audio or visual features either refer to or repeat particular 
styles and narrative traits found in the film G30S/PKI and also in the Hapsak ceremony. This 
description is followed by an analysis of the repetition of old styles and narrative traits in new 
and counter-propaganda documentaries in a broader context.
Bill Nichols postulates that the use of certain styles and modes of production in 
documentaries defines concepts of historical representation. He argues that such modes of 
documentary production as ‘expository’, ‘observational’, ‘interactive’ and ‘reflexive’ function 
in the same fashion as genres, in that they are ways of characterizing films by their likeness to 
rather than their differences from one another. But instead of co-existing as different types of 
imaginary worlds (science fiction, westerns, melodrama), modes represent different concepts 
of historical representation. Nichols claims that different modes may co-exist at any moment 
in time and can be transposed across different periods and national cinemas. The creation of 
a new mode is the result of challenge and contestation elicited by a previous mode (1991:22-
3). As Nichols links modes of documentary production to the identification of concepts of 
historical representation, this presupposes that the appearance of new modes also challenges 
previous models of historical representation. Nichols’ argument about modes of production 
applies equally to modes of engagement. However, in early post-Soeharto documentaries 
specific New Order modes of engagement were repeated, even though the purpose of the 
films was to edit and re-edit collective memory. This section contains an outline and analysis 
of this process, bearing in mind that the reproduction of New Order audio-visual styles, 
structures, and narratives in post-Soeharto documentary productions may also simply relate 
to the widespread practice of ‘jiplak-menjiplak’ (the replication, imitation, or blatant copying) 
of film formulas. 
The post-Soeharto documentary Mass Grave (2001, Lexi Rambadeta) addresses an aspect of 
Indonesian history which was passed over in silence under New Order rule. The film is about 
the exhumation in Central Java in 2001 of a mass grave containing the remains of massacred 
alleged PKI members in the mountains of Wonosobo sometime in 1965-1966. In its opening 
scenes, Mass Grave instantly recalls the visualization of New Order documentaries and 
the film Penumpasan Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI. This similarity is particularly striking in 
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the composition of the last fifteen minutes of the film. The closing scenes of G30S/PKI are 
devoted to the retrieval of the bodies of the slain generals from the dry well of Lubang Buaya. 
Soon after the scene begins it shows the image of the tops of the trees clustered around the 
well shot from a low angle. Then from a top angle the camera zooms in on the well from 
which the decomposing bodies of the generals are taken out one by one. Thereupon, the 
camera moves back filming the bystanders. The position of the bystanders, among them 
the actor playing the role of Major General Soeharto, was a detailed reconstruction from 
the historical archive material of the event. On screen a text appears alerting the audience 
that the voice which they are about to hear is the authentic recorded live speech of Soeharto 
obtained from archive material. At the same time the speech begins to be broadcast in the 
background, the soundtrack of ‘Gugur Bunga di Taman Bakti’ (which was composed during 
the presidency of Soekarno to pay respect to national heroes who had fallen in the struggle 
for independence) begins to play. At that point, the original colour image of G30S/PKI is 
replaced by black and white archive material. In the minutes that follow the film continues 
with cross-cutting shots of the re-enacted drama, copying the archive material of the incident 
in detail, with real footage of the occasion in black and white. 
For an excerpt from the closing scenes of G30S/PKI see Disc Two 4.1. 
The film ends with archive material of the state funeral of the generals and the authentic 
live speech delivered by General Nasution in 1965, in which he recalls the sacred tasks 
of the Armed Forces as defenders of the freedom, the people, and the highest authorities 
of the nation. He asserts his belief that the slain generals are national heroes who paid the 
ultimate price and that the living members of the Armed Forces should continue to uphold 
these values. In both the dramatized version, which is filmed in colour, and in the historical 
black and white footage material some shots of photo and film cameras are included in order 
to emphasize that these cameras captured and recorded the event to which the viewers bear 
witness.2 Using to the fullest advantage the cross-cutting of fictional film with historical 
audio and visual archive material in the last fifteen minutes, G30S/PKI emphasized it was not 
merely a representation of the past, but a representation of the facts: ‘the true story’.
The documentary Mass Grave reproduced the structure and some of the visual aspects of 
Hapsak and the last fifteen minutes of G30S/PKI.  However, the human remains exhumed could 
not have been more different: not those of the generals at Lubang Buaya but those of the people 
killed in massacres in 1965 in Central Java. Just as in the film G30S/PKI, after its opening 
scene, which shows a map of the location, Mass Grave begins with the depiction of the tops of 
the trees encircling the mass grave in Wonosobo. Then the camera zooms in on the exhumation 
of the skulls and bones of people who perished in the bloody aftermath of the 1965 coup. After 
this opening sequence, the documentary introduces black and white archive material images. 
This time it is not the set-up of the scene itself, but the insertion of old stock footage and 
newsreel images which remind the viewer of New Order documentaries. The same material 
was televised each year under the New Order before the Hapsak ceremony commenced to 
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illustrate the story of the historical events which occurred in 1965. 
For an excerpt from Mass Grave see Disc Two 4.1. 
The visual structure and style of the opening scenes of Mass Grave revived and repeated 
images which easily could have been part of the collective memories of Indonesians who 
lived through the New Order. I am thinking especially of the image of the retrieval of the 
decomposing bodies of the murdered generals from a dry well at the end of G30S/PKI. This 
image was now replaced by the dry bones of the victims from the mass grave in Wonosobo, 
brought to the surface one by one. Importantly, in Mass Grave old stock footage and newsreel 
images, familiar to many, were used again, but this time provided with a new narration 
exposing the atrocities committed at the founding of the New Order. 
The second example of a post-Soeharto documentary which reproduces particular emblems 
of the film G30S/PKI and the Hapsak ceremony is Tino Saroengallo’s 1998 documentary 
Student Movement in Indonesia. It depicts demonstrations and rallies and the ensuing violent 
clashes between student activists and the Indonesian army in Jakarta in 1998. The documentary 
recounts the incidents at the Trisakti University and at the Semanggi flyover in which students 
were shot dead. In this documentary an important audio motif of G30S/PKI and the Hapsak 
ceremony, the song ‘Gugur Bunga di Taman Bakti’, appears and is commented on. In G30S/
PKI, ‘Gugur Bunga’ is used as a theme song at the end. In the last fifteen minutes the soundtrack 
of the song is heard as though from a great distance at the moment the bodies of the generals are 
retrieved. The song can be heard more loudly in the background to the live speeches of Soeharto 
and Nasution. ‘Gugur Bunga’ was a leitmotif during the Hapsak ceremony, in which it featured 
over and over again. Often the song was played exactly at the moment when the President either 
headed for the children’s orchestra or when he was standing in front of it. The song also often 
featured in the background to the newsreel and stock footage material broadcast before the 
Hapsak ceremony commenced. In Student Movement, students sang the song to commemorate 
the Trisakti incident: on 12 May 1998, the army killed four students of the Trisakti University 
in Jakarta. In the documentary, a voice-over comments that the students and the army were 
singing the same songs of bravery and nationalism. 
For an excerpt from the film see Disc Two 4.1. 
The reproduction of certain audio and visual structures or emblems from the film G30S/
PKI and the Hapsak ceremony can be seen as quotations of important New Order electronic 
monuments which tell new histories. Ella Shohat and Robert Stam suggest that: ‘The same 
filmic images and sounds provoke distinct reverberations in different communities’ (1994:353). 
To paraphrase Shohat and Stam, in post-Soeharto Indonesian communities, some filmic images 
and sounds evoked specific reverberations. Quotations of audio and visual aspects of the film 
G30S/PKI and the Hapsak media event might have acted as an instant trigger to the subtexts of 
these themes, which relate to conceptions of heroism and nationalism. 
Although this was not necessarily the intention of the directors of the films, the 
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examples demonstrate a juxtaposition of old images and new narrations, and new images 
and old narrations.3 The altered use of emblems which were part of memory sites of the 
New Order now abstracted from their source functioned as a device which re-structured 
national history and public memory. At viewings of Mass Grave in Jakarta in 2002 and 2003, 
audiences commented that the film instantly brought to mind images of the decomposing 
bodies of the generals in the epic G30S/PKI. In their theory of media events, Dayan and 
Katz postulate that the collective memory in a society is edited and re-edited by quoting from 
earlier events (1992:211). These Indonesian documentaries, in which specific monumental 
images and sounds were used in a different context, are examples of such a process. In the 
case of Mass Grave, the same mode of visual representation was employed to tell a reversal 
of the authorized story: that of the victims of the New Order.4 In the documentary Student 
Movement, the melody ‘Gugur Bunga di Taman Bakti’ was quoted to usher in new national 
heroes: the Trisakti students who were killed by the Indonesian Army.
The emphasis on victims and newly created heroes in two very disparate documentaries 
can be used to illustrate preoccupations with certain modes of representation in a majority 
of documentaries which were produced after the end of Soeharto rule. In the first few years 
of Reform, many new and ‘counter-propaganda’ films and documentaries were employed to 
provide a forum for victims and shape new heroes to displace the old, hackneyed ones. Apart 
from the documentary Student Movement in which ‘Gugur Bunga’ was used to define the 
heroes of Reformation, the reproduction of the conventional narrative trait of heroism in New 
Order propaganda and historical films was significant. In December 2003, the organizing 
committee of the Indonesian Documentary Film Festival (Festival Film Dokumenter, FFD) 
in Yogyakarta allowed me to watch all fifty or so films which were to participate in the 
FFD competition that year. Watching these films, it struck me that a substantial part of the 
documentaries followed a New Order or Gelora Pembangunan-dictated style. As mentioned 
in Chapter Three, this kind of documentary begins with a map and a voice-over which, 
assuming a particular documentary narration pitch, gives precise information about the 
setting or location of the film. In the meantime, some sort of unrelated entertaining ‘cheery’ 
music score plays in the background. Most of the films I saw which began in this fashion 
could be fast-forwarded to just a few minutes before the end. There indisputably the hero of 
the story emerged. Depending on the subject of the documentary, all the main characters – 
the housewife, the person collecting the garbage, or the man cutting trees for a living – were 
positioned as heroes, fulfilling the ordinary day-to-day ‘heroic’ deeds of common people.
The overt Gelora Pembangunan type of documentaries stood no chance of selection 
in the competition. Instead, the festival committee chose films which were either shot in a 
‘Discovery’ or ‘National Geographic’ channel style, or entries which exhibited more original 
modes of documentary production. In 2004 and 2005 most documentaries which entered 
the FFD competition had discarded the styles and contents of the New Order. By this time 




The trait in post-Soeharto documentaries which continued to depict heroes has to be 
seen as a legacy of the New Order, in the sense that it conveyed a partial extension of its text 
conventions. It put forward a particular understanding of the modes used in the representation 
of documentaries which were formed under Soeharto rule.6 The parallel trend in the new 
documentary productions, which now stressed the victims of the regime, was part of the 
same discourse; only the point of view was turned around one-hundred-and-eighty degrees.7 
Nevertheless, there was also an important innovation in both the post-Soeharto documentaries 
on victims of New Order rule and those which featured new heroes. Their chosen focus 
was the common people: victims, students, housewives, or people collecting garbage. These 
documentaries revealed a shift from the ‘voice of authority’ to the ‘voice of the voiceless’ and 
they substituted tokoh for ordinary people. The emphasis on narrative traits of victims and 
newly found heroism in the early post-Soeharto documentaries initially showed that dominant 
discourses and narrative structures of New Order historiography were being reproduced. 
4.2. Post-colonial histories and identities; film Islami
Representations of Islam and Muslim participation in Indonesian audio-visual media both 
increased significantly after the resignation of President Soeharto. The rise of Islamic film 
production companies and the empowerment of Islamic film communities required that new 
practices of Islamic self-representation be found. One group of young Islamic film-makers in 
particular shaped new discourses on the position and representations of Islam in Indonesian 
and transnational audio-visual media. This new film movement explicitly referred to the 
post-colonial discourses deriving from Third Cinema theories. Moreover, their discourses 
indicated affiliations with communities worldwide. In this section I look at the emergence 
post-Soeharto of the genre film Islami (Islamic film) and its attempt to present counter-histories 
in film. I emphasize the rise of Islamic film as part of a film movement which wanted to tell 
its own post-colonial histories and stories in an authentic ‘Indonesian’ fashion. 
Film and Islam were not easily united. Under the New Order, ulama (Muslim religious 
teachers or leaders) discussed the issue of film officially for the first time in 1983. In the 
same year the film Sunan Kalijaga (Sofyan Sharna) was produced. The film was based on 
the legend of Sunan Kalijaga, the first of the nine holy men, wali sanga, who are believed 
to have disseminated the teachings of Islam in Java.  In conjunction with the production 
of Sunan Kalijaga, a dialogue about film was organized between ulama from the Majelis 
Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulama Council, MUI) and film journalists. In newspapers it 
was said that most ulama believed it was unfitting to watch a film in a cinema, which was 
associated with indecent films and such improper behaviour as secretly kissing in the dark 
on a date (Bintang 1983; Jasin 1985). The aim of the dialogue was to explore to what extent 
film could be used as a form of Islamic preaching or dakwah (Islamic religious intensification 
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activities)8, and to find a way to combine the traditional mediation of oral preaching with 
the visual aspects of film. As some subjects may not be visualized in Islam, questions were 
raised about how religious teachings should be presented, and in what way certain concrete 
religious principles could be represented in filmic symbols. However, most of the discussion 
concentrated on the film Titian Serambut Dibelah Tujuh (English title ‘The Narrow Bridge’, 
Chairul Umam 1982), which was screened before the discussion in order to give the ulama 
an idea of what an Islamic film could be like (‘Ulama dan pers diskusikan.’1983).
 About a year and a half after the initial formal discussion the first ‘official’ Indonesian 
Islamic mission film was produced. The fiction film with the title Sembilan Wali (‘Nine 
saints’, Djun Saptohadi, 1985) was based on various legends and folk-tales about the wali 
sanga which circulated in Indonesia. 
For an excerpt from Sembilan Wali see Disc Two 4.2.
Following closely in the footsteps of Sembilan Wali came another ‘nine-saints film’. Once 
again this film, which bore the title Sunan Kalijaga & Syeh Sitijenar (Sofyan Sharna, 1985), 
was about Sunan Kalijaga and his dealings with an apostate. The premiere of this film was 
watched by 250 ulama, who had gathered in Jakarta to attend the third national MUI meeting 
from 20 to 23 July 1985. Although in earlier times, many ulama had believed that watching 
films was haram (proscribed), this time those who were interviewed were by and large 
approving. Nevertheless, they did not miss the opportunity to stress that particularly films 
which contained any slightly sexual scenes, such as nudity or unmarried men and women 
socializing together, were still prohibited. Perhaps because of the lack of titillating scenes, 
the film Sunan Kalijaga & Syeh Sitijenar proved not to be particularly enthralling: many 
ulama fell asleep while watching it. When their opinion about the film was asked, most of 
them could not comment because they had missed part or nearly all of it (Jasin 1985).
From 1989, discussions about the connection of film and Islam began to find their way 
into newspapers and magazines. The link between the two was also the subject of a variety 
of conferences and gatherings. In these discussions various questions were addressed: How 
should the production of ‘entertaining’ dakwah films be tackled? How could these be made 
to function as an alternative to oral preaching traditions? Was it possible to find a formula 
for a film with religious themes which would be acceptable to all parties? What role could 
be assumed by ulama or other religious authority figures in the production of films? There 
was a tacit agreement that the involvement of religious authorities was essential to pre-empt 
errors which could easily ignite the spark of protest. Should they merely act as consultants with 
the task of ensuring that everything which had to do with religion in film was represented in 
‘the right way’? Or should their involvement be deeper? Should ulama also invent or propose 
ideas for films, indeed even become actors themselves, in order to attract an audience (5.16/2.4 
1993; Cahyono 1989; KV/32 1990; Mahmud, Nashir and Suryanto 1990)? Apart from these 
questions, most of which addressed the content of Islamic films, the bulk of the discussions 
about film and Islam was motivated by the perceived need for the production of Islamic films 
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in modern Indonesia (Ant/2.4 1993; Mahmud, Nashir and Suryanto 1990). Between 1994 and 
1996, Islamic intellectuals stressed that in the present era of information and globalization it 
was extremely important to set up some resistance to the influx of films from overseas. They 
were convinced these films promoted nothing but secularism, sex, and violence (Arief 1996). If 
the Indonesian community were to produce Islamic films, Indonesians, of whom the majority 
were adherents of Islam, would be offered a lifeline by which to hold onto their own culture.
Indonesian films did not escape criticism unscathed. Quite apart from ‘hot’ film 
productions, various films which the general public called ‘Islamic mission films’ were 
also frowned upon. Islamic scholars were concerned that broader audiences might become 
confused and believe that Indonesian horror and mystery films were actually dakwah films. 
Viewers indeed thought this type of films contained elements of religious propagation because 
of the frequent deus ex machina role accorded authority figures who were generally religious 
teachers, or other Islamic symbols which were introduced to restore order at the end of such 
films. In addition to horror films, other films which ulama considered to depict controversial 
scenes were also perceived as Islamic mission films. Among them were several films which 
featured the famous actor and dangdut (popular music) star Rhoma Irama. General audiences 
were quick to interpret these as promoting Islam, because both in and outside the film world 
Rhoma Irama presented himself as a pious Muslim who brought faith to the people. The 
Islamic scholars thought otherwise, saying that Irama’s films tended to feature too many ‘hot 
scenes’ to deserve the epithet of dakwah films.9 
For an excerpt from Satria Bergitar, which stars Rhoma Irama, see Disc Two 4.2.
Alongside discussions about the need for more Islamic film productions, there was a call 
for the establishment of Islamic film production companies. In 1996, Islamic organizations 
such as the mass organization Muhammadiyah took steps to found production houses 
furnished with all the equipment needed for film production (AU/D-3 1996). The zeal to 
establish Muslim film production companies was due to the victory of religious organizations 
in a political argument with the government. In May 1996 the government had issued a 
draft for new legislation on broadcasting which, among other regulations, prohibited the 
founding of private broadcasting organizations based on religious principles. After a vigorous 
discussion, fierce protests, and tough negotiations, the religious organizations won their case. 
On 18 June 1996, the incumbent Minister of Information, Hartono, announced that religious 
groups would be allowed to found broadcasting organizations. This victory gave a strong 
incentive to go ahead with the setting up of Islamic film production companies (45. 1996; ant 
1996; Ant/2.1 1996; Haryanto, Wijanta, and Tjiauw 1996; ‘Lima lembaga keagamaan.’1996; 
‘Menpen.’1996). 
As well as the plans and efforts to found production companies, strenuous attempts 
were made to empower young Muslims in audio-visual media. In 1993, at a seminar in 
Cirebon about the role of pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) in the era of industrialization, 
film-maker Eros Djarot stated that pesantren possessed great potential in helping to shape 
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an Islamic art and film industry. He argued that santri (Islamic scholars) should not keep 
themselves aloof from the world of art and cinema. Instead of feeling downhearted watching 
non-Islamic films, santri should produce films themselves (Ant/2.4 1993). In 1997, generated 
by the fear of a tidal wave of films from overseas and the annoyance aroused by incorrect, 
stereotypical representations of Islam in Indonesian films, workshops and discussions were 
organized in Islamic schools, universities, and organizations. These were set up to convince 
principals of Islamic schools and universities and heads of Islamic organizations that their 
students and members should become involved in film production and train to become skilled 
at it (Ant/2.6 1997; ian/rid 1997).10
After the resignation of President Soeharto, the developments of the past few years in 
conjunction with the climate of Reform led to a significant rise in activities which combined 
film with Islam. The number of professional production houses for Islamic films grew, and 
some Islamic organizations supported film production training courses for Muslims. Taking 
the bit between their teeth, different Islamic organizations participated in the organization 
of Islamic film screenings and discussions about audio-visual media. In addition to the 
cinema clubs of mainly Muhammadiyah universities many newly established Islamic film 
communities embraced these activities enthusiastically. Among the new communities were 
M-Screen Indonesia (Muslim Screen Indonesia), Muslim Movie Education (MME), Fu:n 
Community (based on the Arabic word al funnuun, which means art), and the Salman Film-
maker Club, a film community connected to the Salman Mosque, which is part of the Technical 
University of Bandung. Such communities were composed mostly of young amateur and 
professional film-makers, Islamic students, and members of youth branches of established 
Islamic communities and organizations. A number, such as the Fu:n Community, also 
involved artists from the Jakarta Art Institute, Teater Kanvas, and Teater Bening, members of 
the non-governmental organization Mer-C, and Forum Lingkar Pena. The film crew affiliated 
to the Muhammadiyah production house PT Media Cipta Utama and some activists of other 
organizations also participated.11 The communities led by young Muslim students and film-
makers showed a marked tendency to discuss motivations for the production of Islamic films 
and shape the rules and regulations required to govern this undertaking. Discussions waxed 
on subjects such as the way in which women should be depicted in Islamic films; the need to 
take breaks for prayer during the shooting of films; and whether or not Islamic films could be 
consumed by men and women in the same space at the same time. 
For pictures of the casting process and a discussion of film Islami see Disc Two 4.2.
To strengthen the Islamic film movement, a national association of Islamic film 
communities was founded in July 2003. The Morality Audio Visual Network (MAV-Net) 
consisted of representatives from six film communities and institutions: the Fu:n Community, 
M-Screen, Kammi, Rohis Mimazah, IKJ, MQTV Bandung, and a representative from the 
Pesantren Darunnajah.12 At the basis of this network lay the debates mentioned earlier about 
the need to resist the hegemony of foreign films and to strengthen the position of Islam in 
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mainstream Indonesian audio-visual media. In the opinion of MAV-Net members, domestic 
‘Islamic’ films and soaps, which after the fall of Soeharto were mainly screened on television 
during the Islamic fasting month Ramadan, had nothing to do with Islam. They argued that 
the access to ‘real’ Islamic films in Indonesia was restricted to pirated VCDs.13 In a manifesto 
MAV-Net underlined that it was extremely important to fight the film and television industry 
by producing films which were based on Islamic ‘visual ethics’.14 While the exact delineation 
of these Islamic visual ethics was still being debated, some main principles were set out in 
a pamphlet written by Ustaz (term of address for an Islamic teacher) Ahmed Sarwat from 
the Centre of Syariah (Islamic Law) Consultation. In this pamphlet, Ahmed writes that a 
film is only truly Islamic if Islam is the guideline in all the film mediation practices. He 
gives examples of the use of Islamic principles from the production of an Islamic film (the 
producer, actors, and crew all have to be (devout) Muslims), to distribution (sponsors must 
produce halal goods), up to exhibition and consumption (the screening time should not be 
during hours of prayer and cinemas should provide for a division between male and female 
audiences) (Sarwat 2003). 
In the MAV-Net manifesto, the need for the production of films based on Islamic visual 
ethics was germane to an early theory of Third Cinema put forward by Teshome Gabriel. 
In 1985, Gabriel created a model which distinguished three phases of development in 
Third World national cinemas: the first phase of national cinemas in the Third World was 
characterized by the mimicry of Hollywood film productions; the second phase encompassed 
appropriations from traditional cultural products in both form and content (films about exotic 
traditional cultures); the third marked the engagement in a critical reassessment of traditional 
cultures, and the use of Third World film-makers’ own film languages, consisting of their 
original images, representations, and imaginations of society (Gabriel 1985:355-69). This 
third phase often featured guerrilla sentiments and the deconstructions of conventional Euro-
centric film themes and representations of First and Third Worlds.15 While Gabriel’s model 
did not cover the huge production of Indonesian films which combined elements of Hong 
Kong action films, Indian and Latin American melodrama, plus all types of B films from the 
US and elsewhere, the MAV-Net manifesto still used it to account for the need for Islamic 
films based on Islamic visual ethics. Islamic film was to constitute an authentic Indonesian 
and oppositional cinema which countered both the flow of films from the West and the 
allegedly corrupted commercial mainstream Indonesian cinema.
The founding of this oppositional cinema was not exclusively influenced by ideas about 
the position of Muslims in Indonesian domestic media and society. In 1999 discourses 
had emerged which extended ideas about the representation and position of Muslims to 
transnational media and world politics. Some Islamic scholars and television reviewers even 
argued that the distribution and exhibition of films and television series from the US and 
other imported entertainment in Indonesia was a carefully planned mission by the West to 
destroy Islamic religious principles.16 They believed that this mission was part of a strategy 
launched by Zionist Jews to control representations of the world. In these discourses, it 
Part Two
86
was claimed that in the US Jews controlled 80 per cent of the Hollywood film industry 
and consequently strove to control and misrepresent the facts of world history, seizing the 
opportunity to undermine Islamic religious principles (bea 1999).17
Influenced by the same kinds of ideas, the communities affiliated to the MAV-Net network 
announced they were committed to countering the ‘colonization of mainstream media by 
Zionists, imperialists, capitalists, and communists’. They saw themselves as part of an Islamic 
umat  (religious community) which transcended the borders of Indonesia. Therefore, besides 
presenting an alternative cinema and defying the misleading representations of Islam on a 
national level, the goal of the film Islami movement was also to contribute to and increase 
the number of truthful representations of Islam worldwide. In forming a network which 
supported transnational Islamic film mediation practices they were not hasty but strove to 
convert gradually the position of Western culture and ideologies, and their representations of 
history, in mainstream film mediation channels worldwide. 
4.3. Film in the framework of Ramadan
In the early years of Reform the mechanism of screening films in a certain framework or 
relating them to a particular context persisted, in spite of the flow of discourses on reformation 
and changes in conventional film mediation practices. The perception that there was a need to 
screen films as part of a specific occasion was highly conspicuous in post-Soeharto debates 
about the commemoration of Hapsak. Although discussions raged about the discontinuation 
of the propaganda film G30S/PKI as part of the media event, the screening of a film on 
30 September was not questioned.18 Also no controversy existed about the convention of 
relaying a film simultaneously on all television channels (‘Bukan Sekedar Kenangan.’1998; 
Nin/D-12 1998; SJ 1998a). In this section I investigate the practice of screening films in the 
framework of a certain event during and after Reformasi. I first return briefly to the discourses 
engendered by the screening of historical films and documentaries in the framework of 
Hapsak, after which I move on to examine new commemorative and other events. As the 
focal point of my argument, I have chosen to concentrate on ‘Islamic’ television programmes 
shown as part of the Islamic fasting month Ramadan.
On 1 October 1998, the commemoration of Hapsak was carried out in the conventional 
manner; the only omission was the screening of G30S/PKI as part of it. The official reason 
given for not screening the film was that it was damaged. However, it also was said that 
the screening of G30S/PKI was discontinued because after twelve consecutive years of 
screening, television viewers must be bored watching it over and over again (JP/10 1998; 
ric 1998a; SJ 1998b). There were also some voices which suggested that G30S/PKI was not 
consonant with the new era of Reform because the film was too much inclined to make ‘make 
a cult of a certain person’ (‘pengkultusan seseorang’), and to take the shape of a ‘certain 
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individual’s personal monument’ (‘monumen pribadi seseorang’) (45. 1998; Nin/D-12 1998; 
SJ 1998c). There was a general feeling that the viewers needed something new instead. 
Hence, on 29 and 30 September 1998, G30S/PKI was replaced by a television drama with 
the title Bukan Sekadar Kenangan (Not Just a Memory, BSK). It was stressed that unlike 
G30S/PKI, BSK did not represent any personal monument but was about common people. 
In a new guise – above all a love story – the intention was still to convey the traditional 
message warning of the latent danger of communism. Moreover, BSK, just as G30S/PKI, 
was screened simultaneously on all television channels. Diverging from the former practice, 
however, it was agreed that G30S/PKI would not be replaced by one single film. The solution 
to this would be that a new film would be produced each year (ric 1998b; SJ 1998c; Yad/
Man/R-3 1998). This idea never materialized. In subsequent years, and particularly under the 
presidency of Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001-2004), the Hapsak ceremony lost much of its 
credence. The Soekarno family had never accepted the official New Order version about the 
termination of Soekarno’s presidency, making way for the legitimate succession of Soeharto, 
the version celebrated in the Hapsak ceremony. Since Megawati’s presidency, the ceremony 
has not been broadcast on television in its entirety but only in fragments inserted in daily 
news programmes. 
As well as the initial endeavour to screen a film as part of the Hapsak media event, there 
was also an attempt to create new commemorative and other more general events and relate 
these to specific film screenings. Either films were specifically produced and screened for 
certain events, or efforts were made to fit a film into an event. An example of the latter practice 
was apparent in the frequent changes of the title of the documentary Student Movement to 
fit different film screenings. Under its original title The Army Forced Them to Be Violent, 
since 1998 the documentary had been shown on campuses in Indonesia and at different film 
festivals abroad. However, at the instigation of the Indonesian Censorship Institute its title 
was changed before it was certified to enter Indonesian cinemas. Notwithstanding Reformasi 
it was still unacceptable to be too critical of the Indonesian army in films. Consequently the 
title was changed to the neutral The Student Movement in Indonesia, by which name it was 
screened in the top-end cinemas of the 21 Group in August 2002. In November of that year 
the documentary could again be seen Indonesian cinemas. It was deemed perfectly suitable 
for the commemoration of the ‘first Semanggi tragedy’ (Tragedi Semanggi I) which had 
occurred on 13 November 1998. On that day, demonstrating students and a hapless bystander 
died after being fired upon by the Indonesian military near the Semanggi flyover in Jakarta, 
and approximately 239 people were injured. On 13 November 2002, exactly four years after 
the incident, the documentary Student Movement was screened in eight cinemas belonging to 
the 21 Group to commemorate the incident (Ati 2002). To suit the occasion of its re-release 
the title was first changed to: Empat Tahun Tragedi Semanggi I (Four Years [after the] First 
Semanggi tragedy) (Ati 2002; wy 2002). 
The showing of films as part of a specific event or occasion in post-Soeharto Indonesia 
is comparable to the broadcasting of ‘Islamic’ programmes on television during Ramadan. 
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During the Islamic fasting month, the normal pattern of film programming on television is 
interrupted. Television stations are suddenly flooded with Islamic programmes, and regular 
programmes which contain elements of violence, sex, and mysticism, are rescheduled. As 
soon as Ramadan is over all programmes which may be construed to have ill effects on 
people return, and their Islamic counterparts disappear again (see also afa/ghu 1996). While 
the celebration of Ramadan on television during the New Order tended to be a rather modest 
affair, in post-Soeharto Indonesia it turned into booming business. In an interview with the 
film director Ali Sahab in 2003, he commented that during the launch of private television ten 
years earlier, Ramadan had not yet been commercialized. At that time Christmas was an even 
greater show than Ramadan. Sahab claimed that in due course the religious atmosphere had 
disappeared from Ramadan television programmes. He commented that the fasting month 
had been turned into a spectacle in which only entertainment counted (‘Ali Sahab.’ 2003).
Signs of the development which was to transform Islam into a lucrative television 
business first began to emerge in 1999. Private television stations began to compete for a share 
of the advertisements in Ramadan programming, which grew by about 15 per cent during the 
Islamic fasting month (akh 1999; rad/dmm 2000). The number of advertisements increased 
as some special products, among them sarung, halal food products and soap, were advertised 
only during Ramadan. In 2001 there was a particularly marked rise in the business and profits 
of Ramadan programming on television. In that year, several newspaper articles referred to 
the fierce competition between private television stations to grab a share of advertisements, 
for which there were significant price increases in the Islamic fasting month.19 Although 
competition between the television stations increased, at that juncture there was hardly any 
change in the formulas of Ramadan programmes, either compared to what had been broadcast 
during the fasting month in previous years or to regular programming. Implementing the laws 
of the market place and making a conscious attempt to copy tried and tested formulas, various 
television programmes were rerun in Ramadan. The questions in conventional quiz shows 
concentrated on matters of religion, and several soaps which revolved around the problems 
of people, psychological or practical, and the way in which religion could help to solve them 
were launched. Nevertheless, despite a change in outward appearances – protagonists were 
dressed in Islamic clothes – and a change in prime time – to one hour before sunrise (sahur) 
and the breaking of the fast at sunset (maghrib) – quiz shows still focused on entertainment 
and soaps sold melodrama. Apart from these kinds of shows, Ramadan programmes in tune 
with a worldwide television trend of the past few years were produced. This trend had been 
marked by a mushrooming of infotainment and gossip programmes about the lives of artists 
and the ‘rich and famous’, clustered under the portmanteau word ‘celebrities’. The only 
difference in the domestic infotainment shows produced during Ramadan was that female 
artists and presenters covered their heads and that some religious messages were inserted in 
the intervals. Often these Ramadan messages were delivered by an Islamic authority figure, 




In 2002, this propensity to include a religious authority figure began to be a feature in 
all sorts of Ramadan programmes. Standing out among them was the kyai and businessman 
Abdullah Gymnastiar, commonly known as AA Gym, who turned up almost everywhere. He 
featured in no less than nine television shows which were divided over five private television 
stations.20 AA Gym owned the television production company Manejemen Qolbu Televisi 
(Management of the Heart Television, MQTV) and produced and sold his own programmes. 
For a profile of programmes produced by MQTV see Disc Two 4.3. 
Other popular Islamic authority figures who appeared on national television that year were 
‘Dai Sejuta Umat’ (‘Islamic Preacher for the Millions’) Zainuddin, Lutfiah Sungkar, a popular 
‘Betawi’ (Jakarta-style) kyai, who had the gift of being a spellbinding speaker and was also 
the leader of the political party Partai Bintang Reformasi (Star of the Reformation Party), 
and famous actor and dangdut singer Rhoma Irama (‘Ramadhan.’ 2002). In 2003 the number 
of Ramadan programmes increased yet again. In their bid to compete with one another, the 
programmes varied from (sequels to) Islamic soaps, quiz shows to Ramadan programmes 
which were interspersed with elements of comedy, music, or wayang (play with leather or 
wooden puppets). There were also live broadcasts of the preaching of Islamic leaders from 
mosques in different cities. In pride of place though was the increasing trend of featuring 
popular Islamic leaders in television programmes. AA Gym was by far the most popular. 
Advertisers of special Ramadan products fought with each other to fill the advertising slots 
around his programmes (‘AA Gym di televisi.’2003; m2/dw/reh/et 2003), but other such 
prominent Islamic leaders and personalities as Quraish Sihab and Arifin Ilham also appeared 
on various shows. 
For pictures of Ramadan programmes see Disc Two 4.3. 
The way in which AA Gym surfaced on almost every television channel during Ramadan 
can be attributed to his credibility as an Islamic expert at that time, but the widespread media 
trend which focused on artists, the rich and famous, and popular people (the celebrity circuit) 
cannot be discounted in seeking a reason for his success. Just as regular programming which 
featured popular artists, comedians, and other celebrities, famous kyai were used to woo 
advertisers and attract as many viewers as possible. In 2003, an article in the newspaper 
Bisnis Indonesia mentioned that the fashion for featuring Islamic leaders on television during 
Ramadan had led to the birth of the category of ‘kyai artists’. The article suggested that the 
‘camera face’ of kyai artists was very important in reaching the masses, and not necessarily 
for the sake of dakwah; such personalities were also a draw for advertisers in the lucrative 
business of Ramadan programming (am 2003).
Others were less enthusiastic about the direction which was being taken. Several Islamic 
leaders and some television reviewers criticized what they regarded as the commercialization 
of Islam. In 2004, the Indonesian Ulama Council, which had tried to steer the contents of 
Ramadan programmes since 2001 by handing out a yearly award for ‘Best National Ramadan 
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Television Programme’, remonstrated about what it saw as the trend in which television 
during Ramadan was being ‘degraded to mere entertainment’ (Cdr-o 2004). Noted television 
reviewers, among them Akhmod Seku and Indra Tranggono, joined the chorus of disapproval 
of the use of Islam in the Ramadan programmes, castigating these programmes as nothing 
more than a ‘formality’. Their criticism was based on the argument that these programmes 
were devoid of any real substance and for that very reason could be seen as examples of Umar 
Kayam’s notion of performing arts ‘in the framework of’ (Seku 2002; Tranggono 2004).21 Aulia 
Muhammad also wrote that he experienced a sense of vacuity as he watched television during 
Ramadan. In his article, he connected this sense of emptiness to Henry Lefebvre’s analysis of 
meaninglessness about which he had read in Dick Hebdige’s book Subculture: The Meaning 
of Style (1979:117). Aulia criticized the Ramadan programmes for their blatant focus on the 
outward appearance of famous artists and the depiction of ‘seasonal repentance’, or as he 
expressed it ‘the selling of tears’. Each year during Ramadan celebrities donned a recognizably 
Muslim costume and, in an orgy of self-abasement, burst into tears on entertainment shows, 
begging forgiveness for the scandals in which they had been involved. Aulia’s objections were 
based on Baudrillard’s conception of the loss of the intrinsic meaning of seasonal changes and 
differentiations in ‘consumer society’ – a society in which consumption forms the total be-all 
and end-all of everyday life (Baudrillard 1998:110, 193). In other words: the celebrities during 
Ramadan merely ‘[spoke] with their clothes’. The clothes reflected the seasonally dictated life-
styles and temporary identity assumed during the fasting month. In Aulia’s opinion, celebrities 
dressed up and acted the roles required by the sentiment evoked by Ramadan because they 
believed that the television audiences expected it of them. Aulia argued that the annual circus 
surrounding Ramadan reflected ‘the real post-modern face of television as a sea of illusion, 
imaginary world, and hyper-reality, which should not be believed’ (Muhammad 2004).
These discourses on the commercialization and void-ness of meaning of Ramadan 
television soaps, series, and programmes demonstrate a new development in the convention of 
screening films in the framework of a certain event. The previous use of a framework during the 
New Order to direct the reading of a film at least in part was discarded. Rather than directing the 
meaning or reading of a film, the framework itself had now become the focal point. Television 
programming during Ramadan was not really concerned with the quintessence of Islam or the 
fasting month. As Aulia has suggested, much of it was about the ‘hyper-reality’ of television 
which presents a superficial, imaginary world. Moreover, in turning kyai, ulama, and other 
Islamic authorities into artists and making such people part of a prefabricated routine, their 
position in Ramadan programmes reduced them to being on par with celebrities. Religious 





After the stepping down of President Soeharto, new post-colonial discourses and 
imaginations of society were reflected in both the discourse practices of text production 
and in the conventions of framing films at the level of text consumption. The new found 
freedom of expression offered by the socio-political situation of Reform induced several 
tentative, incomplete and contradictory changes in the shifting discursive practices of the 
media (Fairclough 1995:52).
The first tentative and incomplete changes and some continuity could be discerned in 
the modes of engagement in post-Soeharto documentaries. Such documentaries as Mass 
Grave and Student Movement exhibited a substitution of new narrations for old images, and 
new images for old narrations. Nevertheless, as well as most of the documentaries produced 
in the first few years after the fall of Soeharto, they used the same modes of engagement 
of New Order representations of history and society in film. In their narrative traits, most 
documentaries followed either the New Order/USAI development film formulas, or what 
may be designated the Usmar Ismail mode of heroism. The difference in the post-Soeharto 
documentaries was that the viewpoint was anti-New Order. A majority of the documentaries 
focused on newly created heroes or on victims of Soeharto’s rule, but there also was a change 
in the discourse. The heroes of the post-Soeharto documentaries were not authority figures, 
but victims and common people.
The changes in discourse practices relating to continuations of the convention to screen 
films in the framework of a certain event were contradictory. In the context of the screening 
of ‘Islamic’ television films and programmes during Ramadan, these contradictions 
were to some extent related to discourses of the film Islami movement founded in 2003. 
Paradoxically, at the same time an association of film Islami groups was founded to promote 
Islamic visual ethics for film, Indonesian commercial television turned the screening of soaps 
and programmes which contained features of Islam into a booming business. A survey of 
the discourses about media representations of Islam during Ramadan shows that in contrast 
to the idea of Islamic visual ethics, which inserted Islam into all aspects of film mediation 
practices, the television shows during Ramadan merely availed themselves of their outer 
shell. Behind the superficial appearances of Islam, these programmes were actually devoid of 
any religious meaning. The spirit of the Ramadan soaps and programmes was stifled by the 
framework in which they were screened.
In Islamic discourses, the programming of Islamic soaps and other series in the 
framework of Ramadan was perceived as nothing more than a commodity at the disposal of 
the television industry. Also on other occasions, the use of frameworks can be connected to 
commercial motives. Films were often screened in the framework of certain events as a ploy 
to sell more tickets. Conceivably, the change of the title of Tino Saroengallo’s documentary 
Student Movement to fit the commemoration of the ‘first Semanggi tragedy’ was based 
on commercial premises too. By re-releasing the documentary under another title, it was 
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anticipated it would attract more viewers. I have argued that as an instrument employed by 
the New Order, one important function of a framework was to direct the reading of film and 
television productions. But in the post-Soeharto mediascape, it should rather be seen as a tool 
to make these productions more saleable.
The shallowness, the temporal identities, and the ‘hyper’ reality of the Ramadan 
programmes and soaps were all decidedly antithetical to discourses which urged the need for 
truthful self-representation and Islamic visual ethics. The lack of authenticity spawned by this 
backdoor commercialism was also in contrast to the emphasis on ‘getting history straight’, 
and the stated bid for ‘true’ and ‘real’ representations of history and society. Moreover, when 
the Ramadan programmes and the post-Soeharto documentaries are compared, the stress on 
the allure of celebrities in the former stands out starkly in contrast to the focus on common 
people in the majority of post-Soeharto documentaries.
The focus on both reality and common people and celebrities – both secular and 
religious – was not limited to Indonesia; it was a phenomenon that could be observed in 
global media trends. In the case of reality and the common people, there were two readily 
identifiable shifts: from an emphasis on the voice of authority to the voice of the voiceless and 
ordinary people in the production of post-Soeharto documentaries, and a marked tendency 
on television to broadcast programmes which featured the man in the street. The stress on 
factual reality and common people began as part of the discourses which questioned New 
Order historiography and its imposition on society. In the first few years of Reform numerous 
talk-shows on television addressed these issues. Over time people became fed up with these 
shows. Corresponding to transnational trends in television, the initially overriding truth and 
reality in these rather serious talk-shows was replaced by the production of all sorts of light 
entertainment reality shows which featured common people. In the same vein, the focus 
on celebrities in Ramadan programmes was part of a worldwide trend on television which 
showed popular infotainment and gossip programmes about the rich and famous. Hence, 
while television was crammed with reality shows which featured ordinary people, it was also 
flooded with an overload of celebrities. The stress on celebrities in programmes broadcast 
during the fasting month even resulted in the birth of celebrity kyai. This invention of the 
celebrity kyai corresponds with another global television trend: a new religious format 
evolving around charismatic media personalities.23
In 2004, ‘Islamic’ soaps and series managed to escape the framework, and were 
subsequently screened outside the confines of Ramadan. However, they were still made for 
commercial motives and they still contained prefabricated televised representations of Islam. 
The focal point of these soaps was that they were based on true stories. They were spiced up 
with such elements of mystery as supernatural occurrences. They contained scenes in which 
people indulged in paroxysms of tearful repentance. An important component was the major 
role assigned to heroes in the guise of Islamic authority figures, kyai celebrities, or sometimes 
personalities who combined these two traits. In the next two chapters I look more closely at 






5  The kyai and hyperreal ghosts: Narrative practices  
of horror, commerce, and censorship1
Introduction
In recent years there have been several publications about horror films and the 
connotations of horror in different societies in which it is thought to serve as a field 
for the dramatization of cultural and universal nightmares. Scholars have written about 
horror film being an outlet which exposes social taboos or as a channel for political 
critique. Sometimes in their discussions they have related the use of horror to theories 
about the role of carnival in certain societies.2 It is not the intention here to discuss 
the Indonesian horror genre in audio-visual media from any of these perspectives. 
The prime focus of this discussion will be on horror as a form of imagining and as a 
technical means of ‘re-presenting’ elements of what constitutes the nation (Anderson 
1983). 
In this chapter, I concentrate on forms of imagination and representation through 
the Indonesian horror genre. I examine the position these forms of imagination assume 
in the context of film narrative practices and debates on what kind of representations of 
society are acceptable in Indonesian audio-visual media. On one level, I consider horror 
from the perspective of film genres, and certain formats or formulas within such genres. 
On this level, horror is a forum for identity formation. Benedict Anderson turned to the 
basic structure of two forms of imagining, namely the novel and the newspaper, which 
‘provided the technical means for “re-presenting” the kind of imagined community 
that is the nation’ (1983:30). Building on this idea, I investigate discourses about 
Indonesian films which identify and imagine certain communities through the horror 
genre. In what way are audiences, communities and classes identified and constructed 
around horror film? How is the character of horror film and its audiences determined 
by particular film formats (film versus television) or formulas? How have these 
identifications changed after the fall of President Soeharto in May 1998?
On another level, the chapter moves beyond the concept of imaginations and 
identifications between small-scale communities and genres. In this part I reflect 
on discourses about film formulas within the horror genre which are indicative 
of developments and problems in the search for a representative image of what 
constitutes the modern Indonesian nation. I explore discourses about tolerable modes 
of representation of the supernatural in film and television and as part of modern 
Indonesian society. The principal concern is the relationship between discourses about 




5.1. Horror films under the New Order: Comedy, sex, and religion
The horror genre has a long history in Indonesian media culture and it is found in writing, 
in radio and television programmes, as well as in cinema. The first horror film in Indonesian 
cinema was produced by The Teng Cun in 1934 and had the title Doea Siloeman Oeler 
Poeti en Item (The transmogrifications of two serpents: one black, one white).3 Since this 
pioneering effort, Indonesian horror films have been screened in cinemas, mobile cinemas, 
and on television in varying numbers. During the 1950s and 1960s horror films were pushed 
into the background  as, at the time, there was a great interest in producing films which 
featured the Indonesian Revolution and the struggle to wrest Independence from Dutch 
colonial rule (1945-1949). Only at the beginning of the 1970s were horror films starting to be 
produced again (Kristanto 1995).
Since the film Ratu Ular (Snake queen, 1972), the number of horror films screened in 
Indonesian cinemas increased. In fact horror films were about the only kind of films still 
produced after 1993 when the Indonesian cinema collapsed. But it was not until after May 
1998 that a revival of horror film production began. After 1993, most top end cinemas screened 
mainly imported US films, while home-produced Indonesian films that tended to feature 
the erotic and horror genres were shown in lower class cinemas throughout the country. 
Newspaper articles in 1993 and 1994 mention horror films as representative of the Indonesian 
film industry, and indeed associate the Indonesian film industry with horror films just as the 
US has westerns, China kung fu films, Japan films about ninjas and samurais, and India, 
love stories with a liberal dose of singing and dancing.4 Indonesian cultural commentators 
have tried to explain the appeal of horror films by stating that the genre is closely related to 
the psyche of the Indonesian people and is generally inherent in Eastern culture, which they 
assume to be synonymous with mysticism and the occurrence of supernatural beings and 
events. These explanations were based on the assumption that every region and ethnic group 
in Indonesia had its own superstitious beliefs and mystery tales recounting supernatural 
events. Some film producers even thought that horror stories formed a characteristic cultural 
asset of Indonesian culture. They were convinced that this feature should be exploited in 
films for both the Indonesian and the foreign market.5 
The horror genre in Indonesian film has its own format and peculiarities. Horror films 
are also labelled film mistik (mystical films) or film klenik (superstitious films). Generally 
speaking, anything can happen in these films, and the story does not necessarily have to 
make sense. Apart from these generalizations, some main features can be detected.6 Karl 
Heider (1991) noted that horror films were the most common type of film in Indonesia at the 
beginning of the 1990s. He delineated the productions of Indonesian horror cinema as films set 
in the present but resembling the Indonesian legend film genre, which were dramatizations of 
traditional legends or folktales. It is true that, just as the legend genre, horror films often draw 
their inspiration from traditional Indonesian folk beliefs, above all those about supernatural 
powers. Heider also points out the use of ‘horribly humorous’ scenes as a distinctive aspect 
97
Film narrative practices
of Indonesian horror films. As an example, he remarks upon the recurring scenes in which 
supernatural monsters attack their victims. In his viewing experience in Indonesian cinemas 
this raised uproars of laughter from the audiences (1991:44). Indeed, the element of humour 
or comedy is a frequent component of the horror genre. Another example of a frequently used 
comic scene is when someone mistakes a ghost for a real person and vice versa (Suyono and 
Arjanto 2003). A prototypical Indonesian horror film from the 1970s is usually set in a village 
and revolves around the quest for ilmu (spiritual knowledge) or ilmu gaib (supernatural 
powers). An inherent part of such supernatural powers or black magic is that they always 
have some inherent weakness (pantangan or ‘taboo’), a prohibited action or certain spell by 
which the powers can be undone. The best way to break the spell cast by magical powers 
is by reciting a verse from the Quran, but other, more peculiar pantangan, such as eating 
more than three portions of sate (Suyono and Arjanto 2003:71) or encountering a monkey 
(Kristanto 1995:145), have also been used in horror films. 
Besides supernatural powers and humour, there are two other distinct features of 
Indonesian horror films, namely their use of sex and the appearance of religious symbols 
or of religious leaders as protagonists.7 The use of sex emerged in the 1970s and was used 
to titillate the audience. By the 1980s and 1990s, the extravagant use of erotic elements 
which debased them to the level of smut and kitsch had become the main ingredient of such 
films. The central themes of these ‘horror-sex’ films were men having an affair, tante girang 
(literarily ‘merry aunt’; a pushy woman of loose morals), rape, and promiscuity. The use of 
sex was not confined to horror but was part of a wider trend of Indonesian films from the 
1970s, capitalizing on its selling power.8 However, particularly in horror films was sex made 
fairly explicit.
The second classic feature of horror films, the use of religious symbols and a deus ex 
machina in the form of a religious leader, a kyai (teacher of Islam), clergyman, or Hindu 
priest who is able to overcome all evil at the end of the film, emerged as a typical element in 
the 1980s (Suyono and Arjanto 2003:72). The protagonist in horror films since the 1980s has 
mainly been a kyai or an ulama (Muslim religious teacher or leader); if not one of these, then 
some other religious figures with Islamic connections. But there is also one instance in which 
a Roman Catholic Priest conquers a Dutch ghost which is haunting an old colonial house in 
the film Ranjang Setan (‘Satan’s bed’, 1986). In the 1981 movie Mistik (Punahnya Rahasia 
Ilmu Iblis Leak) (Mystic (the vanishing of the secret devilish knowledge of the evil spirit)), 
for which Bali is the setting, the hero is a Hindu priest who defeats evil. 
For an example of the kyai coming to the rescue see Santet II on Disc Three 5.1.
The central role of a religious figure in horror films is a perceptible effect of the Ethical 
Code of Film Production in Indonesia, which was drawn up in 1981 by the Dewan Film 
Nasional (henceforth Film Council) under the Minister of Information, General Ali Murtopo 
(1978-1983). The Ethical Code was based on censorship guidelines for the Badan Sensor 
Film (Film Censor Board, henceforth BSF) laid down in a ministerial decree in 1977. In 
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1980, the BSF drew up its own further guidelines for censorship in the BSF Ethical Code 
(Kode Etik Badan Sensor Film). These guidelines were elaborated in the Film Council’s 
Code of Ethics (Kode Etik Produksi Film Nasional) and issued in 1981 (Sen 1994:69).
The Code of Ethics of the Film Council was modelled by eight commissions, including 
the commission for ‘film and national morality’ (film dan moral bangsa), the commission of 
‘film and the awareness of national discipline’ (film dan kesadaran disiplin nasional), and the 
commission for ‘film in its relation to devotion towards the One and Only God’ (film dalam 
hubungannya ketakwaan terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa). The last-mentioned commission 
recommended that all filmic aspects had to lead to devotion and the praise of God. It also 
demanded that ‘[t]he storyline ought to be composed in such a way that it gives the audience 
the impression that what is bad will definitely be made to endure the consequences of its actions 
and suffer; that what is good will surely receive a reward and happiness.’9 Consequently most 
films made under the New Order in the 1980s and 1990s followed a predictable pattern of 
good versus bad in which the good always triumphed (Suyono and Arjanto 2003:72).10 
Even though there was never an official prescription that a religious figure had to be the 
hero of horror films, many producers of such films today have the impression that during the 
New Order a kyai was a figure inalienable from horror movies. Ali Tien, ex-producer of the 
production company Cancer Mas, suggests that by 1981 BSF had sanctioned that horror films 
should fulfill a religious mission. Likewise, in the experience of Ferry Angriawan of Virgo 
Putra Film, a horror film in the 1980s which did not feature a kyai at the end of the story 
would be banned from being screened. Hence, in his opinion, a kyai would in many instances 
appear where his sudden intrusion did not make any sense in the story. According to producer 
Budiati Abiyoga, who used to be on the jury of the Indonesian Film Festival under the New 
Order, the outline of the Code of Ethics led to a tendency to use religion for religion’s sake. 
As an example, she recalls the depiction of a Quranic verse with the added phrase:‘This is not 
approved of by the Quran,’ straight after a sex scene (Suyono and Arjanto 2003:72).
The catalogue of Indonesian films produced between 1926 and 1995 (Kristanto 1995) 
shows that horror films had already begun to use religious symbols as early as the 1970s 
and many kyai regularly turned up in horror films from 1978 onwards. The use of religious 
heroes in horror films before the 1980s led Krishna Sen to describe the guidelines of the Code 
of Ethics as representing ‘no more than a setting out of practices already in operation in the 
censorship system’ (Sen 1994:53). The idea that directors today believe it was a prerequisite 
to feature a kyai in horror films may indeed offer a clue to the way film censorship under 
the New Order worked. As Sen suggests, there were relatively few cases of film censorship 
under the New Order in which BSF intervened directly by excising sections of a film or 
banning films altogether. Prescriptions issued by such other film institutions as production 
companies, professional film organizations, film schools and festivals shaped which films 
would be produced and as such worked as a system of self-censorship (Sen 1994:50-51). 
The detailed censorship regulations which had been made public by 1980 contributed to the 
increase in self-censorship in the film industry (Sen 1994:70). Possibly because the use of a 
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kyai in horror films was a successful formula resorted to to prevent a film from being banned, 
many film-makers did not take recourse to other formulas with no proven success. Although 
films which used kyais prevailed, not all horror films since the 1980s in the film catalogue 
mention the role of religious figures. Other formulas were also possible. For example, some 
horror films were based on traditional legends or placed in a mystical setting did not feature 
a religious figure.11 
Be that as it may, after the implementation of the Code of Ethics in 1981, many horror 
films did use religious leaders and symbols because of the perceived need to include them. 
Such an inclusion was well worthwhile, for these films would pass the Board of Censors even 
though they might show all that God had forbidden. Under the influence of the combined 
commercial interests of the film producers and government film regulations, under the New 
Order a bizarre situation developed in which the horror film genre was simultaneously equated 
with sex and with religious propagation (dakwah), the latter predominantly represented 
through the use of Islamic symbols and Islamic religious leaders as the heroes of horror 
stories. 
 
5.2. Horror films for television: New narratives and debates on their bounds
Besides horror films produced for the silver screen, television was another format which 
showed horror and mystical films during the New Order. At the beginning of the 1990s, when 
there was a sudden rise in the number of commercial television stations, many film directors 
who used to produce films for the cinemas crossed over into television production. Even 
before the production of mystical television films began around 1995, many old horror films 
were aired on television. Both domestic and imported US horror films were usually shown on 
Thursday night, referred to in Indonesia as ‘Friday eve’ (malam Jumat). Friday is a religious 
day for Muslims and at noon Muslim men should perform communal prayers in the mosque. 
The significance of this day will be discussed later.
In 1995-1996, the private television station RCTI began to produce and screen the 
sinetron misteri (mystery series) Si Manis Jembatan Ancol (The sweetie of Ancol bridge). 
Later this was followed by the sinetron komedi misteri (comedy mystery television series) 
Jin dan Jun (Jin and Jun). Because of the success of these programmes, other television 
stations soon followed suit. During a very short time, these were few in number. This 
probably had to do with the fact that then Minister of Information Harmoko ‘recommended’ 
reducing the screening of Indonesian mystery series in 1996 – a recommendation which, 
strikingly, did not seem to apply to foreign products of the same genre (pur 1996). Despite 
Harmoko’s recommendation a year later in July 1997, every private television station had its 
own Indonesian mystery series. RCTI added two series similar to Si Manis Jembatan Ancol 
and Jin dan Jun to their programme: Kembalinya Si Manis Jembatan Ancol (The return of 
the sweetie of Ancol bridge) and Tuyul dan Mbak Yul (Tuyul and Miss Yul), and a mystery 
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series based on a Javanese folk legend, Misteri Sinden (The singer mystery). Other private 
television stations didn’t drag their heels and quickly produced their own mystery series: 
Hantu Sok Usil (The fidgety ghost) and Janda Kembang (The virgin widow), both of the 
folk-legend type on SCTV, Dua Dunia (Two worlds) on Indosiar, and Misteri (Mystery), 
recounting peoples’ stories of encountering the supernatural, on Anteve (Pudjiastuti and 
Bredana 1997).
Unlike the screening of Indonesian horror films in cinemas which passed virtually 
unnoticed apart from some protests decrying erotic film posters, there were fierce debates 
about horror films on television and the mystery television series. These debates began in 
1994 when the Head of the First Commission of Parliament (Ketua Komisi I DPR), Aisyah 
Amini, criticized the Department of Information for permitting television stations to screen 
horror films as a matter of routine on malam Jumat.  Her argument was that broadcasting 
these productions at that specific time of the week ‘gives that evening a bad image’ (membuat 
image jelek tentang malam itu). She was worried that it would cause people to regard that 
evening as one full of fear, whereas it should actually be a very virtuous point of time in the 
week [for Muslims] (sm 1994). The debate about the screening of mystical films on malam 
Jumat and the possible harm to the ‘image’ of Friday continued until 1995 and was the 
probable motivation behind the edict issued by the Minister of Information concerning the 
reduction in the screening of horror and mystery films on television around 1996.12 Another 
discussion in 1994 was about the need to re-censor horror films, primarily those which were 
produced for the cinema, before these were screened on television. In the words of Harmoko, 
this was essential ‘because the characteristics of television viewers are different from [those 
who attend] cinemas’ (Sebab, karakteristik penonton televisi lain dengan bioskop) (sm 
1994).
Yet another debate, launched in 1995 but only becoming an issue in 1996/1997, revolved 
around the prevailing idea that mystical films would lead Indonesian people astray from 
reality and set them apart from modern life. The anti-campaign was run largely by the 
government aided and abetted by individuals and Islamic groups who saw mystical films 
as an obstacle to Indonesia becoming a modern, pious nation. They declared that mystery 
films were devoid of any educational value and therefore might harm the mental and spiritual 
development of the people. Generally speaking, the popularity of mystery films was inversely 
proportioned to the dominant discourse of the New Order, with its constant reiterations about 
the ‘development’ of Indonesia into a modern nation. It was feared that mystery films would 
fuel superstition and the belief of Indonesian people in the supernatural; this would thwart 
development. Moreover, some Muslim groups and authorities had great difficulty coming to 
terms with the idea that these series would show concepts contrary to religious teachings. 
The complaints raised were that these series depicted a realm outside reality, were far from 
rational, and were devoid of any educational value (5.29/2.4 1998; Ant/2.6 1995; Gus 1997; 
pur 1996; roh 1997; Suryapati 1997). 
Interestingly, in the debates about mystery films on television it transpired that the main 
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problem was not the mystical itself. Several articles made the point that this was an enduring 
part of Indonesian culture, and the existence of mystics and belief in supernatural powers in 
Indonesian society was not denied.  All kinds of shamanism, superstition, mystical objects, 
ghosts and a seemingly endless number of other supernatural creatures were cited as an 
undeniable part of the beliefs and culture of Indonesian peoples (Hasim 1997; Gus 1997; 
Nuridin 1997; Pudjiastuti and Bredana 1997; Suryati 1996; Yad/R3 1997). To a great extent 
Indonesian horror films built on that foundation, and even those who protested against horror 
films often professed a belief in ghosts, jin, tuyul, and other supernatural beings.13 Yet, there 
was a particular narrative allotted to the supernatural in which it could operate. In horror films 
set during the New Order, which was ruled by policies of development, there was no space 
for the supernatural. In legends of the past, or under the guidance of a religious authority 
who would step in and restore order at the end of the film, however, the supernatural was 
tolerated. Similarly, newspaper articles which voiced complaints about mystery films did not 
really get too vociferous about films of the legendary or folk-story type. Their objections to 
mystery films and television series applied to those films and series which diverged from the 
sanctioned modes of addressing the issue or that were felt to be out of kilter with leading state 
and Muslim discourses. Hence, heated debates about mystery films in newspaper articles 
from February 1995 to April 1998 were about defining ‘authorized’ narrative practices for 
the supernatural or mystical.
Most debates in articles from September 1996 to April 1998 were about the mystery 
television series which had adopted a new formula. This required a new definition and 
demarcation of the supernatural and the rational. The mystery series, Si Manis Jembatan 
Ancol, was based on an urban legend of Jakarta about a female ghost but set in the present. 
The series Jin dan Jun was about a girl called Jun, who finds a jin (genie) in a bottle who 
becomes her friend. Tuyul dan Mbak Yul was about a girl who befriends a tuyul (a spirit 
which obtains wealth for its human master); it bore a very strong resemblance to Jin dan 
Jun. None of these three series depicted the familiar horror legend type, nor did they feature 
a kyai as rescuer. In Si Manis Jembatan Ancol a ghost, Mariam, settles the scores with evil. 
She helps murder victims to take revenge, haunt, and kill their murderer in retribution. The 
series of the jin and tuyul type, which had a mystery comedy format, solved problems with 
humour.14 Initially the majority of those with objections to these new series were groups and 
persons with Muslim backgrounds. Later their ranks were joined by government ministers, 
psychologists, and others who can loosely be styled ‘authorities’. Si Manis Jembatan Ancol 
and, in particular, the series about jin and tuyul were considered problematic as they were 
thought to pose an indirect challenge to religious (Islamic) and state discourses on the 
sanctioned forms of imagining the supernatural and reality.
Among those with Muslim backgrounds the difficulty lay not so much in the fact that 
the series did not feature a kyai to step in and make the denouement. On various occasions 
Muslims had protested against a perceived misuse of Quranic verses in mystery films – simply 
as a spell to exorcise ghosts – rather than representing these as an intrinsic part of a code of 
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belief. They were also greatly upset by the unrealistic depiction of kyai in horror films, which 
accorded the religious teachers supernatural powers and had them tossing around balls of fire. 
It was a problem of negotiating and demarcating representations of the fictitious and the real, 
on the basis of  ‘facts’ emanating from competing worldviews.
The debate about narrative practices and the bounds of representing the supernatural and 
the rational in television series was launched in 1996 when the chairman of the Indonesian 
Council of Muslim Leaders, Hasan Basri, stated that Jin dan Jun and Si Manis Jembatan 
Ancol indirectly disputed religious teachings (‘Ketua MUI.’1996).  While Basri did not go 
into the specific details of his objections to mystery series, Imam Tantowi, film director and 
screenplay writer, did. Tantowi stated he did not object to mystery films, as long as the content 
or message these films wanted to convey did not contravene religious teachings or mislead 
the viewers. It was on these grounds that Tantowi did not approve of Si Manis Jembatan 
Ancol: the series was about a female ghost and, in Islam, there are no such things as ghosts. 
However, as someone with a minority15 viewpoint amongst those protesting about new horror 
formulas, Tantowi did not have a problem with Jin dan Jun. Even though he had seen it 
only once, he did not think its content strayed too far from Islamic teachings in which the 
existence of jin is acknowledged.16 He said that he assumed the film-makers had consulted a 
Muslim jin first (Suryati 1996).17 
His opinion was one of a few voiced and it was only gradually that the jin and 
tuyul series specifically emerged as the subject of a heated debate. In an article in the 
newspaper Pikiran Rakyat, Abdul Hasim wrote about the return of the mystical to 
Indonesian television in a new format. He said that, unlike earlier in horror films, in this 
new format, the jin and tuyul were no longer presented as frightening creatures, but were 
‘kind friendly, and often very close to human beings and their everyday lives’ (Hasim 
1997). This atypical representation of jin and tuyul was perceived as problematic. Besides 
the fear that such series would reinforce people’s belief in jin and tuyul (Gus 1997; pur/
asa 1997), the greatest objection expressed in most articles was that these were either not 
in accordance to the perception of jin as people commonly knew it (roh 1997), or not in 
harmony with Islamic teachings (pur/asa 1997). Hence, in some articles it was denied 
that the appearance of jin and tuyul in mystery television series was part of Indonesian 
culture and allegations were made that these had been borrowed from fairytales from 
India (pur/asa 1997) or were attempts to imitate films from Hong Kong (Suryati 1998). 
Refuting the allegations that the mystery series were based on Indian fairytales Raam 
Punjabi, owner of the very successful production house Multivision Plus which produced 
some of the most popular programmes on Indonesian television including Tuyul dan 
Mbak Yul, stated that the tuyul in his series was closely modelled on descriptions of tuyul 
in old Indonesian folk tales (nda 1997). Punjabi, who is of Indian descent, has often been 
criticized by those who claim that his soaps do not represent Indonesian culture and are 
only the purveyors of dreams. 
In February 1998, Minister of Information Hartono instructed the Film Censor Institute 
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to ban films and television series with jin or tuyul as a theme.18 His stated reason was that these 
were not didactic. Hartono felt that if a story in a television series presented the goodness or 
kindness of a jin, this did not accord with reality/the truth: ‘Honestly, I’ve never seen a jin. 
So how can we tell if there are good jin. Please do not cause a rift in our nation by purveying 
items which are at odds with religion. Do not teach the people to see something that does 
not exist’ (5.29/2.4 1998).19 The former Director-General of Radio Television and Film, Alex 
Leo Zulkarnaen, was also disturbed by false representations of jin in television series. In an 
interview in which his comments were sought about the increase in number of the members 
of the Film Censor Institute specifically to censor mystery films, he made the remark: ‘Can 
you imagine producing television series with a jin as the main character, going so far as to 
have the jin called Uncle Jin or Aunty Jin. They [all parties involved in the production and 
screening of television series] go overboard selling dreams’ (‘Mantan Dirjen RTF.’1998).20 
Despite the ban on the jin-type mystery comedies in February, they were still being 
screened in March 1998, with Jin dan Jun the most popular. When asked about the actions 
taken by the Department of Information to end the screening of such series, the director of 
Pembinaan Film (Institution for Film Cultivation) answered that a letter had been sent to all 
private television stations requesting them to obey broadcasting regulations to reduce the 
number of films with superstitious themes (pur 1998). However, before this could occur, 
Reformasi, the bid for change in every possible field after thirty years of New Order rule, 
emerged with the stepping down of President Soeharto in May 1998.
5.3. Horror films for cinema and television: Developments of Reformasi
During and after Reformasi the world of film was overwhelmed by a host of new developments. 
Under the presidency of B.J. Habibie (1998-1999), a process of democratization of the media 
was set in motion. During the presidency of Abdurahman Wahid (1999-2001) the Ministry 
of Information was officially abolished, but the Film Censor Institution continued to exert its 
function, even though its position was called into question. As discussed in Chapters Two and 
Four, the euphoria and disorder of Reformasi gave rise to new film genres and also redefined 
the use and substance of film discourse and narrative practices. The spirit of Reformation 
did not leave the genres of horror films and mystery television series unscathed. Two distinct 
changes were introduced for horror films: newly released horror films often ignored the old 
formula of the film genre, and from 2001 they were being screened in top-end cinemas. 
The first horror film produced for the cinemas after the fall of Soeharto, Jelangkung, 
included both these changes. In October 2001 this film, which was shot on digital video 
camera and directed by the young film-maker Rizal Mantovani, was shown in major cinemas 
in Jakarta. The story, based on urban legends in Jakarta, was totally different from New 
Order horror films. Shot in the music-video style and with a soundtrack of popular music, 
the film tells the story of a group of teenagers who set out on an adventure to look for ghosts 
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in haunted places in and around Jakarta. On a camping trip to a little village, Angker Batu in 
the hills of West Java, one of them conjures up a ghost by using a jelangkung (a doll made 
out of a coconut shell and some wooden sticks used as a medium to invite spirits to descend), 
as a result of which the whole group is haunted. Nowhere in the film does a kyai appear, 
nor are any other religious symbols apparent. Moreover, the film does not have a mystical 
setting and, even though it is about legends, these are filmed as part of reality and the lives 
and beliefs of teenagers in Jakarta. After its success in Jakarta, Jelangkung was screened in 
cinemas throughout the country; it was the box office hit of 2001, reaching 1.3 million viewers. 
After Jelangkung, more horror films, the bulk of them produced by young film-makers, were 
released and screened in top-end cinemas: Titik Hitam (Black point, November 2002), Satu 
Nyawa dalam Denting Lonceng Kecil (One soul in a little tinkling bell, November 2002), Peti 
Mati (The Coffin) (February 2003), Jelangkung’s sequel Tusuk Jelangkung (Demon’s spike, 
March 2003), and The Soul (November 2003). None of these films made any pretence about 
inserting religious elements and, apart from Peti Mati which was set in the 1960s, the films 
were situated in the present.
This seems to provide evidence that during Reformasi, the Code of Ethics for film 
production was abandoned. Horror films for cinemas were being produced in a new style 
and their formulas were more varied. The appearance of a kyai was no longer perceived as 
obligatory. Moreover, most films which reached the top-end cinemas depicted the mysterious 
in the present, as part of modern life. Did this signify the end for the ‘kyai’ then?  It did not. 
In cinemas, the kyai was still found where he had always been since the 1980s – in the lower 
class theatres, primarily in the outskirts and kampung areas of the city and in rural areas. Even 
though most contemporary Indonesian horror films used new styles and formats, there was also 
a horror film released in November 2002 which still adhered to the old New Order format of 
horror films. Kafir (Satanic) (Infidel (Satanic)), was inspired by a true story which occurred 
among the people of Cigugur in West Java during the fight for Independence in 1945. Through 
flashbacks, it tells the story of a shaman who is obsessed by the idea of becoming a wali (holy 
man) after he has gone in search of spiritual knowledge (ilmu) and has become an apprentice to 
a mysterious, allegedly immortal man on a mountain. Moving to a small village with his wife 
and son, he sets up a practice as a healer there. But as the story advances, he becomes involved 
in black magic practices and after he has been killed, the earth refuses to receive his body. 21 In 
Kafir (Satanic) as in old New Order horror films, an Islamic authority figure comes to the rescue 
by restoring peace and order. Film critic Joko Anwar writes: ‘Watching the latest release of 
locally made horror flick, Kafir (Unbeliever), the joy of watching such campy horror movies in 
the ‘80s would certainly come back to the audience’s mind’ (Anwar 2002b). He mentions that 
Kafir was made by an ‘old-time film director,’ while other recently released horror films had 
been the work of new talents (Anwar 2002c). In contrast to Jelangkung and other films made 
by young film-makers, Kafir (Satanic) was released in lower class cinemas. Its producer, Chand 
Parwez, claims the film was very popular, especially in rural areas (Anugerah 2003). 
Apart from the kyai’s enduring presence and popularity in old horror movies mostly found 
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in rural areas, after the fall of Soeharto he also appears in a new mystery television format. 
Due to the momentum of Reformasi the February 1998 decree, which enforced the reduction 
of the screening of the jin and tuyul series, never came into force. A year later, in March 1999, 
when questions were asked about the continuation of mystery series on television, it was 
said that people needed entertainment and that it would be better not to ban these series until 
there was more political stability (mam 1999). By 2001, the screening of horror films and 
mystery series on television had increased considerably. Initially, re-runs of old horror films 
and mystery television series were screened, but gradually the production of new series and 
television films ensued (cp 2001) and, at the end of 2001, a new formula of mystery series 
for television had emerged. At the root of this new formula lay the re-instatement of religious 
authorities in the form of kyai, ulama, or simply people with authority speaking on behalf of 
Islam. When a new television series Kismis (an abbreviation of kisah misteri, mystery tales) 
was screened by the private television station RCTI in 2001, it launched a new formula in the 
mystery genre called ‘infotainmen horor’ (horror infotainment) which would eventually lead 
to the return of the religious figure. Inspired by the huge success of Jelangkung, Kismis was 
based on the reconstruction of existing legends and stories about ghosts and haunted sites in 
Indonesia (m07/m08/cp 2002).
Kismis follows the formula in which the programme host, a model (Caroline Zachri), 
interviews people who have had a blood-curdling experience (peristiwa seram). After 
the interview, the stories of the informants are visualized in a semi-documentary style 
reconstruction. For example, a couple of young men happened to be walking home late at 
night after having played cards. Along the way, they saw a beautiful woman to whom they 
are attracted. But as they draw nearer, her face suddenly transforms into a hideous apparition. 
Rumours abounded that the well they had just passed by was haunted. In the first year of the 
series, the programme was 24 minutes long and included three separate accounts by three sets 
of informants. Screened on Thursday evenings at 22:00, its slot was filled with commercials 
and it proved popular with television viewers (the first couple of episodes had a rating of 
about 7 to 9 per cent according to the AC Nielsen survey) (Anugerah 2002; m07/m08/cp 
2002). 
In the wake of Kismis’ success, similar programmes soon followed suit. In 2002 there 
were three: Percaya Nggak Percaya (Believe it or not) and O Seraam (O scaary!), which were 
screened by Anteve, and Dunia Lain (Another world), which was broadcast on Thursday 
evening by Trans TV. The series Percaya Nggak Percaya greatly resembled Kismis in that it 
was also about true ghost stories and legends, and was presented by a model (Arzeti Bilbina). 
Some episodes of Kismis and Percaya Nggak Percaya dealt with the same subject, such as 
the story of a haunted house in Pondok Indah, South Jakarta, but in Percaya Nggak Percaya, 
the presenter did not interview informants herself but just introduced excerpts of mystery 
stories. These mystery stories were told to a reporter who went on location accompanied 
by an informant and an eyewitness. As proof of the authenticity of the story in Percaya 
Nggak Percaya, the reporter was accompanied by a supernatural expert/practitioner (praktisi 
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supernatural). This person would say what he ‘saw’ at the haunted site, and at times transmit 
(that is ‘speak on behalf of’) the wishes of the ghosts or other creatures at a certain location. 
The inclusion of strange occurrences in a part of the programme was a standard part of 
the series. A foggy image or shadow or perhaps some eerie sounds would appear on the 
television screen, and a narrator (either a voice-over or the reporter on location) would then 
say: ‘That was not simulated, but is actually happening’ (itu bukan rekayasa, tetapi kejadian 
sesungguhnya) (cp 2002).
Taking a slightly different tack to Kismis and Percaya Nggak Percaya, Anteve’s second 
series O Seraam recounted various ghost stories based on people’s own experiences. This 
horror infotainment programme was interactive and people could phone in and recount the 
uncanny events they had personally experienced. This programme also included a quiz about 
a ghost story (cp 2002). The third new horror infotainment, Dunia Lain (2002), had a host 
(Harry Pantja) who challenged people to stay overnight at haunted locations. They were then 
asked to narrate their experiences the next day. One episode entitled Hantu Kuburan Cina 
(Ghost of the Chinese Graveyard, broadcast on 19/09/2002) begins with a man accounting 
how he regularly desecrates Chinese graves when digging up the riches rumoured to be buried 
inside. Once when he was engaged in this nefarious pursuit, a ghost suddenly appeared. 
In the next segment of the programme, someone was dared to stay overnight at the grave 
where the ghost had been seen. The camera then filmed that person remaining at the grave 
all night long, and recorded all movements. After sunrise, the reporter returned and asked the 
person about what he had experienced (cp 2002). As in Percaya Nggak Percaya, during the 
recording eerie sounds could be heard and images which were said to be authentic appeared 
on screen. 
For an example of Dunia Lain see Disc Three 5.3.
Even though they still much resembled one another, the various horror infotainment 
programmes made strenuous efforts to find diverse forms to transmit authentic experiences 
of the supernatural as facts and part and parcel of the daily lived reality of Indonesian people. 
The key word reiterated in the depiction of the supernatural in the horror infotainment series 
was ‘real’.22 All series were based on true stories (kisah nyata), and what was recorded or 
reconstructed was claimed to be authentic and not fabricated (bukan rekayasa). Although in 
2002 in the authentication of the supernatural experiences the stories of eyewitnesses and 
the help of a paranormal or supernatural expert was sufficient, by 2003 religious authority, 
through the participation of a kyai or an ulama, was once again favoured as an essential part 
of horror infotainment programmes.
It was in this year that the number of horror infotainment series markedly increased. 
Besides the above-mentioned programmes on RCTI, Anteve, and Trans TV, other television 
stations now also boadcast their own horror infotainment series. To compete with this, in 
January 2003 Kismis came up with a new segment of thirteen half-hour episodes called 
Kismis: Arwah Penasaran (Mystery tales: lost souls). Again the series was about true stories, 
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but this time the focus was restricted to the category of ghost stories giving accounts of the 
wandering souls of people who had died by suicide or had been murdered, consequently 
leaving behind their unresolved problems on earth. The director of the new series CC 
Febriono claimed that Kismis: Arwah Penasaran was different from the other mystery series 
which had recently swamped the television stations. Its scope extended far beyond exploiting 
the scare factor of the stories of lost souls, as the programmes of other television stations 
did; it would also find a solution at the end of the story. Publicity contained such sentences 
as: ‘For example, to help the lost soul enter the Hereafter in peace the mediation of a kyai is 
required.’ ‘And indeed a good solution is still to ask Allah for help.’23 An example of Kismis: 
Arwah Penasaran screened on 05/01/03 was the story of Eriya, a girl from Kampung Asem, 
Cililitan, East Jakarta, who was murdered when she was six months pregnant. She was found 
with her throat slit open, her head nearly severed from her trunk. Her soul wandered through 
the area in search of the person who killed her and people from the village often encountered 
her ghost. All was well after an ustaz had prayed for her. She was then able to return to her 
world (kembali ke alamnya) in peace (Anugerah 2003).
By June 2003 the producer of Percaya Nggak Percaya felt that his programme also 
required the prestigious assistance of a religious co-star. Initially the series had consisted of 
several parts and now it was thought best just to maintain the Cerita Misteri section about 
people who had experienced a supernatural event. As a new development, it would no longer 
merely give a ‘news coverage of mysteries’ (liputan berita seputar misteri), but would also 
involve the participation of an Islamic paranormal medium, who would lead prayers and 
beseech permission and guidance from Allah before location shooting commenced. The 
participation of a paranormal medium on location as well as a break at sunset to observe 
the sunset prayer (sholat Maghrib) would be a hard and fast rule. It was felt that this would 
ensure that the production of the series would not encounter any hindrance from the spirits 
which it may have disturbed (Tim 2003).
The most extreme example of a marriage between horror realities and symbols of 
Islamic authorization was the horror reality-show Pemburu Hantu (Ghosthunters), which hit 
the screens in early 2004. In this programme ghosts were caught ‘live’ on screen. The concept 
of Pemburu Hantu was based on the Hollywood blockbuster Ghostbusters (Ivan Reitman, 
1984), a film about a team of men hunting down and catching ghosts. In Pemburu Hantu 
this theme was applied in real life. People at home could call the television programme to 
report ghostly apparitions or some haunted place. The Pemburu Hantu team would then set 
out to investigate the place and, should they indeed be present, capture the ghosts or other 
supernatural beings and cleanse the place and its surroundings of ‘negative energies’. After 
the ghosts were captured a sticker was glued on a wall with the image of a ghost and the 
words ‘under observation’ (dalam pengawasan). If the ghosts had not re-appeared after a 
few weeks, this sticker was replaced by another sticker showing the image of a ghost crossed 
out and bearing the words ‘free of ghosts’ (bebas hantu). The slogans associated with the 
programme sounded like commercials for a detergent: ‘Ghosthunters, the supreme solution 
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for overcoming ghosts!’ (Pemburu Hantu solusi jitu atasi hantu!) and ‘Ghosthunters: contact 
us, we’ll come, and we’ll cleanse [the place]!’ (Pemburu Hantu; hubungi kami, kami datang, 
kami bersihkan!).
The Pemburu Hantu team consisted of four persons: the supernatural expert (a dukun 
kejawen or Javanese magic specialist) Pak Hariry Mak, the Ustaz (Islamic authority figure) Aziz 
Hidayatullah, a young kejawen/santri (Javanese mystic/Islamic scholar) Ki Gusti Candra Putih, 
and a painter who drew portraits of the beings with his eyes covered. During the programmes 
the team prayed and invoked God’s help several times before, during, and after the ghost hunt. 
Its members also asked for the ‘interactive prayers’ (doa interaktif) of the viewers at home, 
beseeching God’s support (doa restu) to ensure that the mission would be brought to a safe 
conclusion. When their mission was accomplished at the end of the programme in a final 
comment Ustaz Aziz confirmed the existence of supernatural beings and explained that this 
also is acknowledged in Islam, for their existence is described in the Quran.24 
For an excerpt from Pemburu Hantu see Disc Three 5.3.
The participation of religious leaders in Kismis: Arwah Penasaran, the observance of 
religious rituals in Percaya Nggak Percaya, and the emphasis on the authorization of Islam 
and the power of prayer in the hyper-real Pemburu Hantu series are all reminiscent of the 
effects set in motion by the Code of Ethics guidelines. During the New Order, a kyai figured 
prominently as the appropriate authority figure or expert to restore order in horror films which 
dealt with public taboos as a means to evade censorship. While many New Order censorship 
regulations and guidelines for film production became obsolete during Reformasi, within a 
few years the kyai resurfaced to deal with supernatural issues, or to speak on behalf of ghosts 
and other supernatural creatures, in a new formula for the mystery television series.
Now a subtle difference had crept in. The re-instated participation of religious figures 
in post-Soeharto mystery television series implied a discourse about the supernatural which 
diverged from those which circulated during the New Order. In addition to the rise in reality 
TV, the socio-political climate of Reformasi set in motion a questioning of past dominant 
discourses of New Order rule. To unravel the authoritarian dogmas of the New Order, a 
widespread call for ‘facts’, ‘truth’, and ‘authenticity’ resounded. The search for post-Soeharto 
versions of the facts, realities, and truths of Indonesian society also impinged on mystery 
television programmes. Moreover there were commercial grounds for such a call: reality 
shows cashed in on people’s beliefs in the supernatural. In this setting everything claimed 
to be true in horror infotainment programmes needed proof that it was real and not caused 
by mere camera tricks or special effects. For example, a senior lecturer in criminology at the 
University of Indonesia in Jakarta, Prof. Dr. Tb Ronny Rahman Nitibaskara, proposed that 
in order to refute the idea that whatever occurred in the mystery programmes was fictitious, 
these programmes should be subjected to an analysis by an assembly of ulama and experts 
from different disciplines (bwo 2003). 
Hence, the use of religious and other authorities in the new formulas devised for the 
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mystery television genre during Reformasi functioned to authenticate what was shown on 
television as real. The tendency to define and authenticate the mysterious as part of present-
day reality shifted the previous New Order boundaries which had determined where the real 
and supernatural in Indonesian society should be placed, understood, and exploited. In that 
sense the kyai in horror reality shows after Reformasi challenged those discourses which 
rejected the mysterious as part of modern Indonesian society, marking possible new forms 
of imagining contemporary society. Nevertheless, the participation of religious leaders and 
the observance of religious rituals were presumably also re-instated to ward off anticipated 
objections by mainly Islamic groups which may have felt disturbed, had the mysterious been 
allowed to hover undefined and uncontrolled. As such, the presence of a kyai combined with 
an Islamic medium and religious observance on set as an integral part of these programmes 
was intended to permit and legitimize the new themes in horror infotainment. Reminiscent 
of the old practices of evading censorship under the New Order, the use of these religious 
figures and symbols can once again be perceived as a safeguard that enabled producers to 
show everything which might be construed as problematic and still get away with it.
Conclusion
In this chapter I examined the Indonesian horror genre as a forum for the representation of 
constituents of the nation and the formation of national identity. I showed that the genre itself, 
as well as certain formats and formulas employed in it, represented and imagined specific 
audiences and communities. New Order discourses about horror films produced for the cinema 
argued that the genre represented first the Indonesian film industry and Indonesian peoples, 
who, as part of Eastern culture, were close to mysticism. Second, horror films were seen as 
a genre for the lower classes and rural communities because the films were screened mostly 
in rural or lower class cinemas. Third, because of the deus ex machina formula employing 
the intervention of a kyai, horror film was gradually equated with film dakwah and Islamic 
communities. When horror films were produced for another format, television, and reached 
broader Indonesian audiences, other connotations began to arise. The emphasis shifted to 
different ways of imaging and imagining the supernatural and rational in Indonesian society 
and raised the discourses about the horror genre to another level.
From this fresh perspective, discourses about the horror genre sought to find acceptable 
forms of representing the supernatural on Indonesian television without interfering with New 
Order conceptions of how to image and imagine the modern Indonesian nation. Mystical 
films or television series faced opposition if they did not reflect certain sanctioned formulas 
and dominant discourses about development and the rational – or reality based on Islamic 
teaching – of how to imagine the supernatural in New Order society. For example, in 1998 
Minister of Information Hartono proscribed these series so as not to ‘cause a rift in our 
nation with items which contest religion’. Fierce debates about mystery films argued about 
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the definition of acceptable modes of representation of the supernatural and reality.  
Reformasi implied changes in both senses. The first shift occurred in the link between 
certain film formats and formulas and certain imagined audiences or communities. Changes 
in horror film formulas altered the specific association of horror with the lower class, rural, 
and Islamic communities. Several horror films produced for the cinema demonstrated a new 
freedom of expression at work among film-makers. In many cases the changes heralded the 
exit of the kyai. Also, a number of new Indonesian horror films were now screened in top end 
cinemas, signalling that horror was no longer a genre confined to the lower classes only.
The second change could be found in the discourses of how to imagine the supernatural 
as part of Indonesian society. During Reformasi television began to produce new formulas of 
horror programmes. Within a few years new horror ‘reality shows’ or infotainment programmes 
had emerged. These presented the supernatural as part of the everyday life of Indonesians. 
Such programmes contested the New Order discourses which had defined the mysterious as 
a realm outside reality. However, even though horror reality shows altered discourses about 
the supernatural, in due course old modes of representing the mysterious emerged again in 
some of the new television formulas. Personified by the kyai, past representations regained 
ground in an altered discourse. The kyai was an unrivaled asset in the exploitation of the 
supernatural in Indonesian audio-visual media. He increased the realism of horror reality 
shows and warded off censorship at the same time. I further explore the combination of 
commerce, censorship, and Islam in post-Soeharto media in the next chapter. 
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6  The celebrity kyai and phantoms of the past: Tussling 
with the bounds of Indonesian moralities, realities, and 
popularities
Introduction
After two weeks of controversy on 21 August 2004 the teen flick Buruan Cium Gue! (Kiss 
me quick!, Findo Purwono) was withdrawn from Indonesian cinemas. The film had passed 
the censors but after its release it had elicited strong protests from the famous dai (preacher), 
public figure, and businessman Abdullah Gymnastiar. Without actually having seen the 
film, basing his views simply on its title, AA Gym believed that it would encourage illicit 
premarital sex amongst teenagers. It did not take him long to round up support in Islamic 
governmental and mass organizations. After two weeks of loud protests from these groups 
the film was banned from cinemas. The producer, Raam Punjabi, retracted it so as ‘not to 
destabilize the nation any further’. 
Muslim protests stirred up by putatively inappropriate films were nothing new. Both 
under New Order rule and during Reformasi, films were banned, withdrawn from circulation, 
not publicly screened, or even not produced in anticipation of Muslim protests. Nevertheless, 
there were subtle changes in the socio-political environment from under the New Order 
to after Soeharto rule had ended. One significant difference was that during Reformasi, in 
response to the rise of freedom of expression in all sorts of fields, Muslim protests were 
expressed more loudly. Furthermore, in the freer atmosphere of Reform, images of Islam 
gradually achieved greater exposure in the Indonesian media. In the context of protests in the 
name of Islam, between 2003 and 2007 such outcries particularly attracted substantial media 
attention. It was not just film which elicited protests; music and dance performances and 
visual arts also drew the ire from some Muslim groups. In 2003 the uproar around Buruan 
Cium Gue! was preceded by a controversy about the famous dangdut singer and dancer 
Inul Daratista. Pious Islamic veteran dangdut singer and film star Rhoma Irama expressed 
his disgust with Inul’s sexy dance movements. His objections to Inul’s dances launched a 
heated debate about whether or not her provocative hip rotations could be defined as an act 
of pornography and be forbidden on the grounds of religious moral values. In 2005 another 
two cases which attracted ample media attention involved the militant Islamic organization 
Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI).1 Since its formation in August 1998, 
the FPI had invariably been depicted in the Indonesian media as a fanatical Muslim group 
which would not shy away from violence to make its point. The first case which involved 
a protest from the FPI in 2005 had to do with the use of the Arabic calligraphic symbol for 
Allah on the cover of the album Laskar Cinta (Love army) of the rock band Dewa 19. FPI 
also objected to a television performance by the band because during the show dancers trod 
on the calligraphic symbol which was painted on the studio floor. FPI accused Dewa 19 of 
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blasphemy, reported the band to the Jakarta city police, and demanded a public apology. The 
second case which made the limelight was occasioned by FPI protests against a photograph 
on display at the 2005 CP Biennale art exhibition in Jakarta. It depicted a nude Adam and Eve. 
FPI repudiated this photograph on the grounds that it was pornographic and consequently 
reported photographer Davy Linggar, art curator of the Biennale Agus Suwage, as well as 
‘Adam’, who was personified by popular television actor Anjasmara, and ‘Eve’, the well-
known model Isabella, to the Jakarta police. In February 2006 the four were cited suspects 
who allegedly had displayed obscene art which affronted certain religious groups (Suryana 
2006).
The growth in Muslim protests against films, music performances, and works of art in post-
Soeharto Indonesia was linked to discourses about the position of Islam in the Indonesian public 
sphere and its role in the politics of Reform. This issue was a very old one, which dated back to 
pre-independence days. Then the discourses centred on the position of Islam in the Indonesian 
Constitution. The burning question was whether the new Indonesian nation-state should separate 
state and religion or, alternatively, adopt the document known as the Jakarta Charter (Piagam 
Jakarta). This charter paved the way for the state to implement Islamic law among Muslims. The 
Jakarta Charter was rejected and in its stead the Pancasila was adopted as the state ideology on 22 
June 1945. Reformasi and the concomitant bid it brought to change society reopened the debate 
on whether the Indonesian nation should be ruled on the basis of Islamic principles. Although in 
the period between 1998 and 2007 the general feeling was still that Islam should not be part of the 
Indonesian Constitution, in the public sphere and in regional politics Islamic values were gradually 
gaining ground. In particular, the law on regional autonomy, officially promulgated on 1 January 
2001, strengthened the position of Islamic rule as part of regional regulations (peraturan daerah, 
Perda).2 Between 2001 and 2005 the regional governments in Aceh, Tangerang, Cianjur, Padang, 
and South Sulawesi all implemented regulations based on Islamic law. Furthermore, in 2006 an 
important debate took place which involved questions about the position of Islam in ruling the 
nation. The majority of these discourses occurred in the context of the proposal for the drafting 
of a new law which would regulate public morality and boost the endeavour to ban pornography 
from the public domain. Under the presidency of Habibie (1998-1999), rightwing Muslim parties 
had proposed a new law on pornography. In 2006 their efforts bore fruit in the Anti-Pornography 
and Porno Action Bill (Rancangan Undang Undang Anti Pornografi dan Pornoaksi, RUU APP). 
Among the aims the law hoped to achieve was to ban kissing in public, sensual dances, and the 
depiction of sexual activity in literature, paintings, photographs, and recordings (Suryana 2006).3 
Ideas about the implementation of Islamic values in the framework of the bill led to vehement 
protests from both non-Islamic and moderate Islamic groups. In the words of Muhamad Ali, 
lecturer at the State Islamic University in Jakarta, the controversy between the proponents of 
the bill and its critics exposed ‘the fault lines of a cultural war between the conservatives and the 
liberals, with the silent majority in the middle’ (Ali 2007). 
Next to the wider exposure and increased intensity of Muslim protests against films, 
performances, and visual arts, another difference between New Order Indonesia and Reform 
113
Film narrative practices
was that Islamic features became more frequent in audio-visual media after the fall of President 
Soeharto. To some extent this could be attributed to the growing number of Islamic groups and 
organizations which had begun to use audio-visual media as a tool for religious propagation 
and self-representation. As discussed in Chapter Four, this had led to the founding of the 
new film genre and movement of film Islami. The ideas and representations of Islam which 
the Islamic film movement had in mind with film Islami did not reach the Indonesian mass 
media. Instead, as discussed in Chapter Five, horror reality shows produced by commercial 
television stations were associated in an increasing degree with religious propagation. In 
2004, this trend of Islamic authority figures appearing on television increased yet again. A 
new television genre called ‘religious soaps’ (sinetron religius) emerged. Although initially 
confined to the fasting month Ramadan, these soaps which had an outwardly Islamic 
appearance, were screened on television even after this time. Gradually, images of Islam had 
managed to evade this framework, but the new religious series were still haunted by ghosts 
and, generally speaking, the stories still leaned heavily on tearful repentance. As was the 
case in the horror reality shows, the religious soaps were imbued with elements of mystery, 
namely supernatural occurrences, and also reiterated the claim that they were based on true 
stories. Moreover, as did films and series of the horror genre, the religious soaps accorded 
a major role to heroes in the form of Islamic authority figures. Kyai, ustaz, ulama, or dai 
appeared in the soap itself, or celebrity kyai gave an introduction before the programme 
started and also brought it to a close. So, even though Islamic films had broken free of the 
framework of Ramadan, most works featuring Islam on television were a far cry from the 
envisaged film Islami. 
The proliferation of images of Islam on television and the wider exposure of Islamic 
groups in their efforts to regulate film media, music, and art, could not but influence narrative 
practices in film and television. This chapter is an attempt to discover the way in which Islam 
was implicated in defining the bounds of post-Soeharto film and television narratives. In both 
the first and third sections I address a case in which the banner of Islam was used in attempts 
to direct film narrative practices by means of assessments by the censor. In the interval of the 
second section I discuss post-Soeharto television narrative practices.
6.1. The ban on Kiss Me Quick!: The kyai, the foreigner, and Indonesia’s morality
On 5 August 2004, the film Buruan Cium Gue! was released in top end cinemas of the Cinema 
21 group in fifteen different cities. The film followed the average formula of ‘ABG’ (Anak 
Baru Gedhe; teenager) television soaps. It featured a simple love story about a young couple, 
Ardi and Desi, who are each other’s first love. The girl, Desi, comes from a rich family. 
The boy, Ardi, is a poor orphan who works hard after school to pay for his education. Even 
though they have been dating for two years, Ardi has never kissed Desi on her lips. Ardi, who 
is an adherent of ‘old-fashioned’ principles, does not want to kiss his girlfriend before it is 
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the right time to do so. Desi, on the other hand, dreams of being kissed by him. Most of her 
girlfriends at school have already been kissed. On a radio programme about ‘the first kiss’, 
Desi lies about her first kiss experience and it is this lie that stirs up a tempest of troubles. 
Because Ardi has never kissed her he wonders when and by whom Desi was kissed. After a 
plethora of misunderstandings all the problems are solved. In the end Ardi and Desi enjoy 
their first kiss.
Buruan Cium Gue! was produced by the ‘king’ of television soaps, Raam Punjabi. Since 
the beginning of the 1990s his production house Multivision Plus has been very successful 
in producing popular entertainment for Indonesian television. The film Buruan Cium Gue! 
strongly resembled the formula of Punjabi’s soaps, and it also featured actors and actresses 
who played in one of his popular soaps Anak Baru Gedhe (Teenagers). This soap had been 
launched two years earlier on the Indonesian private television station RCTI. In an interview, 
Punjabi mentioned that he had wanted to produce a version of the television series for the big 
screen, because: ‘There are things which actually do happen amongst teenagers but can not 
be shown in soaps; these are exposed in Buruan Cium Gue!’ (CP 2004).4 
Only three days after its release the film sparked a big controversy. On 8 August 2004 
the then very popular dai Abdullah Gymnastiar raised objections to the film. He did so in his 
bimonthly sermon on Sunday, which was broadcast live from the Istiqlal Mosque in Jakarta 
on the private television channel SCTV, in a homily called Indahnya Kebersamaan (The 
beauty of togetherness).  
For an example of his sermons in the Istiqlal Mosque see Disc Three 6.1. 
AA Gym was convinced that the film Buruan Cium Gue!, contained pornographic elements, 
a conclusion which he extrapolated from its title alone, inspiring him to attack the film in 
his sermon. He said Buruan Cium Gue! was dangerous as it would encourage premarital 
sex among teenagers. Gym said that according to Islamic doctrine it was a sin for a man and 
woman who were not married even to touch each other, let alone kiss. Not only did such 
a kiss run counter to Islamic doctrine, it was one sure step on the road to premarital sex. 
Pursuing this theme, AA Gym asserted that the title of the film might as well be changed to 
‘Buruan Berzinah’ (‘Hurry up Let’s Fornicate’).
Soon after his televised sermon, AA Gym won the support from the Indonesian Ulama 
Council MUI, and several Islamic mass organizations. Some of these mass organizations 
initiated protests against the film, demanding it be banned. The president of MUI, Amidhan, 
asserted that the film was not at all suitable to be screened in Indonesia. He too considered 
the title of the film to be an insuperable hurdle. It implied ‘porno action’ (porno aksi, meaning 
porn-related acts). Moreover, he believed that scenes of premarital kissing in the film formed 
an infringement of the morality and culture of the Indonesian nation. Such a film, he said, 
destroyed the morality of the nation. Therefore it should be banned. Amidhan argued that 
the film could be construed as an insult to religion. He felt personally offended that the film 
unfolds the tale of how an initially deeply pious boy discards his religious moral values at its 
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end and succumbs to kissing his girlfriend before marrying her (Yordenaya 2004a).
Presumably stimulated by the support of MUI and the mass organizations, AA Gym 
began a tour around the city in efforts to gauge the popularity of Buruan Cium Gue! among 
film audiences. On Friday 13 August in an interview before his visit to some film theatres, 
he laid heavy emphasis on the fact that he did not intend to watch the film personally. He 
reiterated that the title alone made it palpably clear that it ran counter to basic religious values 
and posed a serious danger to the younger generation of Indonesians. AA Gym declared that 
his sole purpose was to visit the cinemas to check on the popularity of the film. Precisely 
because of the controversy he had stirred up, the cinemas which screened Buruan Cium Gue! 
were packed. Many in the audience simply wanted to see what all the fuss was about and were 
curious about the risqué scenes. The majority came away disappointed after watching the film. It 
was an ordinary Indonesian soap or teen flick and there was nothing special to see.5
Nevertheless, AA Gym and his supporters continued their mission of protest against the 
film. Five days after his visits to cinemas, AA Gym and his associates set out to call on the 
Film Censor Institute. On 18 August they paid a visit to the head of the institute, Titie Said, in 
order to interrogate her about the institue allowing the film’s general circulation in cinemas. 
In answer to Gym’s questions, Titie Said explained that the kissing scene in Buruan Cium 
Gue! had abided by the censor institute rules. It was believed that the scene portrayed a part 
of daily-lived reality of contemporary Indonesian youth. Moreover, Titie argued, before the 
making of Buruan Cium Gue! several other Indonesian films which had passed the censor had 
already contained kissing scenes. She explained that the title reproduced the trendy language 
used among teenagers. Despite her neutral explanation, after the visit by AA Gym, Titie Said 
commented in an interview that she believed that Gym’s call on the censor institute was a 
sign that the institute had made a wrong decision. However, she stated, as the film had already 
passed the censorship procedures the institute was not entitled to withdraw it from cinemas 
(Yordenaya 2004b).
Surprisingly, four days later it was. On 21 August 2004, after a fortnight of controversy, 
the film was withdrawn from the cinemas. The institute, with the agreement of Punjabi’s 
Multivision Plus, had decided to bow to the pressure of the public rejection of the film. The 
Film Censor Institute withdrew its approval of the film on the grounds that it had ‘disrupted 
public order’. The Ministry of Culture and Tourism issued a letter revoking the distribution of 
the film and Multivision asked cinemas to stop screening it (Unidjaja 2004). The film copies 
were sent back to the production company, and it was decided that Buruan Cium Gue! would 
be re-released later that year after some editing and under another title. Raam Punjabi told 
the press that when undertaking the revision of the film, besides the censor institute he would 
also involve religious leaders in the production process. Punjabi regretted that Buruan Cium 
Gue! had been banned but believed that it was more important that the nation had not been 
divided over it (‘Mana yang perlu.’ 2004). Punjabi clearly stressed he had not retracted his 
film because of its content. The film, he stated, showed nothing but the factual lives of middle 
class young people in Indonesian society. 
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For an impression of BCG! and statements by Punjabi see Disc Three 6.1.
The controversy did not stop there. In their turn groups of journalists, intellectuals, film-
makers, writers, artists and other public figures began to protest the banning of the film. 
The protest raised by these groups articulated a fear of the implementation of a new form 
of censorship on the basis of religious moral grounds. In the newspaper The Jakarta Post 
cultural critic Zoso wrote that he was afraid that censorship on the basis of religion would be 
the first step on the path to political repression and curbs on the freedom of expression. He 
recalled that the Indonesian media had already experienced such restrictions under Soeharto 
rule and nobody wanted it to go back there. Zoso emphasized that religion should not become 
an instrument of harassment (Zoso 2004). Others also probed the question of the role of 
religious pressure in the banning of Buruan Cium Gue!.6 On 25 August the cultural centre 
Utan Kayu produced a petition signed by film-makers, intellectuals, artists and other public 
figures. This petition addressed three points. Its first point was that the withdrawal of the film 
was an annihilation of the freedom of expression and could be seen as an anti-democratic 
action at odds with human rights. Its second objection was that religious authorities and 
symbols (in this case Islamic) should not be brought into the public sphere, but be reserved to 
the private sphere. The third objection raised was that this ban on a work of art was perceived 
as moralistic, dogmatic, old-fashioned and not representative of the religious/Islamic 
community in Indonesia as a whole (Gaban 2004).
Ignoring such criticisms, Islamic pressure groups continued to stage protests against 
films and television programmes. Members of the Alliance of People against Pornographic 
Acts (Aliansi Masyarakat Anti Porno-aksi, AMAP) complained about the programmes 
Cowok Cowok Keren (Handsome guys) on RCTI, Nah Ini Dia (Nah here he/she/it is) on 
SCTV, and Layar Tancep (Mobile cinema) on Lativi. In their view, these programmes were 
merely a vehicle for selling sex. Even though every one of the series had passed the censor, 
as far as AMAP was concerned they exceeded the boundaries of what was acceptable in the 
Indonesian media (‘Mana yang perlu.’2004). In this atmosphere, producers of films which 
might possibly elicit protests tried to pre-empt objections usually by claiming that their 
films just represented reality. One of these films was Virgin (Hanny Saputra 2004), which 
was released not long after Buruan Cium Gue! The film, which was noticeably inspired by 
the US films Thirteen (directed by Catherine Hardwick 2003) and Coyote Ugly (directed 
by David McNally 2000), was said to depict daily life in contemporary Indonesia.  In a 
television programme about ‘the making of Virgin’, producer Chand Parwez stressed that 
the film showed what was actually happening in Indonesian society. According to Parwez, 
Virgin, which depicts teenage girls clubbing, using drugs, drinking alcohol, and selling their 
bodies to men to pay for trendy clothes and gadgets, was produced ‘to inform and warn 
parents’. Parents, he said, should watch the film together with their children in order to make 
themselves aware of the dangers inherent in contemporary city life and, thus armed, teach the 
children right from wrong. 
For fragments from ‘the making of Virgin’ and Parwez’s statements see Disc Three 6.1.
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At the same time as discourses and protests about the moral value of Buruan Cium Gue! and 
similar films were being staged, an anti-pornography law was drafted.7 In 2006 discussion 
of the bill led to a huge controversy which according to lecturer Muhammad Ali was best 
understood in the context of a struggle about a fitting definition of the public morality of 
the Indonesian nation-state (Ali 2006). Until 2006 any serious discussion of the law had 
mainly been conspicuous by its absence. The law was proposed under the presidency of 
Habibie and was brought up again a few times during the presidencies of Abdurrahman 
Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri. In 2003 new interest in an anti-pornography law 
was aroused by the enormous upheaval across the country caused by the erotic dance 
movements of the dangdut singer Inul Daratista. The hip gyrations of the rising star were 
compared to the working of a drill giving her the title ‘queen of the drill dance’ (ratu 
ngebor). Inul’s dance aroused the ire of celebrity, film star, and ‘king of dangdut’, Rhoma 
Irama. A devout Muslim, Rhoma Irama declared that Inul’s drill dance posed a threat to 
the morality of the country and that such ‘porno-action’ – he was the one who launched the 
term – should be banned from the public domain. The row between Inul and Rhoma Irama 
received wide exposure in the Indonesian mass media and divided Indonesia into pro and 
contra Inul camps (Barendregt 2006; Sushartami forthcoming). It did not take long for the 
controversy to enter the forum of social and political discourse and set off discourses on 
public morality. Some were captivated by Inul’s dance movements and viewed these as a 
form of art. Others were loud in their condemnation as they believed it downgraded the 
nation’s morality. The discourses on Inul’s drill dance as an expression of porno-action 
prompted some rightwing Islamic groups in the House of Representatives to push for the 
speedy enforcement of a law against pornography and porno-action. However it was to be 
another two years before the Anti-Pornography Bill was discussed intensively in 2005.8 
The case of Buruan Cium Gue! widened the scope of earlier discussions about the role 
of the government and Islamic values in the regulation of public morality. In an article posted 
on the Indonesian mailing list Layarkata, Farid Gaban, a journalist on Kantor Berita Pena 
Indonesia, wrote that the protests against Buruan Cium Gue! went far beyond this film. Farid 
interpreted these as a symptom of the Indonesian public being fed up with the existing trend 
in Indonesian mass media, which were completely dominated by mystery programmes, an 
obsession with private lives and the scandals surrounding celebrities, and vulgar criminal 
news programmes (Gaban 2004). In the same vein, in 2005 commenting on the controversy 
around the Anti-Pornography Bill, Muhammad Ali suggested that the drafters and supporters 
of the bill thought that the moral values in Indonesian society were being degraded by the rise 
of freedom of expression. Thinking particularly of the increase in pornographic materials in 
tabloids, art shows, literature, and films, Ali argued that such people saw these developments 
as a massive threat. Religious leaders and pressure groups, Ali believed, needed the bill 
as they found themselves powerless to impose their worldviews without a legal basis (Ali 
2005).9
While some believed that freedom of expression had gone too far and blemished the 
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Indonesian nation, others embraced it as part of the open and democratic society Indonesia 
had become during Reform. As mentioned earlier, some feared that religion would provide 
the new grounds by which the freedom of expression in Indonesian society would be 
restricted. Such commentators as Zoso compared the role of AA Gym and Islamic groups 
which had elicited the ban of Buruan Cium Gue! with ‘the tyrannical authority’ exercised by 
the Department of Information during the New Order (Zoso 2004). Gaban likewise expressed 
the fear that the case of Buruan Cium Gue! would lead to a new renunciation of freedom 
of expression. He was worried that the petition launched by Utan Kayu would trigger a 
polarization in which AA Gym would be supported by such groups as FPI, the Indonesian 
Council of Defenders of the [Islamic] Faith (Majelis Mujahiddin, MMI), components of the 
Party of Liberation (Hizbut Tahrir, an international Sunni pan-Islamist political party), or 
the political Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), which would fight 
back the hard way. Gaban was afraid that if that happened, the government would respond by 
reducing freedom of expression drastically (Gaban 2004).
Nevertheless, in the views of some others, among them noted psychologist Sartono 
Mukadis, comparing the ban on Buruan Cium Gue! to the limitations imposed on the freedom 
of expression during the New Order was inaccurate. Mukadis was adamant that the protests of 
one person backed by a number of groups could not be compared to the rigid control exercised 
by institutions which was systematized under the New Order. He was not at all convinced 
that the case of Buruan Cium Gue! reflected the birth of a new system which would curb the 
freedom of expression on the basis of religion because, he argued, when Rhoma Irama spoke 
on behalf of religion in his attempts to stop Inul from performing, he had failed to achieve 
his purpose (Mukadis 2004). In an analogous comparison, Jujur Prananto went a step further. 
He did not see the cases of Buruan Cium Gue! or Inul as matters which were connected to 
the question of whether Islam was at the basis of new censorship regulation in Indonesia. 
Instead, he saw both cases as evidence that control over the nation was in the hands of those 
people who wielded great influence. In the era of Reform, Prananto argued, power was in the 
hands of the most popular celebrities: at the time being Inul Daratista and AA Gym (Prananto 
2004). Even so, Inul owed her victory over Rhoma Irama not only to her popularity, but also 
to the fact that she was supported by prominent Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, a 30-million-strong 
Muslim organization) figures such as former President of Indonesia Abdurrahman Wahid and 
Ahmad Mustofa Bisri (Islamic leader and teacher as well as painter and poet, well-known as 
Gus Mus).
Prananto did address two valid points. Firstly, it was true that in post-Soeharto Indonesia 
celebrities did dominate in the mass media and secondly, the use of religion as grounds to 
control censorship was not irrefutable. The victory of AA Gym and religious groups in the 
case of Buruan Cium Gue! was based not purely on religion. It was a mixture of stardom, 
popularity, and religion, all ranged on the side of the popular real-life kyai-celebrity AA Gym, 
which turned the case into a non-contest for Raam Punjabi, the film’s producer. The latter 
was of Indian descent and therefore open to accusations of being a ‘foreigner’ and ‘capitalist’ 
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promoting non-Indonesian secular realities. As said, the withdrawal of a film in response to 
Muslim protests was not something new. Under the New Order there had also been some 
cases in which Islam was used as the grounds to ban or retract films. The next section gives 
a broader overview of the role of Islamic authorities and mass organizations and the fear of 
Muslim protests in film production, exhibition, censorship, and self-censorship during the 
New Order and Reform.
6.2. Censorship from the street: The authority of religion
Under the New Order influential censorship of the media was based on the principle of SARA 
(an abbreviation of Suku (ethnic groups), Agama (religion), Ras (race), and Antar-golongan 
(class)). The mass media were not permitted to cover these subjects in any critical way as 
there was a fear that this would destabilize the nation. Besides the guidelines for SARA, rules 
and regulations were drawn up specifically for film administered by the Film Censor Board 
(Badan Sensor Film, BSF; after 1992 Film Censor Institute, Lembaga Sensor Film, LSF). 
The members of the Film Censor Institute consisted of representatives of the government, the 
legal fraternity, the army, film producers, and several religious organizations, among them 
the Indonesian Ulama Council, the Nahdlatul Ulama, the Muhammadiyah, the Council of 
Churches in Indonesia (Dewan Gereja-gereja di Indonesia, DGI), the Bishops’ Conference 
of Indonesia (Konferensi Wali Gereja Indonesia, KWI), and the Hinduism Society (Parisada 
Hindu Dharma Indonesia) (‘LSF diminta.’1995). Both domestic films and imported products 
had to pass the board of censors before they could be released in cinemas, on television, 
or distributed in the format of video cassettes, VCD, and DVD. As mentioned in Chapters 
Two and Five, next to the official censorship regulations laid down in Indonesian Film 
Legislation, a special Ethical Code for Film Production was created in 1981.10 However, 
despite the involvement of a special commission for administering religious principles in 
the creation of the Ethical Code for film production and the co-operation of representatives 
of religious mass organizations in the censorship system, from time to time there were 
protests about films, which were led by religious, mainly Islamic, communities and (mass) 
organizations. These protests interfered directly in censorship proceedings, or were raised to 
demand the withdrawal of films which had already been released by the board. Such protests 
were apparently random though: not all films which may conceivably have been rejected on 
the grounds of religious sentiments raised objections, and at times protests were elicited by 
films which contained nothing that could be construed as contrary to religious teachings. 
Between 1993 and 1997 such groups as Communication Forum of Dakwah Institutions 
(Forum Komunikasi Lembaga Dakwah, FKLD), the Association of Islamic Students 
(Himpuan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI), the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity in the Islamic 
World (Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam, KISDI), and branches of MUI in 
different provinces of Indonesia all lodged protests about films.11 The greatest objection was 
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to what were interpreted as ‘pornographic’ images in Indonesian films. Ever since the 1970s 
various Indonesian films had toyed with an impression of female nudity and sex. Members 
of Muslim organizations in particular feared that these films would have a bad influence on 
the young generation and lead them to stray from religion. The films were deemed to be 
unacceptable from the point of view of religion and to oppose the essence of Indonesian 
cultures and traditions. Anwar Sanusi from the Institution for the Study and Development 
of Islamic Dakwah (Lembaga Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Dakwah Islam, LPPDI) and 
Ahmad Suaidy and Husein Umar, respectively head of and spokesperson for the FKLD, 
said that Indonesia was a pious nation (hht 1993; Sanusi 1993; spw 1994). Even though the 
majority of those protesting about films were members of Muslim groups, leaders of other 
religious groups upheld the same ideas about pornography. They also argued that films which 
contained nudity or sex should be forbidden: ‘The sentiments of the Islamic community 
are also those of the Roman Catholic, Protestant, Hindu and Buddhist communities’ (U-1 
1996).
Alongside regular protests about the circulation of both legal and illegal pornographic 
films and videos or the qualms voiced about sexy film posters, which mainly tended to be 
lodged during the fasting month Ramadan, under the New Order there were three particular 
cases in which protests about films sparked heated controversy.12 In all three cases, Muslim 
protests interfered in the work of the film censor. Twice the controversy involved imported 
films from the US. The first of these was True Lies (James Cameron, 1994), which was 
perceived to be an insult to Muslims as they were represented as terrorists. Even though 
True Lies had passed the censor institute, Muslim groups demanded it to be withdrawn 
from circulation. The upshot was that its popularity soared and it was transformed into an 
item very much in demand in pirated videos sales. The second film which upset Muslim 
sensibilities was Schindler’s List (Steven Spielberg, 1993), which never reached Indonesian 
cinemas. Before they had even watched the film, some Muslim groups were convinced that 
it contained Jewish propaganda and protested against its release in Indonesia. In order not to 
incite Muslim protests any more than were already aroused, but also because it did not get 
permission from the film-maker to cut any scenes, the censor institute decided not to release 
the film (‘Schindler’s List.’1994). Again this film proved a popular item which was widely 
available in piracy networks. A third controversial case involving efforts to override state 
censorship by Muslim groups was sparked by the Indonesian film production Pembalasan 
Ratu Laut Selatan (Revenge of the queen of the southern sea, Tjut Djalil, 1988). This film 
was a horror story about a legendary goddess who harbours a snake in her vagina which 
bites off the vital organs of men who have sex with her. Pembalasan Ratu Laut Selatan had 
passed the Film Censor Board but after its release Islamic organizations raised a hue and cry 
about the film’s content. The organizations objected to the pornographic theme of the film 
and singled out particular scenes for especially hard criticism. Because of the uproar caused 
by these protests after a few days the film was withdrawn from cinemas.
During and after Reformasi a huge wave of new developments in the world of film came 
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about. Just as various groups and film-makers were experimenting with testing the boundaries 
of Reformation’s new freedom of expression, some Islamic groups were gauging the extent 
to which they could have their say in the restriction of these liberties.13 Such Islamic groups 
as the Paramilitary Unit of Indonesian People Against Piracy and Pornography (Laskar 
Masyarakat Anti Pembajakan dan Pornografi Indonesia, MAPPI), a special force consisting 
of some 750 people, [the majority of whom were part of the banser (paramilitary wing) of 
NU], FPI, and PKS, organized themselves to win victories over what they considered amoral, 
anti-Islamic film products. MAPPI instigated raids to halt the selling of pirated or banned 
films, which involved demolishing stalls of street vendors.14 FPI mainly confined itself to 
threats. Television stations and organizers of film festivals, for example, were left in no doubt 
that their offices or cinemas would no longer be safe if the screening of certain films was to 
go ahead.15 
Besides curbing the distribution of films, in post-Soeharto Indonesia at times fear of 
protests from Islamic groups also hindered the production process. In 2001 film director 
Garin Nugroho planned to make a film Izinkan Aku Menciummu Sekali Saja (Let me kiss 
you just once) about a young boy in a pesantren (Islamic boarding school), who dreams of 
kissing a beautiful Chinese girl whom he happens to see walking by every day. However, after 
protests from pesantren representatives the producer retracted funding for the production of 
the film (Wardhana 2001b). Garin relocated the setting to Papua were Roman Catholics are 
in the majority. In 2003 the film was released under the title Aku Ingin Menciummu Sekali 
Saja (I want to kiss you just once).16 Garin Nugroho found himself contending not just with 
protests from Muslim groups. In 2005 during the pre-production of his film Sinta Obong (The 
burning of Sinta), the Indonesian Hindu’s Women Movement (Gerakan Perempuan Hindu 
Indonesia, GPHMI) repudiated the film because it believed the screenplay was offensive to 
the Goddess Sinta and the true story of the Ramayana. GPHMI also stressed that even though 
Hinduism was a minority religion in Indonesia the nation should be aware that 1 billion 
Hindus believed in the Ramayana. Moreover, they declared, Bali, Hinduism, and its symbols 
and sacred books should neither be attacked by bombs (referring to terrorist attacks that were 
committed in the name of Islam in 2002 and 2005), nor treated with contempt (pelecehan) 
(‘Film Sinta Obong.’2005). In the end Garin produced the film after judiciously changing the 
title to the more comprehensive Opera Jawa (Javanese opera, 2006).
In addition to these examples, generally speaking between 1999 and 2004 the religious 
protests, the majority of them launched by Muslim groups, were not markedly different 
from those staged under the New Order. In the outcry raised about film and VCD and 
DVD productions most protests addressed ‘amoral’ films depicting what was interpreted as 
pornography as well as female nudity. On television in particular Latin-American telenovelas 
and such American series as Baywatch, Melrose Place, and VIP were considered to be 
incompatible with Islamic values, which were often cited as forming the basis of Indonesian 
culture and civilization. As a sop to accommodate members of the Islamic community, 
programmes which may have been construed as offensive were put on hold during the Islamic 
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fasting month. But as soon as Ramadan was over, they simply resurfaced (Ant/ksp 2001; asa 
2000; yus 2002). Again, notwithstanding the various examples which may be adduced, it 
must be stressed that religious protests about films were sporadic and did not cover all films 
which might have incited controversy from a religious moralist point of view. For example, a 
kissing scene in the teen flick Ada Apa Dengan Cinta (What’s up with Love, Rudi Soedjarwo 
2002), and a kiss by a gay couple in Arisan (Gathering, Nia Dinata 2003) were passed over 
without a murmur of dissent.
After the ban on Buruan Cium Gue! and protests about various television 
programmes by AMAP at the end of August 2004, discourses began to address the 
need for the involvement of religious authorities in film and television production. 
Because of the controversy aroused by Buruan Cium Gue!, both the strengthening of 
the role and representation of Islamic authority figures in the Film Censor Institute 
and a revision of censorship rules in the near future, including the assessment of film 
titles, was on the cards (‘Mana yang perlu.’ 2004).. Some favoured the involvement 
of Islamic authority figures, not as any official part of the state system but in the form 
of pre-censorship or self-censorship in the production process. In early August 2003, 
a year before the controversy about Buruan Cium Gue! erupted, a representative of 
film professionals in the Film Censor Institute, Tatiek Malyati Ws, had already put in a 
request for stronger self-censorship on the part of film producers and television stations. 
Moreover, she had called on the leaders of the nation, parents, and religious authorities 
to be pro-active in lodging complaints against pornographic films and participating in 
censorship (‘Sensor segera.’2003).17 In the controversy which blew up around Buruan 
Cium Gue!, it seems her ideas were implemented. Besides pro-active protests leading 
to a ban on a film, king of soaps Raam Punjabi announced that he intended to involve 
religious leaders in the revision of Buruan Cium Gue! (‘Mana yang perlu.’2004). It 
is difficult to obtain any specific clarification of the ways and extent Raam Punjabi 
proceeded in honouring this promise and involve Islamic authorities in his film and 
television productions. But after the ban on Buruan Cium Gue! religious soaps began 
to mushroom on television, and were no longer confined to the framework of Ramadan. 
The boom in production of religious soaps commenced in February 2004 when the private 
television station TPI began to broadcast the series Rahasia Ilahi (God’s Secret).18 The series 
was based on true stories of people who had experienced the wonders of God, accounts of 
which were published in the magazines Hidayah (God’s guidance) and Allah Maha Besar 
(God is great). Rahasia Ilahi was hosted by Ustaz Arifin Ilham, a young, fairly popular dai. 
Television viewers loved the series and it brought TPI to the number one spot in AC Nielsen 
ratings with a share of 15.8 per cent. Sensing a successful formula other television stations 
were quick to follow suit with similar programmes.19 In addition to the majority of the 
series which drew their stories from among the common people, there were some religious 
soaps which were based on stories from old Islamic sources. These sources, mainly hadits 
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(traditional collection of stories relating to words or deeds of the Prophet Muhammad, the 
chief source of guidance for understanding religious questions), were adapted to a present-
day setting. To name one, TPI’s Takdir Ilahi (God’s divine decree) used hadits taken from 
Bukhari and Muslim which were inserted in the books Mi’ah qishshah wa qishshah fi anis 
al-shalihin wa samir al-muttaqin (One hundred tales and the tale of the righteous), written 
by Muhammad Amin Al-Jundi Al Muttaqin, and Madarij al-salikin (The path of the mystic 
traveler) written by Ibnu Qayyim Al-Jauziah.20 In advertisements, TPI took pains to highlight 
that Takdir Ilahi was an ‘actualization of occurrences which had happened once in the time 
of the Messenger of God’ (Ruslani 2005).21 
The above-mentioned religious television series featured both supernatural occurrences 
and an Islamic authority figure. A kyai, ustaz, ulama, or dai appeared at the beginning or 
the end of the series, either to introduce and explain the programme, or to play a role in 
the story itself. For example, the young Ustaz Jeffry al-Buchory, who was very popular 
among teenagers, hosted the programme Azab Ilahi (God’s Wrath, Lativi). Each episode 
of Astaghfirullah ((May God Forgive Me! also an exclamation to be used when shocked 
by immoral behaviour, SCTV) featured an ustaz in its storyline, and the series Takdir Ilahi 
always ended with pronouncements by Ustaz Ali Mustafa Yaqub from MUI. Mustafa not 
only explained the hadits on which the series was based to round off the programme, he also 
supervised every stage of production. In his summing up, Mustafa presented a disquisition 
on the solution by which the evil forces which had exerted a baneful influence on the main 
character could be exorcised. The director of the series, Chairul Umam, emphasized that 
in the series the ustaz used the Islamic ruqyah method, a sanctioned instrument to expel 
evil, consisting of prayers which are consonant with the syariat (Islamic Law). As most of 
the religious series either contained elements of mystery or the intrusion of supernatural 
occurrences, the mission of the authority figures was to link these specifically to religious 
teachings. The producer of Takdir Ilahi, Dondy Sudjono, and Chairul Umam explained that 
the appearance of Islamic authority figures in their series was to ensure that proper information 
was disseminated about how to deal with the supernatural. Without the explanations provided 
by Islamic authority figures, people might not read the series correctly, and there was the 
lurking danger that these series would only feed people’s superstitions (Kalim and Fadjar 
2005).  
For excerpts from some religious series see Disc Three 6.2.
In fact, the religious programmes did not differ greatly from regular television horror programmes. 
Cultural critic Taufiqurrahman described the contents of the religious series as:
[…] regular soap operas with God’s name attached to their title [which] carry a formulaic story 
line in which sinners of all kinds, from corrupt state officials and gamblers to a misbehaving 
son, will be punished by God with a very painful death, ranging from literally being burnt in 
hell, eaten by flesh-eating worms to being swallowed alive by the earth. By the drama’s end, 
after a noisy commercial break, a preacher will appear on screen to give a sermon about what 
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sinners will face in the afterlife in return for their misdemeanors and will remind viewers not 
to commit sinful acts
(Taufiqurrahman 2005)
Moreover, Taufiqurrahman pointed out, as time passed some religious soaps deteriorated 
into campy horror shows featuring ‘devout religious leaders [who] become engaged in 
Armageddon-like battles against demons (portrayed with red skin and two horns on their 
heads) and ghosts of all kinds’ (Ibid.).
Only a few ‘Islamic’ soaps did not contain elements of mystery or supernatural 
occurrences. The actor and film producer Deddy Mizwar, who had produced and directed 
the Islamic film Kiamat Sudah Dekat (Judgment Day Is Nigh, 2003) and played a role in 
its soap version, regarded the religion-inspired series as a mere extension of the horror and 
mystery programmes. In his opinion, the only difference was that these programmes now 
were packaged as if they were about Islam. The soaps, he argued, actually just repeated the 
success of mystery films in Indonesian cinema in the 1970s. This was the reason Deddy 
claimed that ‘[…] our nation now has stepped back again to the 1970s’ (Fitrianto 2005).22 
Despite the dubious quality of the majority of religious programmes, MUI embraced them 
wholeheartedly. In 2005 its secretary-general, Din Syamsudin, was quoted by the weekly 
Gatra as saying that there had been an internal discussion about the possibility of handing 
out awards to television channels which ran religious series (Taufiqurrahman 2005).23 Ismail 
Yusanto, spokesperson of the Hizbut Tahrir, also believed that the religious shows breathed a 
breath of fresh air into TV programming (Ibid).
6.3.  The Post-Soeharto dispute over censorship: Spirits of Reform and  
ghosts from the past
With the twin phenomena of the growing fear of Muslim protests taking control of the film 
industry and the rise of religious soaps, it is fair to say that Islam increasingly directed 
narrative practices of post-Soeharto film. Along the lines of the earlier controversy about the 
Anti-Pornography Bill in January 2007, the juxtaposition of religious sentiments supporting 
conservative forces in society against those defending more liberal views also affected the 
world of film. At the end of December 2006 a new film movement, the Indonesian Film 
Society (Masyarakat Film Indonesia, MFI), was founded. MFI represented a group of film 
professionals who wanted to initiate a belated reform of the old power structures in the film 
industry. It soon found itself in opposition to an old New Order film institution, the Film 
Censor Institute (LSF). In the disagreement between the two, LSF found support from its 
former opponent, the militant Islamic organization FPI. The commitment of FPI to the Film 
Censor Institute and its opposition to MFI represented the wider conflict between conservative 
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and liberal forces in the contest to rule the nation, and it bolstered public allegations that 
Islamic pressure groups were being put to use in a game of power play manipulated by the 
state.
The controversy was sparked off by the tremendous upheaval about the awards which 
were handed out at the Indonesian Film Festival at the end of December 2006. After the fall 
of Soeharto, the production of films had grown because of the rise of mainly independent 
film-makers. In 2004 the state responded by reviving the Indonesian Film Festival (FFI). 
FFI, which in 1992 had been held for the last time, was organized by a committee chosen 
by the National Film Assessment Board (Badan Pertimbangan Perfilman Nasional, BP2N). 
Since 1992 the BP2N had been the umbrella organization of all official New Order film 
organizations. As discussed in Chapter One and Two, notwithstanding Reform and the 
dismantling of the Department of Information under the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid, 
the New Order organizational system pertaining to film and its mediation practices had not 
been dislodged. Between 2004 and 2006, FFI, which was composed mainly of long-established 
figures in the film industry, handed out awards for best film and television productions. As an 
institution FFI can hardly be said to have represented contemporaneous developments in the 
film industry. In inner circles of young film professionals who had emerged during Reform 
FFI was criticized for being a bureaucratic body run in the spirit of the New Order. There was 
deep suspicion that FFI sidelined new talent in the industry and favoured the old guard and, 
much like New Order ‘arisan’ film festivals, preferred to present awards to all participants 
rather than truly evaluating films (Sasono 2007). In 2006 the accumulated disappointment 
with FFI among young film-makers exploded into a huge controversy.
On 3 January 2007, twenty-two film-makers, actors, and professionals, mainly of the 
younger generation, symbolically returned the Citra trophies awarded to them between 2004 
and 2006. 
For pictures of the return of Citras see Disc Three 6.3. 
They protested about the jury’s choice at the FFI 2006 to grant the award of Best Film to 
Ekskul (An abbreviation of Ekstra Kurikuler (Extra Curricular), Nayato, 2006), and the 
refusal of the jury to explain the selection process. The film Ekskul, produced by soap 
opera production house Indika Entertainment, was a campy high school drama barely 
distinguishable from run-of-the-mill Indonesian soaps. It was inspired by the Emmy-award 
winning American television film Bang Bang You’re Dead (Guy Ferland, 2002). Based on a 
true story, Ekskul recounts the tale of a student who takes his schoolmates hostage at gunpoint. 
In terms of the number of votes it received at FFI, the movie outdid the films Berbagi Suami 
(internationally distributed under the title Love for Share, Nia Dinata, 2006), a film dealing 
with problems of polygamy, and Denias: Senandung Di Atas Awan (Denias: singing above 
the clouds, John de Rantau, 2006), which was about a Papua farmer’s son who pursues his 
dream to go to a real school. Both were widely acclaimed by film critics and film-makers 
alike (Taufiqurrahman 2007). The surprise victory of Ekskul unleashed a storm of discontent 
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among film professionals of the film indie generation and beyond frustrated with the hide-
bound Indonesian film industry.
Between 24 and 29 December 2006, around forty film professionals founded the new film 
movement MFI. About 200 people, among them directors, producers, actors and actresses, 
film crew members, festival organizers, curators, journalists, members of film communities 
and organizations, and others who wanted to see changes in the Indonesian film industry, 
supported the movement. MFI used the protest against the FFI award of Best Film to Ekskul 
as the point of departure from which to criticize and call for changes in the official system 
in the Indonesian film industry.24 In an interview film producer and chairman of the Jakarta 
International Film Festival and member of MFI Shanty Harmayn stated that: ‘We use this 
moment to call for changes to the system in our film industry. That is our main agenda’ (Hari 
2007). In a petition addressed to the State Minister of Culture and Tourism, the President, 
leaders of BP2N and other film-related organizations, and the House of Representatives on 
education and culture, MFI insisted that the organization of the 2006 FFI withdraw the award 
for Best Film and give a public explanation of the selection process that the jury followed. 
MFI also petitioned for the temporary disbanding of FFI as well as the shutting down of all 
old film organizations and institutions and replacing these with new, more democratic and 
more transparent equivalents. Turning to the legal side of things, MFI called for a revision 
of the 1992 Film Law and for a fundamental change in the rules and implementation of film 
censorship, as it was convinced that film should be regulated by a system of age classification 
instead of the present one based on censorship. MFI vowed that if these demands were 
ignored its members would boycott future state-organized festivals and structurally reject all 
activities organized by the government in the name of the Indonesian Film Industry.25
The controversy around the 2006 FFI exposed the tensions straining the relationship 
between the surviving New Order film institutions and the fresh sentiments pervading the 
industry espoused by newly emerging film-makers in the era of Reformasi. In 2006, the same 
system, institutions, and people as had been in place under the New Order still officially ran 
the film industry. Now, under the supervision of the Department of Culture and Tourism, 
old hands, mostly retired film professionals, were in charge of the BP2N film organizations. 
Although Reform had led to new press legislation and a new broadcast law, the film industry 
was still regulated by legislation dating back to 1992. As mentioned in Chapter Two, after the 
production of Kuldesak in practice film-makers had not abided by all the rules and regulations 
of the New Order film law. Most film-makers whose talents emerged during and after Reform 
no longer bothered to observe all the stages of film mediation scrupulously set out by the 
New Order, and did not subscribe to any of the official film organizations authorized by 
BP2N. The only New Order film institution which still carried considerable weight was LSF. 
When producers chose to distribute their films through official channels for film exhibition, 
such as cinemas or through legal VCD or DVD productions, they were required to hand in a 
film copy to the censor institute beforehand.
The state censor institute was notorious for both its ultra-conservatism and its 
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arbitrariness. The criteria for censorship imposed by the board were extremely blurred.26 The 
main explanation given for the decisions made by the state censor institute was fear of social 
unrest, which meant it was highly receptive to protests from religious groups, bureaucrats, 
and people in powerful positions.27 Although many believed that censorship in Indonesia was 
redundant given the widespread availability of pirated VCDs and DVDs and the Internet, 
the censor institute director Titie Said claimed that without censorship there would be 
‘more damage to society’ (Diani 2005). Commenting on censorship Titie said that: ‘It’s not 
undemocratic, we’re not against artistic freedom. But there is a bigger interest here, that of 
the nation’ (Ibid). The gist of the protest launched by MFI against FFI was that the latter was 
representative of both the state film system and state support for specific narrative practices 
and that the time had come to revise the New Order 1992 Film Law, the film institutions, and 
particularly the modus operandi of the Film Censor Institute. 
For an example of LSF versus film-maker Nia Dinata see excerpt from Perempuan:  
Kisah dalam Guntingan (Women: in the cut) Disc Three 6.3
MFI encountered both support for and opposition to its ideas. Activists and practitioners 
who wanted to change film legislation, members of the Film and Television Employees – 
Association of Indonesian Cineasts (Karyawan Film Television – Asosiasi Sineas Indonesia, 
KFT-ASI), and even the cinema network Cinema 21 supported MFI (Imanda 2007; Sinaro 
2007). Its challenge rocked most old film organizations, which sensed that their power was 
being contested and which preferred to hold onto the status quo.28 Religious communities were 
also far from happy with the idea of reforming the film industry. Some conservative groups 
were particularly worried about the appeal to change the working method of the film censor 
board. They interpreted this as a call to repeal film censorship altogether, and accused film-
makers of wanting to disband film censorship in order to be free to produce pornographic films 
(Imanda 2007).
In the middle of all this commotion, FPI decided to show its support for film censorship. On 
17 January 2007 an FPI delegation visited the LSF office and was given a tour which included an 
explanation of the work of the institute. After the tour, the leader of the delegation and Secretary 
General of FPI, Ustaz Jafar Sidik, stated that FPI would join and monitor the work of LSF and 
protect it in view of the threat posed by some groups which wanted to disband it (tw 2007). 
Sidik was convinced that the censor institute was desperately needed. He said that: ‘The Film 
Censor Institute must stay. Look at what is screened on television and in cinemas, it has been 
censored but is still outrageous. It would be even worse if there were no censor. In our position 
as a mass organization we are going to monitor this institution, and simultaneously broaden the 
work terrain of FPI’ (Hadysusanto 2007; tw 2007).29 Sidik planned to hold conversations with 
members of the House of Representatives and the government to prepare for launching a plea 
for the intensification and broadening of film censor criteria. He was in no doubt that films now 
screened in cinemas and on television contaminated the religious values and morality of the 
Indonesian nation. In particular Sidik would have liked to add a ban on showing elements of 
mysticism to the existing criteria (Lasykar5 2007). In response to the visit of the FPI delegation 
Part Three
128
Titie Said commented that she had explained to FPI that the board censored films on the basis 
of criteria drawn from religion, politics, culture, and public order: ‘LSF [was] a guardian of the 
nation’s morality, protecting it from bad influences, just as [did] FPI’ (Lasykar5 2007). 
The involvement of the Islamic pressure group FPI in supporting the LSF and opposing the 
MFI petition revealed two separate issues. The case can be seen as representative of the wider 
conflict between conservative and liberal forces in their jockeying to gain the upper hand in ruling 
the nation. MFI’s call for changes to the system in the film industry represented another bid to 
reform Indonesian society. LSF and FPI both represented the groups which were determined to 
hold onto the status quo and by doing so protect the nation’s morality. Secondly, the MFI versus 
LSF and FPI case provides a good example of discourses on the deployment of Islamic pressure 
groups by the state in its bid to cling on to power. Media watcher Veven Wardhana suggested that 
belief was rife that the Film Censor Institute itself had actually invited FPI. Wardhana intimates 
that the motive prompting the board to invite the Islamic mass organization was to provide a 
justification and legitimization for the existence of the institute. Wardhana speculated that in 
all probability during the tour and the concomitant explanation of the working methods of the 
Film Censor Institute, the FPI delegation was deliberately shown sensual and violent film scenes 
which had been banned by the board with a view to eliciting a response from FPI insisting that 
censorship was crucial. Wardhana pins his arguments on the fact that through the statements made 
by the FPI delegation before the invited press, LSF ensured that it had secured its authority on the 
basis of popular support.30
In addition to Veven Wardhana, film-maker and festival organizer Dimas Jayasrana also 
believed that FPI was used as a strategic partner by the Film Censor Institute. Just as Wardhana, 
Dimas suggested FPI was manipulated by the board to substantiate the fact that it had ‘the 
voice of the people’ (suara masyarakat), which supported the existence of the institute and its 
censorship decisions. Dimas stated that this alliance, in which FPI reinforced the position of the 
state-sponsored LSF, extended beyond the bounds of film. He was convinced that it was just one 
more example of the broader power play instituted by the state. As he sees it, in contemporary 
Indonesia Islam was used as a commodity and political tool either to perpetuate or alternatively to 
seize power. As did the Film Censor Institute, the state manipulated FPI and other militant Islamic 
organizations to assist it in its efforts to preserve the status quo and consolidate its own power. 
Dimas pointed out that the government had never intervened to quell any of the aggressive protests 
launched by FPI or any other militant Islamic groups. In fact, he asserted, these groups had been 
fostered by the state to make sure that the atmosphere remained unstable and chaotic, which in 
turn supplies the state with a raison d’être. He was convinced that Indonesian politics were still 
built on generating fear of the recurrence of political, social, and economic instability. Fear of 
militant Islam has now replaced the fear of communism so as to legitimate strict state control of 
society. If necessary the fear for militant Islam would give leeway to the state to seize all power 
if this were deemed essential to national security.31 Such other film professionals as directors Aria 
Kusumadewa and Tino Saroenggalo as well as film critic Ekky Imanjaya have supported this 
point of view.32 Pursuing this line of argument and taking account of the wider notion of the state, 
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the support of Islamic groups for the state film censor institute has been perceived as an example 
of the way in which Islam was used as a device to control Indonesian society.33
Conclusion
In both post-Soeharto audio-visual media and Indonesian politics there has been a perceptible 
growth in representations of Islam. However, the fact that Islam has been garnering a large 
amount of publicity does not mean that it has actually gained in terms of political clout. 
Instead, Islam is but one part of a complex discourse about the organization, principles, and 
representation of the post-Soeharto Indonesian nation. The two specific cases of Buruan Cium 
Gue! and of MFI versus LSF/FPI have revealed debates about what social norms, religious 
beliefs, and realities are acceptable in narrative practices in post-Soeharto Indonesian audio-
visual media. These debates have certainly been tied into the endeavours by some Islamic 
groups to implement national moral codes on the basis of the application of Islamic principles 
in society. Moreover, they have revealed the divide between conservative and liberal forces 
in their efforts to rule the nation to the full light of day.
In presenting a historiography of modern nationalism in East Asia, the historian Prasenjit 
Duara has called attention to the different ‘nation views’ which nationalism in each nation 
encompasses. As Duara argues, nationalism as an ideology and politics are neither uniform 
nor monolithic. Such different groups as political parties, women, workers, farmers, the 
majorities as well as the minorities in a nation-state have different conceptions of the nation, 
for which Duara has coined the term ‘nation views’. Different nation views moreover 
compete to define the ‘authentic’ history and traditions – regimes of authenticity – of the 
people of a nation-state. Generally speaking it is the state which directs and determines which 
regimes of authenticity will form the foundation of the nation. However, at many points non-
state movements and the force of their ideas test and transform the structure of the regimes 
of authenticity and the nation-state (Duara 2008). The debate about filmic moral bounds 
that I described above can be seen as part of a process in which multiple nationalisms test 
the structure of the nation. To the film-makers who joined MFI, democratic rights-based 
individualism and freedom of expression overrule moral bounds determined by religious 
nation views. To the religious groups, Islam represents the basis of the Indonesian nation and 
identity, and this foundation should direct the content of domestic film and television. Secular 
images and representations are discarded and shrugged off as influences of foreign culture 
and propaganda.
Muhamad Ali’s reading of the controversy about the pornography Bill, which took place 
in the interval between the Buruan Cium Gue! furore and the MFI versus LSF/FPI clash, 
offers a constructive analysis of the context in which these different nation views surfaced. 
Ali has suggested that the anti-pornography controversy is best understood in the context of 
power relations. In his opinion the controversy reveals a power struggle about the definition 
of what forms a morally upright society in the context of the Indonesian nation-state. The 
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struggle about what constitutes public morality, he argues, addresses the questions of what 
views, practices, and traditions should be maintained in Indonesian society, and which should 
be discontinued. It also sheds light on the matter of how to deal with religious beliefs and 
social norms and how to relate these to the state. Ali thinks that this power struggle has been 
greatly influenced by the fact that the post-Soeharto definition of an Indonesian nation-state 
has never been formulated in unequivocal terms. He says that: ‘Within the context of an 
ambiguous definition of an Indonesian nation-state, pressure groups continuously want to 
move the pendulum toward a nation based on religious dogma’ (Ali 2007). 
With their roots in different ‘regimes of authenticity’, the opposition of secular and 
religious groups in the two cases of Buruan Cium Gue! and MFI versus LSF/FPI also exposed 
the divide between the secular and religious conceptions of daily reality. In a Foucauldian 
sense – each society causes certain types of discourse to function as true – the claim by Raam 
Punjabi that his film merely represented social reality as opposed to AA Gym’s argument 
that it encouraged immoral behaviour at odds with Indonesian religious values and culture, 
exposed a power struggle over the ‘true’ representations of Indonesian realities. Nevertheless, 
the fact that AA Gym won the controversy over Buruan Cium Gue! cannot be perceived as 
a victory of religious authority over secular Indonesian nation views and realities. Instead, 
as such cultural commentators as Prananto have put forward, it was a victory of stardom: 
the most popular celebrity of the moment rules the nation, in this case the widely celebrated 
celebrity-kyai AA Gym. 
In the struggle to define the representations and realities of contemporary Indonesian 
society to a large extent Islam as a religion has taken centre stage in the debates. Islam was 
increasingly transformed into a commodity; not only as part of the framework of Ramadan, 
as discussed in Chapter Four, but also in the new television genre of religious soaps, which 
proved just as adept at using the outward appearances of Islam to attract viewers. Ironically, 
and in a way similar to the narrative practices employed to address Islam under the New 
Order, religious soaps have waved the banner of Islam to depict all sorts of controversial 
social norms or realities and still escape unscathed. In other words, television producers have 
juggled with images of Islam to sell their productions and to safeguard these from protests. 
In the same vein, Islam has been progressively used as a political tool. The government, 
political parties, and mass organizations have not hesitated to invoke the spectre of Islam in 
their play for power. Moreover, according to some film-makers the state has fuelled a fear of 
domination by extremist Islam to guard the status quo.
The cases of Buruan Cium Gue!, LSF and FPI versus MFI, and ‘religious soaps’ show 
how Islam has been used by Indonesian film and television producers as well as groups active 
in the socio-political field to acquire assets and power. In this context, the rise of Islam in 
the post-Soeharto audio-visual media and in Indonesian society can be understood as a tactic 





Celebrities, ghosts, heroes, preachers, common people, and victims: stories about these 
groups or individuals are likely to appear frequently in contemporary Indonesian audio-visual 
media. The content, style, and formulas of these narratives, to be found in Indonesian horror 
and history films, documentaries, infotainment, quiz shows, or reality TV programmes, are 
not unique. All over the world gossip shows feature and discuss celebrities. Films worldwide 
are about fictional or real heroes. Preachers in the United States, Brazil, and Egypt have 
their own programmes and talk shows. Horror films thrive in Hollywood, Africa, and Asia. 
Common people are the focus of various national and transnational reality TV programmes 
and quiz shows. Everywhere victims are seen in fiction films, documentaries, and daily news 
programmes. However, as McKenzie Wark (1994) and Trinh Minh-ha (1993) have argued, 
people brought up in different cultural frames have a repertoire of quite different stories with 
which they read the genres or the content of audio-visual media. The form and content of 
audio-visual media and the configuration of power relations and access to media resources 
impinge on the discourses about representations of the nation, communities, and social 
realities that circulate in society.
In my analysis of Indonesian film, discursive, and mediation practices three interconnected 
key issues have surfaced, which construe the daily experiences and engagement of Indonesians 
with audio-visual media. First, the organization and understanding of power relations 
in Indonesian audio-visual media that lie at the basis of identifications of communities 
connected to film formats and genres. Second, the identities that were associated with these 
communities which were local, national, or transnational. Third, debates about the moral 
bounds of representations in different film genres and formats which have brought to light 
divergent constructions of Indonesian social and daily-lived realities.
At the start, I discussed the organization of the power relations which formed the basis of 
mediation practices of Indonesian audio-visual media. The organization of power relations 
covered official state rules, regulations, and censorship, as well as officially permitted 
ownership of public and private media industries and networks. Illicit practices, which 
transcended film policies and media ownership endorsed by the state, were also part of these 
power relations. Praktek miring (literally ‘cursive practices’), in the form of the payment 
of pungli (unofficial contributions) before and during mobile cinema screenings, and 
‘arrangements’ about other informal levies at the different stages of film mediation practices 
have been equally relevant to the organization and composition of Indonesian cinema. 
Moreover, the distinction between official and unofficial practices or policies has often been 
blurred. For example, unofficial levies were frequently paid to state officials or members 
of armed forces or police to ensure a film could be produced or, in the case of networks of 
pirated films, to keep these safe from raids.
Under the New Order, a substantial part of the ownership of public and private audio-
Conclusion
134
visual media industries and networks was in the hands of the Soeharto family and its business 
cronies. State policies and normative discourses on film and television were primarily 
motivated by endeavours to secure New Order politics and business interests. That is not 
to say that these policies were always effective: discourses and policies sometimes clashed. 
For example, the political campaign to form a cultural fence of mobile cinemas to protect 
local culture against contamination by globalization, was in stark contrast to the economic 
business deal of Subentra as sole distributor of Hollywood films, or the operation of networks 
of pirated films. Both Cinema 21 and pirated films disseminated images of foreign cultures 
nationwide. Particularly in the last years of the Soeharto regime, film piracy industries and 
networks began to claim a substantial share of film reproduction and distribution.
The Soeharto administration made obsessive efforts to control the mass media. In its 
attitude to film censorship, the New Order was notorious for its authoritarian stance. The 
Film Censor Board cut or banned films. Compulsory membership of professional film 
organizations, which covered all film mediation practices, strongly affected pre-censorship 
of films. Decrees issued by the censor board, and later the Ethical Code for film production, 
heavily influenced the form and content of films produced under the New Order. These set 
the bounds and therefore held the potential for breaching topics and themes for film-makers. 
For example, the Ethical Code lay at the basis of the formula to feature symbols of Islam 
in horror films. Film-makers discovered that this formula allowed them to show a plethora 
of matters which otherwise were likely to be banned by the censor board. The structure of 
power relations shaped the output, form, and content of audio-visual media, and impinged on 
the identifications and affiliations of communities. In fact, identifications and affiliations of 
communities were constituted as part of, or in response to, the organization of media power 
relations. 
In my analysis of community formation and its imaginations, my second line of enquiry, 
I have chosen to focus on discourses on, and policies determining, particular formats and 
genres of audio-visual media. I have shown that film policy and normative discourses on 
film formats and genres led to imaginings of local, national, and transnational identities. 
These kinds of representations and imaginations were not restricted to national political 
and economic power relations; the influence of transnational trade and politics also duly 
motivated the discourses and policies on genres and formats. 
Under the New Order, imaginations of local, national, and transnational identities varied 
according to the different normative discourses and shifting political and economic interests 
of the regime. New Order national identity politics and policies were directed by national 
and transnational economic interests, and created imaginations of film audiences who were 
tied to particular film formats. Rural, lower class communities were connected to domestic 
16 mm film. These communities were contrasted with cosmopolitan urban middle classes, 
which consumed Hollywood films produced in the 35 mm format in the top-end cinemas 
of the 21 Group. Various factors were at play in the formation of these imagined audiences. 
Certainly the goal of New Order identity politics was to safeguard local and national culture 
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and identity. Hence the campaign was launched to build a cultural fence of mobile cinemas 
which were required to screen domestic films in 16 mm format. At the same time, the 
government policy of tying mobile cinemas to the 16 mm format also was calculated to stop 
the circulation of bootleg Hollywood films through this channel. This would help protect the 
21 Group, which had procured the sole distribution rights of Hollywood film, from loss in 
income. From this perspective, the identification of different classes of audiences that were 
connected to different film formats as well as channels of distribution and exhibition, was just 
an element of national and transnational trade policies. It was thought that cleverly denying 
mobile cinemas the 35 mm film format would appease both Soeharto crony and US business 
relations.
Debates about the horror genre in the last years of Soeharto’s rule were part of 
normative discourses on national culture and social identities, but were also motivated by 
economic considerations. Some viewed horror and mysticism as an appropriate expression 
of Indonesian or ‘Eastern’ culture, which they inherently associated with mysticism and 
supernatural things. Along these lines, and never losing sight of the financial aspects, some 
film producers asserted that the horror genre was a characteristic cultural asset, which could 
be exploited in film for domestic and foreign markets. With a nod to Indonesian identities 
and culture, cultural commentators saw the genre as representative of the Indonesian film 
industry, just as the US has its Westerns, China its Kung Fu films, Japan its films about 
Ninjas and Samurais, and India its love stories enlivened by song and dance. On top of this, 
the general public perceived horror films as representing Islam. As mentioned earlier, Islamic 
symbols and religious leaders recurrently featured as the heroes of New Order horror films 
because film-makers believed that the Ethical Code for Film Production demanded it. The 
upshot was that the genre was equated with dakwah (Islamic religious intensification). This 
still left outstanding problems to be solved, not least that horror films induced debates on 
representations of the supernatural in society. Views on this diverged depending on the media 
involved, namely television versus cinema and their audiences. 
The different representations of local, national, and transnational identities at official 
New Order film festivals were also profoundly influenced by the political and economic 
concerns of the regime. The Indonesian Film Festival was involved in the local politics of 
representation and promotion of the provinces, as well as in state determination to spread 
the message of development and images of authorized national Indonesian culture. These 
same considerations also reflected the need to represent national culture in so-called ‘festival 
films’. Festival films were perceived to represent the Indonesian nation at the national film 
festival and abroad at international film festivals. Furthermore, the choice for participation, 
or not, at international film festivals, such as the Asian Pacific Film Festival, and the making 
of awards to films, were largely based on transnational political considerations.
New Order discourse practices also revealed the influence of United States Information 
Agency (USIA) on film policies and transnational politics. Concerns of USIA policy 
materialized in topics, generic conventions, and narrative traits in films which were 
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representative of the New Order regime: heroes, the blessings of modernization, and the 
opposition of ‘evil’ communism versus ‘good’ Islam in New Order history, development, 
and propaganda films. The attention to these subjects tied into an anti-communist political 
discourse, which was part of transnational Cold War politics.  
Changes in the socio-political field, propelled by the resignation of President Soeharto and 
aided by the increasing availability of new audio-visual media technologies, reconfigured 
earlier power relations. First, the bid for reform led to a reassessment of the media ownership 
by Soeharto relatives and business cronies. For example, Monopoly Watch lodged a lawsuit 
against Subentra 21, accusing the cinema group of forming a cartel for film distribution and 
exhibition, and of having been involved in collusion and nepotism. Second, reinforcing this 
effect, the wide availability and use of the ‘democratic’ medium of digital video led to the 
rise of independent film productions and festivals, which did not abide by the strict rules and 
regulations for film production, distribution, and exhibition as set by the New Order. Gay and 
lesbian films and human rights documentaries circulated at such alternative, underground, 
film distribution and exhibition networks as independent film festivals. Moreover, the 
production of films in the relatively cheap Video Compact Disc format, compared to video-
cassettes, Laser Discs and later Digital Video Discs, led to an expansive growth in pirated 
film productions and networks. Film piracy and unofficial film productions and festivals 
reduced state control over film censorship and also undercut the already weakened monopoly 
on film production, distribution, and exhibition of New Order authorized media industries. 
The empowerment of new film communities was a powerful motor in altering the use of 
film genres and their representations. Old genres were reformed. For example, documentaries 
were transformed into a genre which gave a voice to the victims of the regime and represented 
common people as the new heroes. New genres such as independent and Islamic film were 
founded. Particularly those groups which were connected to the new film genres of independent 
and Islamic film launched discourses which altered the imaginations of local, national, and 
transnational identities. Among independent and Islamic film communities concerns about 
domination and resistance in film mediation practices were put into a relationship with Third 
Cinema theories. The community of Islamic film explicitly emphasized the association 
of Islamic film with movements of Third Cinema. Both Islamic and independent film 
communities defined themselves as oppositional cinemas which addressed the issues of 
political and economic domination and the global distribution of power of neo-colonial forces 
in audio-visual media. As oppositional cinema movements, they not only defied Hollywood; 
they also opposed national mainstream film and television productions.
In the discourses of the film communities, the post-Soeharto mediascape was seen as a 
post-neo-colonial site. Mainstream channels of film distribution and exhibition were identified 
as a legacy of New Order hegemonic mediation practices designed to promote New Order 
politics, business interests, and power relations. These interests and power relations were 
seen as an ineluctable appendage of the neo-imperialistic forces of global capitalism, which 
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led to the commercialization of culture. As highlighted in the case of Beth, communities 
of independent film linked the concept of national cinema to a domination of Indonesian 
culture. They felt that national cinema was immersed in New Order identity politics, which 
construed a single national identity at the expense of local ones. Also it was linked to the 
regime’s economic involvement in networks of transnational capitalism. In the independent 
film communities’ endeavour to counter these power relations, they saw themselves as 
representative of an oppositional local cinema which was inclusive of alternative local 
cultures and identities. The communities of Islamic film also strongly identified their genre 
with opposition to neo-imperialism and structures of power in domestic and transnational 
commercial audio-visual media. However, in contrast to the independent film-makers, the 
communities of Islamic film perceived their genre to be representative of national cinema. 
In their eyes, Islamic film formed the true representation of uncorrupted national Indonesian 
culture, as the majority of Indonesians were adherents of Islam.
Despite both movements’ opposition to mainstream media, in the post-Soeharto 
mediascape commercial television soon hijacked the genre of independent film and usurped 
images of Islam. Three years after the rise of the independent film genre, the private television 
station SCTV opened a contest for independent film productions. The television programme 
was very successful in that it attracted many contestants, but it ushered in the decay of the 
independent film movement. Films produced by the movement of Islamic film never reached 
the public eye. In contrast, after the fall of Soeharto private television stations, which the 
Islamic film movement asserted were driven by foreign capitalism, annexed images of Islam. 
For the main part images of Islam appeared on television in the framework of the Islamic 
fasting month Ramadan. Due to their commercial success, in the course of time programmes 
that featured Islam were also screened outside that framework. The Islamic programmes on 
television had nothing to do with the genre of Islamic film, which was created by Islamic film 
communities. Islamic television programmes were primarily about outward appearances. 
Most programmes followed the same formula of mainstream popular soaps, quizzes, and talk 
shows, clad in Islamic attire.
Other forms of opposition which defied both state and global control of audio-visual 
media survived longer. Alternative channels of distribution and consumption, such as film 
festivals founded after May 1998, and pirated VCDs, effectively challenged state authority 
and domination of the audio-visual media. The way in which these alternative channels 
operated may be seen as a variant on Third Cinema tactics of ‘media jujitsu’ in film aesthetics 
(Shohat and Stam 1994). The circulation of pirated films particularly functioned as a form of 
opposition, which appropriated and simultaneously resisted the flow and domination of both 
national and transnational audio-visual media in the Indonesian mediascape.
Apart from the discourses on national and local identity as expressed by the independent 
and Islamic film communities, the alternative or underground film festivals and VCD 
distribution networks showed no clear distinction between local and transnational culture 
and identities. Both the post-Soeharto film festivals and networks of, mainly pirated, VCDs 
Conclusion
138
gave wide access to all sorts of uncensored, mainstream and non-mainstream, domestic and 
foreign film productions. Moreover, at the new film festivals, identifications and issues of 
representations were no longer based on concerns of global, national, or local power relations 
or domination of culture; instead, people sought their authentication in particular film genres 
and film formats and the domestic and transnational discourses which these genres and 
formats tied into. Hence, the gay and lesbian film festival Q stood for discourses on gay 
and lesbian films and homosexuality both in Indonesia and abroad. The Documentary Film 
Festival represented discourses on the specificity of documentary film in Indonesia and 
abroad. The Feast of Indonesian Cinema and Hello;fest were connected to discourses on 
the development, position, and implications of the video format in Indonesia and at other 
comparable festivals in the world. Jiffest, which screened all genres and formats, each year 
addressed another specific film discourse in its festival theme.
Also the film communities which emphasized the representation of local or national 
identity in their opposition to national and transnational hegemonic mainstream media 
were not tied to these identities alone; they too engaged in supranational forums of identity 
formation and community affiliation. First, the communities of independent film identified 
themselves with international movements of independent and alternative film. I-Sinema was 
inspired by the Danish Dogme ’95, and the production of Kuldesak, the first Indonesian 
‘independent’ film ever, was modelled on American Robert Rodrigues’ Rebel without a 
Crew. Moreover, the film also greatly resembled American independent film-maker Quentin 
Tarantino’s Pulp Fiction. Second, as mentioned above, the members of the community of 
Islamic film explicitly defined themselves as a film movement which was part of Third 
World oppositional cinemas. Over and above this, the members asserted they belonged to 
the worldwide umat of Islam. They founded the Islamic film genre to challenge what they 
considered to be universal misrepresentations of Islam in transnational media.
The emphasis on local or national identities of the independent and Islamic film 
communities is, as Arif Dirlik has put forward in another context, part of a ‘politics of 
difference’, which produces a modern notion of the local (1996:35). The film communities 
presented the literal and metaphorical local differences – or in the case of Islamic film, 
national ones – as their identities in the contemporary international mediatized world. This 
modern local or national identity constituted, in the words of Dirlik, ‘the local that has been 
worked over by modernity’ (Ibid). Importantly, this transcended notions of local or national 
boundaries. Wimal Dissanayake (2003:222) emphasizes that where the local and the global 
meet, processes of ‘transnationalization and deterritorialization of consciousness’ are likely 
to occur. This in turn results in the coming into existence of ‘new communitarian cultural 
imaginaries’. Dissanayake states this does not imply that community in its traditional sense 
no longer exists; rather, he points to the rise of  ‘more decentered, contested, and hybridized 
forms of community’. In the realm of the independent and Islamic communities, modern 
local or national identity was not confined to notions of the local or national attributed to the 
Indonesian nation. Rather, the conception of the local was part of a supranational affiliation of 
139
localism, but one which opposed global hegemonic mainstream media networks worldwide.
Besides power relations and the production of collective identities, the third key issue in my 
analysis of the Indonesian mediascape refers to the impact of media discourses and practices 
on constructions of Indonesian social and daily-lived realities. This issue surfaced mainly in 
film discourse practices and narrative practices.
Looking at film discourse practices and their effect on constructions of social realities, I 
raised some pertinent points. First, both the New Order modes of engagement in history and 
development films as well as the practice of screening films in a particular framework were 
endeavours to promote and implant state historiography and politics on national identity and 
economic development. New Order development films and documentaries tried to influence 
and educate the Indonesian public. The general brief of these films was to promote the need 
for development and modernization, while representing a perfect image of modern Indonesian 
culture. Second, the media event Hapsak and the film Penumpasan Pengkhianatan G30S/
PKI were imperative in the state project to mould collective memories and representations 
of history in society, and to define Indonesian core values, including morality and religion. 
Initially, the media event helped shaping the perception that communism was the source 
of all evil in Indonesian society. Communists, or anyone who was accused of being one, 
were barred from the Indonesian public sphere. As time passed, the Hapsak commemoration 
became an occasion on which such new enemies of the regime as extremist Islam and other 
adversaries who were simply labelled ‘atheists’ were defined according to changing political 
circumstances.
In addition to film discourse practices, the use of particular film narrative practices has 
also influenced constructions of society and daily-lived realities. Normative discourses on 
narrative practices represented different views on reality. In debates on the use of certain 
formulas within the horror genre, the discourses disclosed a contention about whether or not 
the supernatural in Indonesia was part of modern life and daily reality. What representations 
of reality and modern times were possible in Indonesian society, and where should the moral 
lines be drawn? To some, the supernatural was seen as part of modern Indonesian society 
and daily life. To others, it was not part of national culture and reality, or it was confined to 
Indonesia’s imaginations of the past only. 
During Reform, a euphoric atmosphere of liberation encompassed all domains of 
Indonesian society. The New Order was now considered by many to have been neo-colonial, 
and with its demise all forms of expression suddenly seemed possible. New, post-colonial 
discourses and imaginations of society surfaced in post-Soeharto film discourse and narrative 
practices. In particular, documentary and independent film-makers engaged in attempts to 
present counter histories to New Order official versions. They started to redefine and re-edit 
collective memories and search for new narratives and representations of history and society 
in film. Initially, this led not so much to changes in the prefabricated modes of engagement, 
as to shifts in focus. Hence, the focus on tokoh (prominent figures) as the heroes in New 
Conclusion
140
Order history and propaganda films, shifted to common people and victims as the new heroes 
in post-Soeharto mediations. Later, new narratives appeared which often were influenced by 
transnational trends in documentary, independent, and mainstream film-making. The practice 
of screening films in a specific framework continued. In one of the frameworks, Ramadan, a 
new hero emerged in the form of the artist kyai or celebrity kyai. In due course, the celebrity 
kyai extended their territories and also appeared in newfound reality TV programmes. 
Moreover, particularly in the new reality TV programmes, representations of ‘the truth’ 
addressed in New Order propaganda films were transformed into new representations of 
‘reality’.
The changes in narratives and representations of society in film and television led to 
discourses on representations of social realities and their moral bounds. These discourses 
revealed an increase in the prominence of Islam in the Indonesian public sphere. Moreover, 
in conjunction with changes in Indonesian socio-politics, the organization of power relations 
in official and unofficial censorship altered. In post-Soeharto Indonesia censorship from the 
street displayed a growing tendency to override official state censorship. Muslim groups now 
stood out as they took part in street protests, targeting not just film, but also music and dance 
performances and the visual arts. Muslim protests about films did not suddenly emerge out 
of nowhere. To an extent these protests could be said to have also influenced film censorship 
and narrative practices during the New Order. However, after the fall of Soeharto, Muslim 
protests drew greater media attention and were expressed more loudly. The rise of Islam in 
the public sphere exposed tensions between secularism and religion over media resources, 
access, management, and audio-visual representations of society.
In particular the cases of AA Gym and Buruan Cium Gue! and MFI versus LSF/FPI 
showed there was a gap in representations of society between commercial film-makers and 
filmmakers and persons who joined MFI, against groups and individuals who based their 
platform on religious conviction. Both groups wanted to define the bounds of narrative 
practices in film. They espoused fairly diametrically opposed ‘nation views’ (Duara 2008) or 
imaginations of what was part of Indonesian society and daily reality. In claims of what was 
part of Indonesian culture and society and what not, both groups put forward and defended 
different filmic representations. These representations encompassed cosmopolitan secular 
and global consumerist lifestyles and cultures, juxtaposing the realities of religious and so-
called ‘Eastern’ values, lifestyles and cultures.
Before the cases of Buruan Cium Gue! and MFI versus LSF with the backing of FPI, 
the differing views of Indonesian society entertained by secular and religious groups had 
already surfaced in discussions held by the Islamic film movement and independent film 
communities on the formation of oppositional cinemas. Both groups shared many viewpoints 
in that they criticized New Order and national and transnational commercial film mediation 
practices. However, the movements of Islamic and independent film adhered to different 
worldviews. The imaginations and claims to specific worldviews were derived from 
different positions in national and transnational contexts. Members of the independent film 
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communities were mainly concerned with a total freedom of expression and representation 
in film. They endorsed the values of universal human rights, individuality, and democracy. 
Claims by Islamic groups about how to image and imagine Indonesian society were related to 
particular conceptualizations of Islamic identities in the Indonesian nation and internationally. 
They felt that both nationally and globally, Islam was not simply underrepresented; it was 
misrepresented. In their opinion, worldwide there were hardly any film and television 
productions which endorsed Islamic views. In contrast, the representations of secular 
thought which were disseminated in film productions from the West, as well as from China, 
India, and Latin America spread all over the globe. Some Islamic communities feared that 
the hegemony of national and transnational media, in which the US and Hollywood played 
such a preponderant role, was part of a scheme to conquer the world by spreading either 
secular or Jewish propaganda, or a combination of the two. To the communities of Islamic 
film, Indonesian culture and Eastern values both had their roots deep in Islam. Consequently, 
representations of social realities in film should be based on religious teachings.
The contemporary dialectic of different worldviews, ideologies, and identities of 
secular and religious groups in the Indonesian mediascape are part and parcel of a universal 
development marked by the resurgence of religion in the public sphere.1 Rosalind Hackett, 
a scholar of comparative religion, has emphasized that in today’s mass mediated world, 
religion forms a new primacy of identity politics. She analyses the contemporary resurgence 
of religion in the public sphere as ‘[…] the drive to claim recognition for, and the possibilities 
for implementation of, religious ideas, values, practices, and institutions in the governance 
of nation states and the lives of their citizens’ (Hackett 2005:63). Moreover, she asserts 
that: ‘Against the backdrop of the forces of democratization, mediatization, and the global 
market, religious groups are compelled to justify their existence to state and consumers alike’ 
(Hackett 2005:76).
In Indonesia Islamic identity was often explicitly connected to state nationalism and 
policies. In the discourses on whether or not the supernatural was part of Indonesian society 
under New Order rule, several Islamic groups had supported the state vision that Indonesia 
was to be or become a modern and developed nation. Hence, they endorsed the supernatural 
only if it were imagined in a framework of the past, or else it should be discarded as foreign 
culture. After the fall of Soeharto, a number of Islamic groups came out on the side of the 
state again, in their backing of state censorship and the existence of the Film Censor Institute. 
Religious studies scholar Peter van der Veer has linked the rise of religious movements in India 
to debates on and identifications of national identities. He argues that religious movements 
can best be designated as ‘religious nationalisms’, because many of them ‘articulate discourse 
on the religious community with discourse on the nation’ (Van der Veer 1997:195). In the 
opinion of some Indonesian Islamic communities, Islam is what lies at the foundation of the 
Indonesian nation-state.
 However, even though the majority of Indonesians are Muslims, as a group they are 
a minority in both media ownership or in the production of successful films and television 
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programmes. Instead national and transnational commercial media and their relationship with 
consumer culture have dictated the Indonesian mediascape. The opposition of religious and 
secular media ownership was represented by Indonesian Islamic authority figure and celebrity 
kyai AA Gym versus the king of soaps Raam Punjabi. AA Gym had built up a very successful 
business emporium selling Islamic television programmes and soaps, VCDs, religious text 
messages for mobile telephones, books, audiocassettes, and other merchandizing at his 
headquarters in Bandung. Gym and his Bandung-based media emporium stood for local 
culture, leadership, and identity. Raam Punjabi is also a very successful businessman. He 
owns one of the most profitable Indonesian television production houses in Jakarta and in the 
past has produced extremely popular soaps. However, Punjabi in the eyes of many represents 
foreign culture, domination, and identity. 
Taking Duara’s concept of ‘regimes of authenticity’ and viewing the situation 
in a Foucauldian sense, in that each society has its regime and general politics of truth, 
the juxtaposition of AA Gym and Raam Punjabi also represents two different views on 
Indonesian society and its realities. Raam Punjabi stands for global consumer culture and 
secular realities, whereas AA Gym advocates that consumerism and freedom of expression 
should be controlled and restricted by religious norms. In the case of Buruan Cium Gue!, 
AA Gym believed that only religious norms should define ‘authentic’ Indonesian realities 
and the narrative practices in film and other media. Conversely, in their attempt to resist the 
religious bounds for audio-visual media, film producers have explicitly stressed that their 
film narratives are representative of Indonesia’s daily realities. Raam Punjabi is not alone; 
Chand Parwez, who produced the film Virgin, and the producers of horror reality shows have 
all stated that their films and programmes simply represent the reality of and the true stories 
circulating in contemporary Indonesian society.
In view of the emergence of the hyper-real reality television programmes and their 
representations of Islam, the references to social realities by Islamic groups in debates about 
representations of Indonesian society has become enormously complicated. Particularly in 
the context of representations of reality and the moral bounds set by Islamic groups, reality 
television has undermined both. As Wimal Dissanayake has postulated, social values, social 
practices, the cultural imaginary, and notions of identity and citizenship in cinema are 
increasingly defined in terms of consumption and the power of the market: ‘As such identity 
is becoming a function of commodity consumption and not the other way around’ (1993:222). 
While Muslim protests about certain domestic films were founded on the argument that their 
narrative practices did not represent Indonesian culture, values, and realities, commercial 
television co-opted Islam in reality ghost shows and religious soaps. Despite the fact that 
many Muslims do not support this representation, in post-Soeharto television productions 
horror once more has been inextricably linked to Islam. This occurred first in the popular 
ghost reality-shows, and later in ‘reality-based’ religious soaps, in which Islamic authority 
figures and hyper-real kyai celebrities appeared as the heroes of the hour who defeated ghosts 
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and evil forces. The call for moral bounds by Muslim groups has contrasted starkly with the 
lack of bounds in the reality-based programmes and soaps, which have featured Islam in a 
seething brew of all sorts of evil and ghosts. Again the role of Muslim authority figures as 
well as outward appearances of Islam has proved a winning formula in attempts to screen 
all kinds of dubious matters and get away with it. Strikingly, the resurrection of ghosts in 
hyper-real Indonesian horror reality-shows and religious soaps reveals a very literal example 
of Jean Baudrillard’s apprehension of the contemporary loss of history and reality in film. In 
his view: ‘Photography and cinema contributed in large part to the secularization of history, 
to fixing it in its visible, ‘objective’ form at the expense of the myths that once traversed 
it. Today cinema can place all its talent, all its technology in the service of reanimating 
what itself contributed to liquidating. It only resurrects ghosts, and it itself is lost therein’ 
(Baudrillard 1994:48).
In all, my analysis about what narrative practices have been possible and permissible in 
the post-Soeharto Indonesian audio-visual media has tied into a struggle over who and what 
shape and decide on national popular discourse and the realities of imaginations of society’s 
daily-lived practices. It has highlighted the relationship between mass media, religion, and 
politics in the construction of post-colonial power relations, and exposed the endeavour to 
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Terjebak (1996) directed by Dedi Setiadi. 
Television series
Anak Baru Gedhe (RCTI)
Astaghfirullah (SCTV)
Azab Ilahi (Lativi)
Baywatch (RCTI, first broadcast on NBC: United States of America)
Beverly Hills 90210 (RCTI, first broadcast on Fox: United States of America)
Ceramah Ramadhan (Trans TV)
Cowok Cowok Keren (RCTI)
Dua Dunia (Indosiar)
Dunia Lain (Trans TV)
Esmeralda (SCTV, first broadcast on Televisa: Mexico)
Gema Ramadhan (SCTV)
Gema Takdir (SCTV)





Jin dan Jun (RCTI)
Kembalinya Si Manis Jembatan Ancol (RCTI)
Kisah2 Teladan (Indosiar)
Kismis (RCTI)
Kismis: Arwah Penasaran (RCTI)
175
Layar Tancep (Lativi)
Manajemen Qulbu Spesial Ramadhan (RCTI)
Melrose Place (SCTV, first broadcast on Fox Network: United States of America)
Membuka Pintu Langit (SCTV)
Misteri (Anteve)
Misteri Sinden (RCTI)








Sentuhan Qolbu Ramadhan (TPI
Si Manis Jembatan Ancol (RCTI)
Takdir Ilahi (TPI)
Taubat (Trans TV)
Tuyul dan Mbak Yul (RCTI)







1 Ien Ang, amongst others has argued that the rating institutions do not really measure the 
‘audience’ but create and manage an image of it to bind advertisers (1991, 1992). For more on 
the corporate practice of ‘audience measurement’ and its pitfalls see Ang (Ibid.). 
2 See Birgit Meyer’s research project on ‘Modern mass media, religion and the 
imagination of communities: different postcolonial trajectories in West Africa, Brazil, and 
India’ (2000-2006). This project investigated the shift from the nation-state as the privileged 
space for the imagination of identity to the genesis of new publics in a pluralist public 
sphere in which the role and place of the state is called into question, and in which religion 
often plays a crucial role.
3 For more details about Reformasi see for example Kees van Dijk 2000, Donald 
Emmerson (ed.) 1999, Henk Schulte Nordholt and Irwan Abdullah (eds.) 2002, Kevin H. 
O’Rourke 2003, Hanneman Samuel and Henk Schulte Nordholt 2004, and Henk Schulte 
Nordholt and Ireen Hoogenboom (eds.) 2006. 
4 For a more sustained discussion of these issues see Rob Wilson and Wimal 
Dissanayake (eds.) (1996).
5 My analysis of these three elements was inspired by Birgit Meyer’s approach in 
her PIONIER research programme ‘Modern mass media, religion and the imagination of 
communities’ which is specified in her research proposal to the Netherlands Organization 
for Scientific Research (NWO). Available online at URL: <http://www2.fmg.uva.nl/media-
religion/>’. (Last accessed on 26 April 2008).
1 New Order and surface
1 Hifki was a post-Soeharto organization for mobile cinemas, competing with the 
official organization for mobile cinemas, Perfiki, established in 1993.
2 Another element in the story of the film, which is that the boy who turns into a bad 
guy was of Chinese descent, is related not only to customary type casting in film scripts, 
it is also closely bound up with a particular stereotypical image of Chinese in Indonesian 
society. The industrious Chinese population, although small in number, is mainly involved 
in the money and trading segments of the local economy. By virtue of their success in these 
areas and because some powerful Chinese businessmen were linked to Soeharto crony 
capitalism, Chinese Indonesians have unwittingly created a negative image of themselves 
with the majority of Indonesian population.
3 For details on financing and sponsoring of film production during the New Order see 
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Sen 1994:41, 65. 
4 For more details on the privatization of Indonesian television see Sen and Hill 
2000:111-3.
5 For details about the founding of a monopoly in film distribution by Subentra see Sen 
1994:58-62.
6 For a discussion of the economic and political background of the Subentra monopoly, 
see Sen 1994:62-5.
7 In 1992 the stronghold of Hollywood films in Indonesian cinemas was reinforced by 
a trade deal with the US in which the number of American film imports was increased in 
return for an extension of Indonesian textile exports to the US (Sen 1994:157). 
8 ‘Pertunjukan film hanya dapat dilakukan dalam gedung atau tempat yang 
dipertunjukan bagi pertunjukan film.’
9 See Firman Syah 1997, and Adityo 1997. 
10 In an interview Hidayat Effendi of Perfiki emphasized that the 500 new small 
cinemas were not to compete with top-end cinemas. These were meant to become the 
partners of the top-end cinemas in serving the market segment of lower-class audiences 
only. Effendi believed that it was a good idea if, as soon as mobile cinemas were turned into 
permanent ones, Perfiki were to copy the arrangement of film distribution and exhibition of 
the 21 Group with as its focus the market for domestic films (‘Perfiki harus jadi.’1993). 
11 For more details on Forum Film Bandung see SM Ardan 2004:156-166. 
12 See, for example, Sen’s account of the rejection by the FFI jury of the corroboration 
of Javanese mysticism in the film Rembulan dan Matahari (The moon and the sun, 
Slamet Rahardjo, 1979) (Sen 1994:124-8). For an example of FFI jury’s endorsement of 
mainstream gender constructions see its evaluation of Bukan Isteri Pilihannya (Not the wife 
of his choice, Eduart P. Sirait, 1981) (Ibid:148). For more on the content of films that won 
Citra between 1973 and 1992 see Seno Gumira Adjidarma 2000.
13 ‘Perfilman sebagai sarana komunikasi yang ampuh demi pembangungan nasional’.
14 ‘Kultural edukatif kita jadikan watak film Indonesia’.
15 ‘Memasyarakatkan dan memanunggalkan perfilman Indonesia dalam pembangungan 
nasional’.
16 See document FFI 1978-1982 – Deppen/1983: ‘Meningkatkan peranan film 
Indonesia sebagai sarana komunikasi dan informasi dalam ikut mensukseskan Pelita IV’. 
17 See document FFI 1985-1990 – Deppen/1991: ‘memungkinkan peristiwa penting itu 
dapat diikuti oleh seluruh bangsa’
18 For more on Indonesian television see Philip Kitley 2000, Klarijn Loven 2008, and 
Veven Wardhana 2001a.
19 At the time, Ali Sadikin, the Governor of Jakarta linked the festival to the 
anniversary of the national capital on 22 June. In June 1975, Sadikin sponsored FFAP a 
second time, again in the framework of the anniversary of Jakarta (Ardan 2004:28).
20 See for example IWN 1995; SK 1995; U-5 2001b; Susanti 2001. 
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21 See agi 2001a and agi/sra 2002. 
22 An informative article covering some elements of both FFAP and FFI is a report 
by film journalist Rosihan Anwar of the 37th FFAP in Seoul in 1992. Anwar mentions the 
involvement of political issues at the festival. This covered both the question of whether or 
not Moscow should be accepted as a member of the festival, and the politically informed 
choice of Seoul handing out the award for Best Film to Taiwan. Taiwan felt offended 
by South Korea as the latter had diplomatic relations with Beijing. Furthermore, as the 
Indonesian film Cinta Dalam Sepotong Roti (Love in a slice of bread, 1991) by Garin 
Nugroho won an award for best new director at FFAP, Anwar recalls the process how the 
film was chosen as Best Film during the FFI of 1991. Cinta Dalam Sepotong Roti won a 
Citra only after heated debates among the jury members. Much of the controversy arose 
from the question of whether the rules of the Department of Information, or the guidelines 
written down in the ministerial order of the standing committee, should prevail. After this 
account, Anwar comments on the FFAP film market. He briefly mentions that the festival 
programme is so much packed with visits to tourist sights that the delegates, including 
those who want to buy and sell films, were hardly able to watch any films. He ends his 
report with the remark that FFAP was defunct and a festival devoid of any significance 
(Anwar 1999:204-18). Two other informative articles about FFAP are Anwar’s reports 
of 1988 and 1994. The first reveals the large extent to which FFAP functions as a tool 
for (tourist) promotion of the country hosting the festival (Ibid:124-9). The 1994 report 
exposes transnational politics at the 39th FFAP in Sydney. During the award ceremony the 
representative to New Zealand raises the issue of the Indonesian occupation of East Timor, 
much to the dismay of the Indonesian delegation (Ibid:232-6).
2 Reformasi and underground
1 For more on sinema ngamen and ‘side-stream’ film see Gotot Prakosa 1997.
2 Part of Section One was published in Inside Indonesia 2002.
3 See for example Gotot Prakosa 2001:3-4, and Chapter One pages 20-1. 
4 For more details on I-Sinema see the article by Joanne Sharpe 2002.
5 A jelangkung is a doll made out of a coconut shell and some wooden sticks used as a 
medium to invite spirits to take possession of it.
6 Set off by these discussions in July 2002 Media Watch came up with a report which 
noted nine violations of the Indonesian anti-monopoly law of 1999 by the 21 Group. Media 
Watch filed a complaint with the Business Competition Supervisory Agency (Komisi 
Pengawas Persaingan Usaha, KPPU) alleging unfair business practices by Subentra 21. 
The case was taken to court. In April 2003 the verdict handed down was that there was 
neither proof of monopoly nor unfair business practices by the 21 Group.
7 The edict about ‘the colonization of aesthetics’ by the Jakarta-based Indonesian film 
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industry was presented at a film indie meeting in Yogyakarta in December 2001. At that 
meeting local film-makers were talking about founding a Yogyakarta film industry. This 
industry was to be supported by the local government and the Sultan of Yogyakarta, and 
would be called Mataram film.
8 At SCTV’s FFII in 2002 and 2003 Gotot Prakosa noticed that the main themes of 
films at various film festivals including that of SCTV were: love, drugs, togel (abbreviation 
of toto gelap: illegal lottery), dreaming or daydreaming, and homosexuality (2005:83).
9 Tim SP wrote an article about a syndicate of film piracy consisting of Glodok (North 
Jakarta), Singapore and Batam mafia (2000).
10 This amount was estimated in May 1998 (Syah 1998). In 2003 the head of 
Indonesian Intellectual Property (Karya Cipta Indonesia) Rinto Harahap stated that each 
year the state lost Rp. 1.4 trillion (US$ 116,666,666: at the time 1 US$ was approximately 
Rp.12,000) on pirated music cassettes and VCDs  (A-92/C-16 2003). By 2007 this amount 
rose to Rp. 2.5 trillion (US$ 263,157,894: note that 1 US$ was then valued at around 
Rp.9,500) (Hadysusanto 2008). 
11 See for example ‘Kisruh penerbitan stiker.’1999 and pur/wid/mam 1999.
12 See for example man 2001; SA/Yad/R3 1998; ‘VCD bajakan.’ 2000.
13 See also Kees van Dijk 2001:82, 104. 
14 It was not the first time the Indonesian government and entertainment industry was 
pressured to take action against piracy. For example, in 1987 the US had restricted trade in 
other Indonesian business sectors because of music piracy.
15 For example, the main theme of Jiffest in 2000 was ‘Issues on Contemporary Islamic 
Culture’, in 2001 it sounded: ‘Indonesian Identity Seen Trough Film’, 2002 focused on 
‘Multiculturalism: Celebrating Diversity’, and Jiffest 2003 was about ‘Understanding 
Change’.
16 Shohat and Stam remarked that the global cultural situation was not as one-sided 
as presented in media-imperialism theories of the 1970s, but was in fact considerably 
more interactive. In their argument they mention that it was not the case that an active 
First World forced its products onto a passive Third World. Global mass culture did not 
replace local cultures but co-existed with them, or was itself marked by a ‘local’ accent. 
For a similar argument, see Grewal and Kaplan’s introduction to Scattered Hegemonies 
1994. There was a growing number of Third-World countries (Mexico, Brazil, India, 
and Egypt) which dominated their own markets and even became cultural exporters. 
Furthermore, they argued, a distinction should be made between the ownership and 
control of the media, which is an issue of political economy, and the specifically cultural 
issue of the implications of this domination for the people on the receiving end (Shohat 
and Stam 1994:31).
17 See for a complete description of these modes and strategies and their implications 
Shohat and Stam 1994:292-337.
18 For concepts on contemporary ‘dispersed’ and ‘scattered’ hegemonies in global-local 
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cultural relations see Arjun Appadurai 1990, and the introduction by Grewal and Kaplan in 
Scattered Hegemonies 1994.
19 For details about an increase in distribution of domestic films in the VCD format in 
the last years of New Order rule see JB Kristanto 2005:xiii-xiv.
3 Histories, heroes, and monumental frameworks
1 For a discussion on Soekarno’s rule see Legge 1972. 
2 See for more details on these organizations and protests against American films and 
Soekarno anti-imperialistic film policy Sen 1994:29-35.
3 For more about characteristic traits and narratives of Usmar Ismail’s films see Sen 
1994:21-2, 38-41.
4 There were some dissenting voices, above all that of R.M Soetarto who was 
representing the Indonesian government when the Japanese studio Nippon Eiga Sha was 
handed over to the Republic of Indonesia on 6 October 1945. This was the day that he 
wished to see commemorated.
5  The article ‘Sejarah Hitam Perfilman Nasional’ was published on 6 October 1970 in 
the newspaper Sinar Harapan under the pseudonym S.M. Ameh.
6 Emphasis added by Naficy.
7 For a detailed description of Dr. Siti Pertiwi Kembali ke Desa, (Dr Siti Pertiwi returns 
to the village) a New Order propaganda film for promoting the government rural health 
scheme, its education programme by sending out urban volunteer workers as set out in the 
Second Five Year plan, and the transmigration programme see Sen 1994:121-4.
8  I think the production and distribution of these Gelora Pembangunan films in the 
1950s was instigated by USIA policy. Writing about USIA films in Iran, Naficy says 
that these encompassed films from the United States dubbed in Persian/Farsi, as well as 
newsreels created specifically for the Iranian market. These newsreels dealt with the US 
Point 4 Programme, military and development programmes, activities of the royal family, 
earthquakes, a variety of human interest stories from the US, as well as programmes about 
improving primitive health, nutrition, and agricultural methods (Naficy 2003:192).
9 Birgit Meyer drew my attention to the fact that references to historical events in 
Indonesia were presented as if they were the titles of films. 
10 For a detailed description of the films see Sen 1994:90, 97.
11 There were at least five versions of who was behind the coup. For more details see 
Hermawan Sulistiyo (1997:55-69).
12 The Pancasila is the five-principle Indonesian state ideology implemented after 
Indonesian independence. The five principles are: 1) Belief in the One Almighty God 
(Ketuhanan Maha Esa), 2) Just and Civilized Humanity (Kemanusiaan yang adil dan 
beradab), 3) The Unity of Indonesia (Persatuan Indonesia), 4) Democracy guided by the 
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consensus of deliberations amongst representatives (Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat 
kebijaksanaan dalam permusyawaratan/perwakilan), 5.) Social justice for all Indonesian 
people (Keadilan social bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia). 
13 For more on New Order historiography and the implication of the military in its 
construction of the past see Katharine McGregor 2007. 
14 From 1980 under the New Order students and civil servants had been compelled to 
follow a mandatory state-sponsored indoctrination course in the state ideology Pancasila 
(see endnote 12). These sessions were known as P4, short for courses in Pedoman 
Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (Directives for Instilling and Implementing 
Pancasila).  
15 The closing scene of the film addresses propaganda for development so blatantly that 
it is almost farcical. By employing the same ‘cheery’ music score which was generally used 
in propaganda documentaries and the inescapable voice-over, this scene rips the film out of 
its historical context and places it in the rhetoric of the New Order present. 
See for the development propaganda excerpt from Operasi Trisula Disc Two 3.1.
16 For more about the production of Terjebak see Veven Wardhana 2001:363-370. 
17 See, for example, the description of the films Jaka Sembung Sang Penkluk (Jaka 
Sembung the conqueror, Sisworo Gautama, 1981) and Si Pitung Beraksi Kembali (Pitung 
strikes again, Lie Soen Bok, 1981) in Kristanto 2005:217, 224. 
18 For more on the political background and representations of the threat of extreme 
Islam and Islamic terrorism see McGregor 2007:176-193. 
19 Dialog, adegan, visualisasi, dan konflik-konflik antara protagonis dan antagonis dalam alur 
cerita seharusnya menuju ke arah ketakwaan dan pengagungan terhadap Tuhan YME..
20 See for example theories about the practice of ‘reading against the grain’ which 
emerged in the 1970s feminist, gay and lesbian readings of Hollywood cinema. In these 
readings the Hollywood films which were made from a heterosexual perspective were 
decoded from the perspective of different sexualities. Since then a great deal of research has 
been expended on the discrepancies in ideas between those who produce films and those 
who consume them. For example, Umberto Eco put forward the theory that the audiences 
possess a power of selectivity to exposure, perception and interpretation to reshape texts to 
fit the audience needs (Eco 1989). For other research on alternative or oppositional readings 
and freedom of audience perceptions of texts see Ang 1991, 1996; Lang and Lang 1983; 
Jhally and Lewis 1992; Liebes and Katz 1990, Livingstone 1991; Real 1982. For theories 
about the encoding and decoding of texts see Hall 1980, Morley 1980, Radway 1984. 
21 ‘Di bidang kesenian, kesenian dibina dalam acuab [sic] kejayaan sistem kekuasaan 
dan dalam pementasan kolosal ‘kesenian dalam rangka’ ritualisasi negara.’
22 For example, the concept that media events and their narration are in competition 
[my italics] with the writing of history in defining the contents of collective memory 
should, in the case of Hapsak, be read as being in conjunction with the writing of (New 
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Order) history enacted (Dayan and Katz 1992:211). I use the term to connect the screening 
of the film G30S/PKI to a ‘preplanned’ mediatized event which highlights ‘some central value 
or some aspect of collective memory’, and ‘is broadcast live on television’ (Ibid: ix, 5-9).
23 Until 2001 the Hapsak ceremony was broadcast on television. Since then it was 
only inserted in small segments in the daily news programmes. Under the presidency of 
Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001), and particularly under the presidency of Megawati 
Soekarnoputri (2001-2004) the commemoration was downplayed. In 2000 the government 
changed the name Sacred Pancasila Day to the Commemorative Day for the Betrayal 
of Pancasila (Peringatan Hari Pengkhianatan (terhadap) Pancasila). In that same year 
Megawati, who as vice-president served as inspector of the ceremony due to the President’s 
absence, did not carry out the second part of the ceremony in which President Soeharto 
customarily had visited the diorama, the preserved well and the Pancasila monument. 
When Megawati was Indonesia’s President herself in 2002 and 2003 she did not attend. 
Nevertheless, it continued to be held. Since Susilo Bambang Yudoyono was sworn in as 
President in 2004 the Hapsak ceremony has been restored. At least until October 2008, the 
President presided over the ceremony as usual.
24 The phrases ‘kejam dan keji’ (brutal and vicious) and ‘di luar batas-batas peri 
kemanusiaan’ (beyond the bounds of human dignity) were repeatedly used when referring 
to communists. 
25 For more on collective memory and monuments see Lasswell 1979, Mosse 1980, and 
Nora 1984. 
26 McGregor demonstrates that Hapsak initially served just as a means to reaffirm 
the army’s claim to have led the nation in a righteous victory over communism. In the 
early 1980s, the meaning of the day expanded to include threats to Pancasila from Islam 
as well as communism. Over time, the commemoration became a means to redefine the 
label ‘communist’ and apply it to any opposition. Finally, in the 1990s, Hapsak acquired an 
increasingly religious nature. By then the day had become more a celebration of opposition 
to atheism than an affirmation of the Pancasila itself (McGregor 2002:66).
27 ‘kejadian-kejadian yang digambarkan dalam film tersebut adalah benar-benar terjadi’.
28 To give a few examples of films that were made for certain events, or certain events 
of which the screening of films was an important part from 1993 to 1997: In 1993 the 
films Janur Kuning, Detik-detik Proklamasi ([original title Detik-detik Revolusi] 1959, 
Alam Surawidjaja]), Lebak Membara (1982, Imam Tantowi), Operasi Trisula and Kereta 
Api Terakhir (1981, Mochtar Soemodimedjo) featured ‘in the framework of’ the Day of 
Heroes (Hari Pahlawan) on 10 November, and in 1994 on National Film Day (Hari Film 
Nasional) (‘Jambore film.’1993). In 1994 the film Saur Sepuh (Satria Madangkara) (1988, 
Imam Tantowi) was screened ‘in the framework of’ information about transmigration, to 
stress the importance of ‘unity and integrity’ (Rel/BL 1994). Also in 1994, to counter the 
film Death of a Nation by John Pilger, which is an account of human rights violations by 
the Indonesian state in East Timor, the Indonesian version presenting the ‘true historical 
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facts’ about East Timor was produced (‘Pemerintah akan buat.’1994). It was planned to 
screen this ‘counter-propaganda’ film in July 1995  ‘in the framework’ of the Day of the 
Integration of East Timor (Hari Integrasi Daerah TimTim), and again in August ‘in the 
framework of’ the Commemoration of 50 Years of Indonesian Independence (Peringatan 
50 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka) (‘Kalangan DPRD Timtim.’1995). Elsewhere during the 
commemoration of the golden jubilee of Indonesian various films were screened among 
them Janur Kuning, Serangan Fajar, Soerabaia 45 (1990, Imam Tantowi), Perawan di 
Sektor Selatan (1971, Alam Surawidjaja), and Enam Jam Di Yogya (1951, Usmar Ismail) 
(it 1995). In 1996 a ‘personal audio-visual monument’ to ‘Ibu Tien’ (Mother Tien), the then 
recently deceased wife of President Soeharto, entered production with the title Mother’s 
Enduring Love (Kasih Ibu Selamanya) (Handiman 1996; ‘Ibu Tien.’1996). Furthermore in 
1996 the television soap Pedang Keadilan (Sword of Justice) was produced and screened 
in the framework of the golden jubilee of the Indonesian police force. The soap featured 
six police officers and ‘horrific killing scenes’ in an effort to teach offenders against the 
law a lesson (‘Enam anggota Polri.’1996). One final example, between 1996-1997 the film 
Fatahillah (1997, Imam Tantowi and Chaerul Umam), recounting the founding of Jakarta, 
was produced as part of a project of the Governor of Jakarta to be screened on 22 June 1997 
in the framework of the 470th birthday of the capital (su/it 1996).
29 McGregor has pointed to similar anti-communist discourses in the politicized 
militaries of Brazil and Burma (2007:220). Moreover, she argues that in such communist 
states as the People’s Republic of China and the former USSR, overtly political educational 
content also upheld the deeds of heroes and strongly emphasized martial patriotic themes 
(Ibid:37).
4 Post-colonial histories, common people, and commercial frameworks 
1 For more on the debates on the need to ‘straighten history’ see Schulte Nordholt 
2004:11-2.
2 I want to say thank you to Patricia Spyer and P. M. Laksono who brought this use of 
cameras in the film to my attention. 
3 In April 2007 when I asked Lexy Rambadeta whether he had G30S/PKI in mind when 
producing Mass Grave he answered that the film had not crossed his mind for a minute. He had 
looked at more ‘universal’ modes of documentary production like those used by the Australian 
television commission ABC. The editor of Mass Grave, Laurensius ‘Goeng’ Wijayanto, whom I 
met in December 2005 remarked that the film G30S/PKI was in his thoughts all the time he was 
working on Mass Grave, but this could not have directly influenced content or style of the film 
since Goeng had simply followed Lexy’s script and instructions.
4 Besides digging up the dead of New Order rule Mass Grave contested the narratives of 
evil communists versus good Islam. The documentary shows a group of angry Muslim men who 
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violently try to prevent the reburial of victims of 1965 in the village’s graveyard.
5 For a database of contemporary Indonesian documentaries see: http://www.in-docs.
com/index.cfm. In-docs was founded in 2002 by Yayasan Masyarakat Mandiri Film 
Indonesia (Society of Indonesian Films, YMMFI), the founder and organizer of the 
Jakarta International Film Festival. Through In-docs, YMMFI promotes and encourages 
the production and development of documentary films by Indonesians. In-docs organizes 
a series of such programmes as discussions about documentaries, film screenings, and 
workshops for documentary production. In-docs is supported by the Ford Foundation, 
Hivos, and the Open Society Institute. For more on FFD see its website at URL: <http://
www.komunitas-dokumenter.org/index.php>. (Last accessed on 26 April 2008).
6 For more on the structure of documentaries in relation to (generic) text conventions 
and parallels with other texts, as well as the use of certain styles in relation to institutional 
discourse see Nichols 1991:18-23. 
7 For more about the stress on victims in audio-visual and other media after the 
resigntion of Soeharto, see Wiwik Sushartami’s research on the victimization of women in 
post-Soeharto Indonesian media (forthcoming).
8  On the rise and context of dakwah in Indonesia, see Henk Schulte Nordholt 
2008:165-176.
9 For example, the film Satria Bergitar (‘The knight with a guitar’, Nurhadie Irawan, 
1983) shows scantly dressed females. There is also a scene set in the bedroom featuring the 
antagonist and his spouse. Even though they just talk it was deemed inappropriate to have a 
scene set in a bedroom.
10 Cinema Clubs at Muhammadiyah universities for example provided video cameras 
and other material to train students in film production (personal comunication with Chaerul 
Umam 2003).
11 Teater Kanvas is an Islamic theatre group founded by Zack Sorga, a graduate of the 
Jakarta Arts Institute. The theatre group consists only of men. Teater Bening is a theatre 
group which consists of women only. Mer C is an Islamic non-governmental organization 
which offers humanitarian aid. It was founded by Jose Rizal while he studied at the 
University of Indonesia. Forum Lingkar Pena is a group of Islamic writers.
12 Also the Islamic boarding school Daarut Tauhid, AA Gym’s Manejemen Qolbu 
Television and Manejemen Qolbu Cooperation, the Islamic women’s magazine UMMI, 
Islamic youth from the Sunda Kelapa Mosque, and the magazine Aku Anak Saleh (I am 
a pious child) were mentioned as having joined the MAV-Net. Moreover, the MAV-Net 
worked together with such professionals in the field of audio-visual media as film directors 
Riri Riza, Chaerul Umam, Marissa Haque, Syaeful Wathon, Slamet Rahardjo Djarot, and 
Islamic artists such as Igo Ilham, Syamsudin Noor Moenadi, Rizal Basri, Moh.Ariansyah, 
Effendy Doyta, Zack Sorga, and others.
13 These VCDs consisted of feature films, documentaries, and television series from 
Cairo, England and Australia. But also films about Taliban training camps or Czech warfare 
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which were on sale were considered Islamic films (Khaironi/dgg 2002).
14 When I spoke to Agres Setiawan in March 2007 he said that his opinion had changed 
and that his view about the need to counter commercialism and transnationalism had 
become less radical.
15 Sen argues that in Indonesian cinema under the presidency of Soekarno Gabriel’s 
third phase was represented by leftist film-makers who were opposed to imperialist 
Hollywood films. She states that when the New Order came to power the third phase of 
cinema in Indonesia was erased (1994:46-7). Hence, the only cinemas surviving under the 
New Order were Gabriel’s first phase copies of Hollywood films, and second phase films 
which showed exotic images of traditional Indonesian cultures.
16 For a broader discussion of the emergence of these discourses in Indonesian society, 
see Henk Schulte Nordholt 2008:170-1.
17 For example, the series Melrose Place and Beverly Hills 90210 by ‘Jewish producer’ 
Aaron Spelling were seen to promote free sex and profoundly non-Islamic lifestyles.
18 The continuation of the ceremony and the commemoration of Hapsak were also not 
questioned. However, in 2000 historian Taufik Abdullah criticized the sacredness of the 
Pancasila and its holiday because in the aftermath of the day being commemorated many 
people were killed and imprisoned and Pancasila was used to rule out all other ideologies, 
principles or beliefs (McGregor 2007:107). See also endnotes Chapter Three no. 26.
19 See for example agi 2001b; agi/ign 2001; arn/cp 2001; ema 2001b; eri 2001; 
‘Program Ramadhan.’  2001.
20 On the television station RCTI, AA Gym featured in Manajemen Qulbu Spesial 
Ramadhan; on SCTV in Membuka Pintu Langit, Gema Ramadhan, Sambut Ramadhan, 
and Gema Takdir; on Indosiar in Kisah2 Teladan (a children’s program); on Trans TV 
in Ceramah Ramadhan AA Gym, and on TPI, in Sentuhan Qolbu Ramadhan (‘Serba AA 
Gym.’ 2002; ‘Ramadhan di TV.’ 2002).
21 See also interviews with Veven Wardhana in agi/nun 2002 and Kusumaputra 2002 
and remarks by film director Ali Sahab (‘Ali Sahab.’ 2003). 
22 For an example of the blurring of boundaries between religious observances and 
entertainment on television in the context of Ramadan in Egypt see Armbrust 2006. 
Also Abu-Lughod has mentioned the rise in production and popularity of big-budget 
religious and religious-historical series on Egyptian television during Ramadan at the 
end of the 1990s (2002:127). Additionally, for more details on television programming 
during Ramadan in Syria see Christmann 1996 and Salamandra 1998. For examples of 
the commodification of Christian religion in the sphere of entertainment in the United 
States see Moore 2004 and Forbes and Mahan 2000, and in Ghana see Meyer 2004 and 
2007.
23 See Egypte (Bayat 2002), Ghana (De Witte 2003), Israel (Lehman and Siebzehner 
2006), Mali (Schulz 2006), and Turkey (Öncü 2006).
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5 The kyai and hyperreal ghosts: Narrative practices of horror, commerce,  
and censorship
1 An earlier version of this chapter was published in Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 2007.
2 See for example Noël Carroll 1990, Paul Coates 1991, and Steven Schneider 2003. 
About horror film in Indonesia in relation to politics see Stephen Gladwin 2003. On the 
subject of carnival and film as deconstruction of political and aesthetic representations see 
Ella Shohat and Robert Stam 1994:274, and on the subject of carnival in film as a form of 
anti-canonical resistance 1994:302-6. For horror films related to Bakhtin’s theory of the 
carnivalesque see Barbara Creed 1995.
3 A siluman (present-day Indonesian spelling) is a human being who has assumed a 
theriomorphic guise for nefarious purposes.
4 See for example Joko P. 1994; w-04 1993.
5 See Joko P. 1994; T-9 1993; w-04 1993. This point was also made by Hasim 1997 and 
by Suyono and Arjanto 2003. 
6 Both Indonesian and foreign critics of Indonesian horror films have commented that 
the storylines often are hard understand. See for example www.iluminatedlantern.com, and 
www.dvdmaniacs.net in relation to remarks about Indonesian horror films abroad.
7 These features are not specified in relation to film genres by Heider, though he does 
mention the use of sex in Indonesian films in relation to narrative conventions under the 
heading of ‘sexuality’ (1991:67-9).
8 Heider remarks that sex in Indonesian cinema was either downplayed or presented as 
sadism. He observed that in Indonesian films, sex itself is rape (1991:66).
9 Jalan cerita disusun sedemikian rupa sehingga menimbulkan kesan kepada penonton 
bahwa yang jahat itu pasti akan menerima/menanggung akibatnya dan menderita, dan yang 
baik itu pasti menerima ganjaran dan kebahagiaan.
10 Another pattern of New Order films was that a film evolved from a depiction of 
a situation of order to a downslide to disorder after which at the end order was restored 
(Heider 1994:34-8; Sen and Hill 2000:138, 143-6).
11 For example, Bangunnya Nyai Roro Kidul (The awakening of Nyai Roro Kidul, 
1985) Putri Kunti’anak (The witch’s daughter, 1988), Pembalasan Ratu Laut Selatan 
(Revenge of the queen of the South Sea, 1988), Kisah Cinta Nyi Blorong (The love story of 
Nyi Blorong, 1989). 
12 See for example sef 1995.
13 Examples of this can be found in the following discussion about mystery television 
series. 
14 Thanks to Dimas Jayasrana for giving me useful information and comments about 
these series.
15 Many viewers of the series, probably the real majority, apparently had no objections.
16 In Islam the existence of the jinn was completely accepted as it is to this day. 
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Muslims believe that jinns are ethereal or fiery bodies, intelligent, imperceptible, with 
the capacity to assume different forms and capable of performing heavy labour. Their 
relationship to Iblis or Shaitans (the Devil or devils) in general is obscure. In Sura xviii.50 
Iblis is said to be of the jinn; but Sura ii.34 implies that he was one of the angels. As a 
consequence great confusion and many legends and hypotheses have come into being (Gibb 
and Kramers 1974). 
17 Literally: ‘So, it seems it has not strayed too far from religious teachings because 
possibly they talked to a Muslim jinn first’ (‘Jadi, rasanya, tidak terlalu menyimpang jauh 
dari kaidah agama, karena mungkin mereka telah berdialog terlebih dahulu dengan jin 
muslim’). This also relates to the point about people rasing objections to mystery films and 
at the same time emphasizing their belief in supernatural issues.  
18 ‘Terus terang, saya tidak pernah melihat jin. Lalu bagaimana kita bisa bercerita 
bahwa jin ada yang baik. Tolong bangsa kita jangan diasah dengan hal-hal yang 
bertentangan dengan agama. Jangan mendidik masyarakat untuk melihat sesuatu yang tidak 
ada.’
19 In 1992  the BSF had changed its name into Film Censor Institute: Lembaga Sensor 
Film, LSF.
20 ‘Masak bikin sinetron yang tokohnya jin, sampai jin-jinnya dipanggil Om Jin atau 
Tante Jin. Mereka itu menjual mimpi terlalu berlebihan.’ 
21 In 2003, the producer and director had to defend their statement that they had based 
the film on a true story from Cigugur before the National Commission of Human Rights. 
The people from Cigugur thought that the film had insulted their ancestors and presented a 
false representation of history and the teachings of the religious figure Pangeran Madrais, 
whom they believed was referred to in the film (LAM 2003; rik 2003; sin 2003).
22 About recent television focusing on the depiction of what is ‘real’, and on ‘facts’, 
‘truth’, and ‘authenticity’ see Bernard Arps and Katinka van Heeren 2006. 
23 ‘Misalnya untuk mengembalikan arwah penasaran ke alam baka dengan tenang 
membutuhkan bantuan kiai.’ ‘Dan memang jalan keluar yang baik tetap meminta 
pertolongan kepada Allah.’
24 For a detailed description of a Pemburu Hantu programme see Bernard Arps and 
Katinka van Heeren 2006.
6 The celebrity kyai and phantoms of the past: Tussling with the bounds of 
Indonesian moralities, realities, and popularities
1 FPI was formed in August 1998 and now claims branches in 22 provinces. Based 
in Jakarta, FPI is led by Habib Muhammad Riziek Syihab, a religious teacher who was 
educated in Saudi Arabia. As does Habib, many of the top FPI leaders have Arab blood. 
The stated goal of FPI is the full implementation of Islamic Sharia law, although it 
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supports the current Indonesian constitution and avoids making demands for an Islamic 
state. FPI has a paramilitary wing called Laskar Pembela Islam and is well know for 
organizing raids on bars, massage parlours and gaming halls. FPI justifies these raids on 
the grounds that the police are unable to uphold the laws on gambling and prostitution. 
Skeptical observers suspect that the police turn a blind eye to, or are even complicit 
in, these activities, knowing that the victims will be encouraged to keep up payment of 
protection money to the police. In late 2001, FPI took the lead in threatening to sweep 
Americans out of Indonesia in retaliation for the US operations in Afghanistan, although 
the threat was not in fact carried out (see URL: <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/intguide/
FAD/sea.htm>.).
2 For more on regional autonomy see Usman 2001 and Jacobsen 2003.
3 For more background information about RUU APP see ‘Anti-Pornography Law- 
Indonesia’ from journeymanpictures posted on YouTube: <http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=WFm2Y7CmoEA>. (Last accessed on 6 April 2008).
4 ‘Ada hal-hal yang sebenarnya terjadi di kalangan remaja tapi tidak bisa ditampilkan 
dalam sinetron, itulah yang dimunculkan dalam Buruan Cium Gue!’
5 For example, in the wake of the controversy the ticket sales in Semarang rose. 
About 70 to 80 per cent of the tickets were sold, which has not often been the case 
when Indonesian films were screened. At first the pro-contra issue about Buruan Cium 
Gue! brought in lucrative business. However, when it became known that nothing really 
controversial was depicted ticket sales soon declined (‘Mana yang perlu.’2004).
6 Film director Ahmad Yusuf believed that AA Gym should have watched BCG first 
before voicing his protests. The fact that the film was removed from cinemas after AA 
Gym’s protests he stated recalled the atmosphere of the old regime. He considered the role 
of MUI was also dubious, as the MUI member on the Censor Board had obviously let the 
film pass for release. Still, after AA Gym had raised an outcry MUI joined the protests 
against the film (‘Mana yang perlu.’ 2004). 
7 See the revealing title of an article in The Jakarta Post 21 August 2004: ‘Local teen 
flick withdrawn after Muslim leaders’ protest: The House of Representatives is deliberating 
a bill on public morality, which bans kissing in public’.
8 In early 2005 President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono declared he would call for 
maximum measures to ban pornography in Indonesian written and audio-visual media 
(Barendregt 2006:9-10).
9 In his paper on the use of mobile phones and debates on the RUU APP Barendregt 
also referred to the fear that the liberalization of society had gone too far (2006:6). 
10 See Chapter Five pages 97-8.
11 See afa/ghu 1996; Ant 1995; ant/mz 1996; hht 1993; ‘Kelompok Islam.’1994; Sutara 
1994.
12 For various protests see ahd 1994; amd 1995; ant/mz 1996; Ant/RS 1996; ikh 1997;
‘Kelompok Islam.’1994; KI/950 1994.
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13 These discourses recall the early years of Independence in the 1950s. At that time 
debates were also imbued with a spirit of great enthusiasm about the future of Indonesian 
cinema and also covered the questions of American film imports, censorship, and Islamic 
morality (Sen 1994:19-20, 22-3). 
14 See for example CR-14/M-2 2000.
15 In 1999 threats by FPI to disrupt the screening of the Israeli film Kadosh (Sacred, 
Amos Gitai 1999) violently caused the committee of the Jakarta International Film 
Festival to decide not to show it. In 2000 protests by FPI led to the end of the screening 
of the highly popular Latin-American soap Esmeralda on SCTV. FPI demanded the soap 
be scrapped because the antagonist was called Fatima, the name of the daughter of the 
Prophet Muhammad, and giving an antagonist her name was perceived to be an insult to 
Islam. In 2003 members of the PKS organized protests in all cities during the road-show 
of the independent film production Novel Tanpa Huruf R (Novel without the letter R, Aria 
Kusumadewa, 2003). However, the film-maker refused to stop screening his film and in a 
counter move opened a debate with the people who had protested about his film during at a 
film screening in Bandung.
16 In the same year Garin Nugroho encountered another protest from Islamic groups. 
This time the trouble was caused by his production of a Public Service Announcement 
(PSA) called Islam Warna Warni (Different hues of Islam). The MMI protested about this 
PSA and demanded a ban alleging that mentioning the ‘different hues’ of Islam represented 
Islam as something ambiguous. In the opinion of MMI there only was one Islam, and 
different interpretations of the religion were not possible. To represent Islam as something 
unfixed was perceived to be an insult (Abidin 2003).
17 At the beginning of 2003 when 45 new members of the Film Censor Board were 
appointed for the period 2002-2005, the secretary of MUI, Ichwan Sjam, had stated that he 
regretted that the number of representatives of religious mass organizations in the board 
that year had declined from two persons per organization to only one (Kompas Cyber 
Media 28 January 2003). Before 2003 the Islamic mass organizations Muhammadiyah and 
NU both each had two persons in the board.
18 For more on the popularity of religious series in for example Egypt and India see 
respectively Abu Lughod 1993 and Mitra 1993.
19 SCTV produced Astaghfirullah (May god forgive me! also an exclamation to be 
used when shocked by immoral behaviour) based on true stories from the magazines Ghoib 
(Mysterious, pertaining to the invisible (divine or supernatural) sphere) and Kuasa Ilahi 
(God’s power). Trans TV had Taubat (Repent and foreswear) taking its stories from the 
magazine Insting (Instinct) and the series Insyaf (Aware) and Hidayah. Lativi screened 
Azab Ilahi (God’s wrath) and Sebuah Kesaksian (Witness to faith), both based on stories of 
people who had experienced or witnessed miracles which they attributed to God.
20 Bukhari and Muslim were Arab Islamic scholars who lived around AD 800/200 
Shawwal. Their books both called Sahih are still highly celebrated among the collections of 
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traditions (Gibb and Kramers 1974).
21 ‘aktualisasi dari peristiwa yang pernah terjadi di zaman Rasulullah’.
22 ‘Artinya, masyarakat kita sekarang ini mundur ke zaman 1970-an lagi’.    
23 As mentioned in Chapter Four in the few past years the MUI had given awards to 
television stations which have made a contribution to enlivening the Ramadan fasting 
month.
24 In a press-statement presented by MFI on 3 January 2007, the movement called 
attention to the fact that the film Ekskul illegally used the music score of several Hollywood 
films. This constituted a breach of copyright. Observing the fact that this was not noticed by 
the FFI jury, MFI drew the conclusion that this was an indication of the poor management 
and lack of competence on the part of the festival organizers. 
25 See ‘Pernyataan Sikap MFI’ (Statement of the Stance of MFI) at URL: <http://
masyarakatfilmindonesia.wordpress.com/pernyataan-sikap/>. (Last accessed on 7 April 
2008). 
26 For example, in kissing scenes sometimes even a mere peck on the lips was cut. 
However, as mentioned earlier, the kissing scene in the teen flick Ada Apa Dengan Cinta, 
and to great surprise a gay kissing scene in Arisan!, and even a masturbation and lesbian 
sex scene in the film Detik Terakhir (Last second, Nanang Istiabudi 2005) passed the censor 
board uncut (Diani 2005).
27 In addition to the example of Buruan Cium Gue! in 2004, in 2005 the Censor 
Institute withdrew the action film Bad Wolves (Richard Buntario, 2005) because the police 
objected to the portrayal of corrupt officers in the film. The police said it would tarnish the 
image of the force, which, as journalist Hera Diani commented, was in fact already at an all 
time low (Diani 2005)
28 Likewise, the FFI organizers, who initially failed to comprehend the wider 
objective of MFI, did not see the protests as a positive effort to bring about change. 
In the mass media, they criticized the return of the Citra as an act by ill-mannered 
youngsters who could not accept their defeat. Veteran film-maker Chaerul Umam, a 
member of the FFI jury who himself had won a Citra for his film Ramadhan dan Ramona 
(Ramadhan and Ramona) in 1992, dismissed the young film-makers as childish for staging 
a protest. ‘It shows that they can’t accept their defeat. If they thought there was a problem 
they should have informed us as soon as possible’ (Hari 2007).
29 ‘LSF harus tetap ada. Lihat saja tayangan televisi dan bioskop, disensor aja 
gila, apalagi kalau lembaga sensor itu nggak ada. Selaku Ormas, kami akan memantau 
kelembagaan ini, sekaligus memperluas bidang kerja FPI’ 
30 Personal communication from Veven Wardhana via e-mail on 22 January 2007. In 
an interview Titie Said denied the charge that FPI had been invited by LSF. She stated it 
was just a visit as those made by many different Indonesian social communities and groups 
to t he institute.  The Censor Institute, she stressed, ‘always opens its door to the people’ 
(Hadysusanto 2007)  
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31 Communication via e-mail with Dimas Jayasrana on 23 January 2007, and personal 
communication in March 2007.
32 Personal communication from Aria, Ekky and Tino in March 2007. Moreover, they 
pointed out rumours which insinuated that FPI was an organization run by the Governor of 
Jakarta Sutiyoso or the police forces.
33 For more on the use of the threat of Islamic fundamentalism in Muslim countries to 
justify repressive state measures see Esposito 1999:172.
Conclusion
1 For more on this subject see Casanova 1994; Robertson 1992; Beyer 1998; Hoeber 
Rudolph and Piscatori (eds.) 1997.
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Nederlandse samenvatting
Hedendaagse Indonesische film: Geesten van Reformasi en spoken uit het verleden
Overal in de wereld circuleren in de media dezelfde beelden, films, en televisie formules. 
Nieuwsprogramma’s wisselen onderling identieke opnames uit, en in verschillende landen 
kijkt men naar de eigen varianten van Idols of Who wants to be a millionaire. Ook soaps en 
‘telenovela’ zoals The bold and the beautiful en Ugly Betty zijn in veel landen ondertiteld, 
nagesynchroniseerd, of in eigen varianten te vinden. Bovendien vertonen de preken van 
televisiedominees in Noord en Zuid Amerika, Islamitische geestelijken in Egypte, en Hindoe 
priesters in India erg veel overeenkomsten. Hoeveel de programma’s en soaps wereldwijd 
ook op elkaar lijken, en hoeveel films uit Hollywood, Bollywood en Nollywood elkaar ook 
kopiëren, toch zijn de films en programma’s die in een land in omloop zijn onderdeel van een 
eigen complex van discourses en mediation practices.
Het begrip discours is ontleend aan Norman Fairclough’s media discourse analysis 
(1995). De term wordt hierin op twee manieren gebruikt. Enerzijds wordt naar discours 
verwezen zoals gebruikelijk is in de taalwetenschappen: discours (een combinatie van 
discussie, debat, en gedachtewisseling) als een sociale actie en interactie van mensen 
in sociale situaties. Anderzijds wordt discours gebruikt zoals Michel Foucault er in zijn 
poststructuralistische sociale theorie naar verwijst: een discours als een maatschappelijke 
constructie van de werkelijkheid, een vorm van kennis. Als de twee betekenissen worden 
samengevoegd is een discours de taal die wordt gebruikt om een gegeven sociale praxis van 
een bepaald gezichtspunt weer te geven. Bijvoorbeeld de sociale praxis van politiek wordt 
verschillend geduid in liberale, sociale, of Marxistische politieke discoursen. Verder betekent 
film mediation practices de praxis van film productie, -distributie en -vertoningen. In andere 
woorden hoe films worden geproduceerd, verspreid en aan een publiek gepresenteerd. Deze 
discourses en meditation practices samen creëren de wijze waarop in een land film teksten 
te lezen en te begrijpen zijn.
Dominante discoursen, zoals de ethische waarden van een land, resoneren in de discours 
over film en dringen door in de meditation- discourse- en narrative practices van film teksten, 
televisie programma’s en soaps. Film discourse practices omvat de samensmelting van 
discoursen van een gemeenschap met de praxis van film productie, distributie en vertoning. 
In andere woorden discoursen krijgen vorm in film teksten. Een voorbeeld van een discourse 
practice is de productie van geschiedenisfilms en documentaires en de manier waarop deze 
films verspreid worden. In hoofdstuk drie laat ik zien dat de productie van deze genres tijdens 
de Nieuwe Orde heersende concepten van geschiedenis en de natie vertegenwoordigen, en dat 
de manier waarop de films werden verspreid gelieerd was aan een poging om de discoursen 
over geschiedenis te sturen. Narrative practices gaat om verhalen, en de manier waarop 
deze verteld worden in audiovisuele media in de context van machtsverhoudingen. De 
machtsverhoudingen omvatten zowel de macht van de staat om de media te beteugelen door 
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middel van censuur en regels voor het uitzenden van programma’s als ook het bezit van, en 
controle over, nationale en transnationale media imperia en -instituties. Daarnaast beïnvloeden 
het filmpubliek en de televisiekijkers door middel van kijkcijfers, en ook publieke organisaties 
of gemeenschappen door commentaren of protesten over films, de vorm en inhoud van media 
producten. Al deze factoren bepalen wat voor beelden van de natie, gemeenschap, en sociale 
werkelijkheden er in een samenleving circuleren. Ondanks de effecten van globalisatie en de 
overvloed van transnationale media producties, behelzen daarom dezelfde genres, stijlen, en 
formules van films en televisie programma’s verschillende weergaven en interpretaties van 
voorstellingen die worden gemaakt van samenlevingen en landen.
In Virtual Geography (1994), een boek over de verslaggeving van de eerste Golfoorlog, 
schrijft McKenzie Wark over een in scène gezet media optreden van Saddam Hussein. 
Hussein liet zich filmen met de buitenlanders die hij in gijzeling hield en geeft daarbij speciale 
aandacht aan een klein jongetje. Hij neemt het jongetje bij zich en aait hem vriendelijk over 
zijn hoofd. Wark stelt dat Saddam Hussein daarmee gebruik maakte van een bekend en wijd 
gedragen stijl binnen een Irakees genre, waarmee hij de indruk zou maken van ‘de nobele en 
gerespecteerde oudere’. Maar in het Westen had ditzelfde beeld een geheel andere uitwerking. 
Het raakte aan andere ideeën over televisiegenres en de verhalen die ze ons vertellen. In 
het Westen deden de beelden eerder denken aan shots van dictators als Hitler of Ceausescu 
die zich ook vaak in vriendelijke interactie met kinderen lieten filmen. Ook weerspiegelde 
afkeurende reacties in het Westen Oriëntalistische opvattingen over Arabische mannen die 
Westerse kinderen zouden belagen. Wark betoogt dat mensen die opgroeien in verschillende 
culturele raamwerken beschikken over andere manieren om met informatie om te gaan. Ook 
bezitten verschillende culturen een repertoire van zeer verschillende verhalen waarmee een 
ieder gebeurtenissen in de wereld filtert en duidt.
Dit proefschrift gaat over film als een sociale praxis binnen veranderende politieke en 
culturele frames van de Indonesische natie. Ik bespreek de invloed van zowel discours over 
film als het effect van toepassingen of praxis van film, op de vervaardiging van collectieve 
identiteiten en sociale werkelijkheden. Op zijn Foucauldiaans ontstaan sociale werkelijkheden 
op basis van de eigen regimes van waarheid die elke gemeenschap heeft. Regimes –  of 
gangbare politiek –  van waarheid verwijzen naar de soort discoursen die een gemeenschap 
hoog houdt en door laat gaan voor waar. Sociale waarheden of werkelijkheden zijn niet 
stabiel maar worden telkens gedefinieerd en her-gedefinieerd in concurrerende discoursen. 
In het bijzonder na het aftreden van president Soeharto wordt het complex van media in 
Indonesië gekenmerkt door een grote verscheidenheid aan discoursen waarin verschillende 
gemeenschappen strijden om verschillende representaties van de Indonesische natie en haar 
sociale werkelijkheden.Veranderingen in de politiek, maar ook de verspreiding van nieuwe 
filmtechnologieën zoals digitale videocamera’s, computer editprogramma’s en digitale 
videoprojectoren hebben een democratiseringsproces in de Indonesische maatschappij 
en filmwereld in werking gezet. Dit proefschrift behandelt de concurrerende vormen van 
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representatie, de verbeelding van specifieke identiteiten en de constructie van sociale 
werkelijkheden in de praxis en discoursen over film in Indonesië tijdens President Soeharto’s 
Nieuwe Orde regime en na zijn aftreden in 1998 waarmee de tijd van Reformasi (reformatie) 
werd ingeluid. 
De analyse bestaat uit drie delen. Om te beginnen bestudeer ik discoursen over bepaalde 
audiovisuele media formats (bijvoorbeeld 16 mm film, 35 mm film, digitale video en televisie) 
en genres die leiden tot voorstellingen van identiteit en het vormen van gemeenschappen. 
Vervolgens onderzoek ik de processen van empowerment die de consumptie van deze 
media formats en genres voortbrengen. Tot slot ga ik na welke invloed het circuleren van 
bepaalde genres en formats heeft op publieke debatten. In deze context behandel ik de 
volgende vragen: Hoe is de Indonesische film industrie te karakteriseren voor, tijdens, en na 
de val van Soeharto? Op wat voor een manier heeft de geest van Reformatie Indonesische 
meditation practices veranderd, en wat was de rol van nieuwe technologieën die in dezelfde 
tijd beschikbaar werden? Welke representaties van geschiedenis werden tijdens de Nieuwe 
Orde verspreid, en tot op welke hoogte bepaalden noties van ‘waarheid’ en ‘werkelijkheid’ de 
kritische discoursen over de Indonesische media? Wat was de rol van Islam in film mediation 
practices voor, tijdens, en na het Reformatie tijdsperk? In hoeverre botsten seculiere en 
religieuze discoursen bij het bepalen van de morele grenzen van film en televisie producties? 
Op welke wijze bepaalden deze discoursen sociale werkelijkheden?
Het betoog is in drie stukken gedeeld. Het eerste deel behandelt de film meditation 
practices. In dit deel contrasteer ik de mainstream praxis van film productie, distributie en 
vertoningen van de Nieuwe Orde met de underground praxis van Reformatie. Ik bespreek 
hoe film formats, zoals 16 mm en 35 mm film tijdens de Nieuwe Orde en  digitale video en 
35 mm film tijdens Reformatie, bepaalde voorstellingen van gemeenschappen bedongen. In 
discoursen over film werden 16 mm film en digitale video verbonden met lagere klassen en 
nationale of locale gemeenschappen. Daartegenover zou 35 mm een stedelijke hogere klasse en 
transnationale identiteiten representeren. Ook behandel ik in dit deel de officiële filmfestivals 
van de Nieuwe Orde en alternatieve filmfestivals en andere sites voor filmvertoningen 
na de val van Soeharto. Ik beschrijf de discoursen waarin verschillende filmfestivals en 
kanalen van filmvertoningen verschillende locale, nationale, en transnationale identiteiten 
vertegenwoordigen. Naast de discoursen over de manier waarop film formats, genres, en 
festivals, gemeenschappen representeren is in dit deel de rol van ‘cursieve praktijken’ een 
letterlijke vertaling van het Indonesische  praktek miring (illegale praktijken) van groot belang. 
Deze praktijken omvatten bijvoorbeeld het omkopen van ambtenaren of gezagsdragers om 
verboden films te kunnen vertonen, of om illegaal gekopieerde films te kunnen verkopen. De 
cursieve praktijken staan haaks op de discoursen hoe het idealiter allemaal zou moeten zijn, 
maar vormen een onontkoombaar onderdeel van Indonesische film mediation practices.
Het tweede deel gaat over film discourse practices. Hier ga ik in op het gebruik 
van bepaalde retorische strategieën en modes of engagement in geschiedenisfilms en 
filmgeschiedenis van de Nieuwe Orde. Onder modes of engagement versta ik de dominante 
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representaties van topics, of manieren waarop bepaalde onderwerpen worden vertolkt, 
die deel zijn van de centrale discoursen van een samenleving. In dit deel beschrijf ik de 
modes of engagement van helden in geschiedkunde. Verder poneer ik dat de productie van 
geschiedenisfilms en ‘ontwikkelingsfilms’ van de Nieuwe Orde deel uitmaakte van een 
transnationaal anti-communistisch discours dat vooral verspreid en gesteund werd door de 
Verenigde Staten. Deze discours werd in Indonesië maar ook in andere landen zoals Iran 
ingezet in een cultureel ontwikkelingsbeleid. Dit beleid omvatte de productie en vertoning 
van een bepaald soort propagandistische documentaires en ontwikkelingsfilms. Vervolgens 
vergelijk ik de films van de Nieuwe Orde met de films en documentaires die na de Nieuwe 
Orde zijn vervaardigd. Na de val van Soeharto beginnen filmmakers contrageschiedenissen te 
produceren. Documentaire verandert van een instrument van propaganda in een medium voor 
activisten die een stem willen geven aan de stemlozen. Ook staat een groep op van Islamitische 
filmmakers die zichzelf als een oppositionele en postkoloniale filmgemeenschap ziet. Deze 
groep verzet zich aan de ene kant tegen de macht over de Indonesische media van de in hun 
ogen ‘neokoloniale’ Nieuwe Orde. Aan de andere kant wil deze groep de ‘imperialistische’ 
invloed van de Verenigde Staten in de media wereldwijd pareren. Daarnaast behandel ik in 
dit deel de manier waarop geschiedenisfilms en documentaires werden verspreid onder het 
Soeharto regime als ‘film in het raamwerk van’ een bepaald evenement. Daarbij ontleed ik 
het meest extreme voorbeeld van het vertonen van de belangrijkste Indonesische propaganda 
film van het Soeharto regime ‘in het raamwerk van’ de  herdenkingsdag van de coup in 
1965 die tot het ontstaan van de Nieuwe Orde heeft geleid. Na de val van Soeharto gaat de 
praxis van het vertonen van films in een bepaald raamwerk door, al veranderen de drijfveren. 
Als voorbeeld van nieuwe frames en overwegingen om films in een bepaald raamwerk te 
vertonen analyseer ik de groei van beelden van Islam als onderdeel van de commercialisering 
van de Islamitische vastenmaand Ramadan. De Ramadan programma’s komen niet overeen 
met het idee hoe de groep van Islamitische filmmakers had gedacht Islamitische films vorm 
te gaan geven. De beelden van Islam binnen dit raamwerk hebben vooral met uiterlijkheden 
van het geloof te maken, zoals het gebruik van Moslem kleding en frases. In de ogen van veel 
Moslems vertolken de programma’s niet de religieuze waarden van de godsdienst. 
Het derde deel van dit proefschrift analyseert film narrative practices. Ik ga in op de 
roulatie van populaire genres en de compositie van verhalen binnen film genres in relatie tot 
machtsverhoudingen. De focus is gericht op horror en hoe de discoursen over formules in 
horror film inhaken op discussies over wat wel en niet vertoond kan worden in verschillende 
film en televisie formats. Het gaat hierbij onder andere om het inzetten van kyai’s (Islamitische 
geestelijk leiders) in horror films als deus-ex-machina figuren om zo de films door de censuur 
te krijgen. Ook onthullen de discussies over horror films en televisie programma’s opvattingen 
over wat wel en niet deel uitmaakt van de verbeelding van de moderne Indonesische 
samenleving. Hier gaat het om debatten over de juiste representatie van geesten, en de vraag 
of die een feitelijk onderdeel zijn van de moderne Indonesië samenleving. Zo behandel ik 
de discours over mogelijke representaties van geesten in horror films tijdens de Nieuwe 
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Orde, en de nieuwe ontwikkelingen tijdens Reformatie als er horror reality-programma’s 
worden geproduceerd die geesten ‘live’ op televisie filmen en zelfs vangen. Verder kijk ik 
naar de recente toename van beelden en protesten van Islam in de Indonesische media. Ik 
bestudeer het verbod op films en andere media uitingen uit naam van de Islam met als doel 
het moreel van de natie te bewaken. Daarmee verbonden ga ik in op discoursen in 1996 
over de voorbereiding van een nieuwe anti-pornografie wet die Indonesië onder meer zou 
beschermen tegen de, volgens sommige met name religieuze groeperingen, te vrije media. In 
deze context laat ik zien dat er een machtsstrijd wordt gevoerd tussen seculiere en religieuze 
visies op de werkelijkheid, en de moraal van de Indonesische maatschappij. Ik analyseer 
de strijd rond film censuur van de staat en de straat tussen seculiere en religieuze krachten. 
Daarbij kijk ik naar de rol van echte en imaginaire Islamitische leiders bij het bepalen van 
de grenzen van onderwerpen en verhalen in de audiovisuele media van het land. De strijd 
is bepalend voor wie en wat de nationale populaire discours vorm geeft, en vaststelt welke 
realiteiten worden erkend in de moderne Indonesische samenleving. Vooralsnog geven geld, 
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